

cal and monetary affairs. Brent Spence was down to earth, humble—the markings of a truly great servant of the people.

Brent Spence was a warm personal friend whose memory I shall always cherish as a friend and as one of the great men in the history of the House of Representatives.

### Suburban Press

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

### HON. DONALD RUMSFELD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 5, 1967

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, the growing stature and importance of the suburban press is a healthy trend in the communications field today. While some newspapers are falling and others merging, the suburban press continues to expand and to provide their readers with an increasingly fine service.

I believe the mature suburban press is

epitomized by the newspapers in the 13th Congressional District of Illinois.

At the annual editorial seminar banquet of the Suburban Press Foundation, held in Chicago on September 28, 1967, achievement awards for excellence in photography, sports writing, women's-interest writing, and feature writing, were presented to suburban newsmen. Of the five award categories, newsmen from the 13th district won honors in no fewer than four. The winners from the 13th district were:

Top award of "Suburban Journalist of the Year" was won by the writer-photographer team of Clifford H. Rowe, feature writer, and Harry Cameron, photographer, of Paddock Publications, Inc., Arlington Heights, Ill., for a feature series on air pollution in the Chicago metropolitan area entitled, "Don't Stop Breathing—Yet." The significance of this subject is known to all; I can attest to the skill with which the series was presented.

The award for best feature writing was won by Paul A. Johnson, Jr., of Hollister Newspapers, Wilmette, Ill.

Robert Strawn, of Paddock Publications, was awarded the top prize for photography.

The award for women's-interest writ-

ing was presented to Mrs. Mary B. Good, also of Paddock Publications.

In addition to the four top awards, 13th district newspaper personnel won numerous honorable mentions and other citations.

The awards banquet was a part of the Suburban Press Foundation's seventh annual 2-day editorial seminar attended by editorial staff and publishers of foundation member newspapers from coast to coast. Seminar sessions were devoted to various aspects of suburban newspaper coverage, with special emphasis on the role of the suburban newspaper in keeping its readership informed on the problems of the central city in this period of social unrest.

Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the Suburban Press Foundation for its interest and concern for the problems of the central city and for its continuing attention to stimulating civic responsibility in the suburbs.

No country can possibly move ahead, and no society can be free, unless its citizens are acquainted with all aspects of the basic problems of their communities. The suburban press is making significant contributions to an alert and informed citizenry.

## SENATE

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1967

The Senate met at 12 o'clock noon, and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O God, our Father, as we rejoice in the gift of another day, may its hours be made luminous by Thy presence, who art the light of all our seeing. In everything we are called to face may we do our best and so be worthy of our high calling.

Ungirded us with Thy might to exercise the potent ministry to all the world to which, in Thy providence, we believe Thou hast called us in this age on ages telling.

In the crises of our times join us with those, who across the waste and wilderness of human hate and need, preparing the way of the Lord, throw up a highway for our God.

As Thy servants in this temple of democracy, give us courage and strength for the vast task of social rebuilding that needs to be dared if life for all men is to be made full and free.

We ask it in that Name which is above every name. Amen.

### THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, October 5, 1967, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT— APPROVAL OF BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries, and he announced that on October 3, 1967, the President had approved and signed the following act and joint resolution:

S. 188. An act creating a commission to be known as the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography; and

S.J. Res. 109. Joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation commemorating 50 years of service to the Nation by the Langley Research Center.

### EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the nomination of L. Dean Brown, of Maryland, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Senegal, and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Gambia, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. If there be no reports of committees, the

nominations on the Executive Calendar will be stated.

### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Alfred B. Fitt, of Michigan, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

### OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Price Daniel, of Texas, to be Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

### NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Maj. Gen. Winston P. Wilson, to be Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

### U.S. NAVY

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Rear Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler to be vice admiral.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

# **NOMINATIONS PLACED ON THE SECRETARY'S DESK—AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS**

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps which had been placed on the Secretary's desk.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## **LEGISLATIVE SESSION**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

# **LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements during the transaction of routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## **COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

# **ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10:30 A.M. MONDAY**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 10:30 Monday morning next.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

# **ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR SCOTT AND SENATOR CLARK ON MONDAY**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Scott] be recognized at the conclusion of the prayer and the reading of the Journal on Monday next, for a period not to exceed 45 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that he be followed, in turn, by the other distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clark], for a period not to exceed 1 hour.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## **EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.**

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following communication and letters, which were referred as indicated:

### **PROPOSED ADDITION OF AREAS TO BE PROCLAIMED WILDERNESS AREAS**

A communication from the President of the United States, proposing that three additional areas, in California, Oregon, and Wyoming, be proclaimed wilderness areas; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

### **REPORT OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, TEST, OR RESEARCH WORK**

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of contracts negotiated for experimental, developmental, test, or research work in the interest of national defense or industrial mobilization, covering the period January-June 1967 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

### **CRATER LAKE LODGE, INC.—PROPOSED CONCESSION CONTRACT**

A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a proposed concession contract under which Crater Lake Lodge, Inc., will be authorized to continue to provide accommodations, facilities, and services for the public in Crater Lake National Park, Oreg., for a 30-year period from November 1, 1967, through October 31, 1997 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

### **REPORT PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTI-TRUST LAWS TO ASSIST IN SAFEGUARDING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS**

A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on providing exemptions from the antitrust laws to assist in safeguarding the balance of payments position of the United States (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

### **TEMPORARY ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN ALIENS**

A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of orders entered, granting temporary admission into the United States of certain aliens (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## **PETITION**

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a resolution adopted by the City Council of the City of Imperial Beach, Calif., favoring the enactment of some form of a Federal tax-sharing program, which was referred to the Committee on Finance.

## **REPORTS OF COMMITTEES**

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. MUSKIE (for Mr. RANDOLPH), from the Committee on Public Works, with amendments:

S. 1552. A bill to amend the Highway Safety Act of 1966 (Rept. No. 581).

By Mr. MORSE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

S. 768. A bill to amend the Act entitled "An Act to provide for compulsory school attendance, for the taking of a school census

in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes", approved February 4, 1925 (Rept. No. 582);

S. 770. A bill to amend the act to provide for the establishment of a public crematorium in the District of Columbia. (Rept. No. 583);

S. 1631. A bill to raise the maximum age limit of schoolchildren entitled to transportation in the District of Columbia at a reduced fare (Rept. No. 584); and

S. 2012. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Public School Food Services Act (Rept. No. 585).

By Mr. MORSE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, with an amendment:

S. 765. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Traffic Act, 1925, as amended, and the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia, as amended, so as to bring within the provisions of such act any person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a drug rendering such person incapable of operating the motor vehicle safely (Rept. No. 586);

S. 1224. A bill to establish a register of blind persons in the District of Columbia, to provide for the mandatory reporting of information concerning such persons, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 587); and

H.R. 3973. An act to amend the Healing Arts Practice Act, District of Columbia, 1928, and the act of June 6, 1892, relating to the licensing of dentists in the District of Columbia, to exempt from the licensing requirements of such acts physicians and dentists while performing services in the employ of the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 589).

By Mr. MORSE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, with amendments:

S. 318. A bill to authorize the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to establish and administer a plan to provide for the care and protection of children through public day care services, and to provide public assistance in the form of foster home care to certain dependent children (Rept. No. 588).

## **BILLS INTRODUCED**

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. ANDERSON (for himself and Mr. FULBRIGHT):

S. 2510. A bill to authorize the Smithsonian Institution to acquire lands for a museum park, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

By Mr. TALMADGE:

S. 2511. A bill to maintain and improve the income of producers of crude pine gum, to stabilize production of crude pine gum, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

(See the remarks of Mr. TALMADGE when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. METCALF:

S. 2512. A bill to provide financial assistance to candidates for President and Vice President and candidates for the Senate and House of Representatives to assist in defraying their election campaign expenses; to the Committee on Finance.

## **CRUDE PINE GUM ACT OF 1967**

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I introduce a bill today to provide a practical and workable means of meeting a serious problem in the crude pine gum industry.

More than 30,000 people, from South Carolina to Florida to Mississippi, are mainly dependent for their livelihood



on income derived from crude pine gum. These people—including workers and their families—face a crisis affecting their very survival in the areas where they have lived for generations. Moreover, about a dozen counties are threatened with the loss of at least 20 percent of their agricultural income, as a result of the possible ending of commercial pine gum production.

The problem is that the gum naval stores industry is expected to terminate output on a commercially practical level unless measures are taken to improve the net income of gum farmers. The purpose of the proposed Crude Pine Gum Act of 1967 is to provide continuing work for thousands of otherwise unemployable people and to maintain and improve net income to gum farmers in the calendar years 1968 through 1970. At the end of that period, it is expected that new practices and techniques will have improved the competitive position of the gum segment of the naval stores industry—with the result that the problem will be alleviated.

Meanwhile, this bill would provide legislative authority to help with this transition—to keep the gum industry in business while it modernizes and at the same time preserve farm jobs without impairing the competitiveness of their product from a price standpoint, and at no increased net expenditures to the Commodity Credit Corporation. I might point out that the present crisis results in part from the application to gum farming of minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1966, and the bill I am proposing would help greatly in this adjustment. It would, I believe, curb the rise in unemployment that has been reported in that area and slow or halt the migration to urban centers of gum workers who are usually not prepared for urban employment.

This bill would give the Secretary of Agriculture permissive authority to establish in each calendar year 1968 through 1970, a national crude pine gum production goal, which would be shared by each producer, then provide compliance payments to producers up to the limit of their individual shares. Payments would be restricted to producers who comply with the minimum wage law and who follow one or more good conservation practices. These compliance payments would supplement price support already available to producers under the Agricultural Act of 1949, which would be amended to provide the new authority. Price support would be within a range of 50 to 90 percent of parity. Combined payments and price support under the act would not exceed 90 percent of parity.

It is expected that the proposed program would maintain laborers—who are not trained or readily trainable for any other line of work in their areas—on the farm and slow down the migration to the already overcrowded cities. This program would counter the trend toward progressively lower net returns to producers of crude pine gum—a trend which has been apparent since 1962.

The proposed program would, we believe, stabilize the domestic production of

gum resin and of resin in the aggregate. Annual production of steam distilled wood resin is expected to decline about 20 percent between 1967 and 1970—this decline to be largely offset by increases averaging 6 percent a year in tall oil resin output. Domestic use of all types of resin is expected to continue a gradual upward trend, with exports likely to be down some as supplies decline. By 1971, domestic stocks will decline, it is expected, to about a 3-month supply—the lowest level since 1962.

Production, disappearance, and prices of turpentine, the other major naval stores products derived from the processing of crude pine gum, would be at stable levels—with stocks likely to remain within easily manageable limits. The United States would likely shift from an export to an import basis.

The proposed bill would bring relief to a small but important American industry which at present is caught in the pressure of social and technological change. Its enactment would also be of assistance to dozens of industries which make use of turpentine and resin, including paper size, synthetic rubber, adhesives, printing ink, varnish and lacquers, chewing gum, cleaners, and insecticides.

Three-fourths of the producers of naval stores are small, and they account for one-fourth of output. Large producers are 1½ percent of the total number, and they produce about 18 percent of the crop. The remaining 24 percent of all producers fall in an intermediate-size range, and they account for 58 percent of the total output.

I repeat, the purpose of this bill is to provide legislative authority which will permit improvement in farmers' income and preserve the jobs of thousands of workers who are sharply limited in other opportunities because of age or lack of education and training. At the same time, the bill would make it possible for their products to remain competitive in the marketplace.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. SPONG in the chair). The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2511) to maintain and improve the income of producers of crude pine gum, to stabilize production of crude pine gum, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. TALMADGE, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

#### SOCIAL SECURITY PENALTIES— AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 384

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I submit for appropriate referral, an amendment to H.R. 12080, the Social Security Amendments of 1967, recently transmitted to the Senate by the House of Representatives.

Each month approximately 115,000 Americans attain age 65 and become eligible for health insurance for the aged and supplemental medical insurance benefit under the Social Security Act. Nearly 90 percent of these newly turned 65-year-olds immediately enroll in both programs.

When the medicare program was initiated, the Social Security Administration made a concentrated national effort to reach every one eligible and to get them enrolled in the program.

In the case of supplemental medical insurance benefits, a voluntary program was offered to give our senior citizens additional medical coverage beyond that in the basic act. A 10-percent premium was imposed upon those who failed to enroll in the voluntary program during their initial period of eligibility, as well as on those who did enroll, but who dropped out later and then sought to again participate.

It is to this added premium or penalty provision that I address myself and offer an amendment to the act.

I wish to point out that the initial premium for this voluntary insurance was set at \$3 monthly, which the enrollee could designate to have deducted from his or her old age insurance payments.

But the act further directs the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to redetermine the amount of annual premium every 2 years, in order to maintain the required financial integrity of the insurance fund. It is my understanding that the premium has now risen to \$4 monthly.

Accordingly, those who failed to enroll during their initial period of eligibility but who desire to come in during the next general enrollment period, must now pay \$4.40 monthly.

If the cost of this insurance is like everything else in recent years, I have no reason to believe that the premiums will not continue to rise. And, as the monthly premiums go up, the 10-percent penalty continues to rise so that 4 years hence, or later, an initial enrollee might be paying \$6.60 as opposed to \$6 monthly for those who did immediately enroll.

Now this may not seem like a great sum, Mr. President, but since the premiums could continue to rise every 2 years, the 10-percent inequity would also grow. The majority of those eligible are those whose incomes are derived almost entirely from old-age benefits. When you look at 60 cents, 70 cents, 80 cents, or even a dollar a month out of an already meager budget, it becomes an appreciable sum.

Although I can understand the desire of the Social Security Administration to have had as many early enrollees as possible, I don't agree that an initial penalty should have been assessed.

There are many reasons why an eligible person might not want to join the voluntary program immediately. Many persons reach 65 years of age in excellent health. They are immediately covered without cost by the basic medicare program. Being in good health, they may feel that the monthly premium, be it \$3, \$4, \$5 or more, could be better spent—or at least not spared—from their retirement benefits immediately. Many a person may not feel the need for this supplemental insurance until he or she attains the age of 70 or more. I fail to see how the Government has suffered from their failure to enroll earlier, or how their

eligibility is in any way lessened. Accordingly, I see no reason, morally or fiscally, for the 10-percent penalty.

On the other hand, I do feel that a person who has once enrolled and drops out for whatever reason, then seeks to reenter the program, is not in the same category as the initial enrollee. This person may have taken the coverage to meet illness at the time of eligibility and then, having recovered, drops it until he becomes seriously ill again. This is playing games with the system and I have no quarrel with the penalty provisions of the act for second-time enrollees.

Accordingly, Mr. President, I now submit an amendment to H.R. 12080, to eliminate the 10-percent penalty for late initial enrollees in the supplemental medical insurance benefit titles of the act, and urge the appropriate committee to consider this corrective action.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and appropriately referred.

The amendment (No. 384) was referred to the Committee on Finance.

#### SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 385

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I submit an amendment to H.R. 12080, the Social Security Amendments of 1967, and ask that it be printed and appropriately referred.

One serious defect which has appeared under medicare is the requirement that, under the supplementary medical plan, reimbursement to the beneficiary is made only on the basis of a receipted bill. Under present law, there are two methods of payment for physicians services under the medicare insurance plan. Where the patient pays the bill, payment is made to the patient on the basis of a receipted bill. Secondly, if the physician and the patient agree, payment may be made to the physician on the basis of the patient's assignment.

It is this requirement that this payment is made to the patient only on the basis of a receipted bill which is causing great difficulty to many of the Americans that medicare was intended to benefit. I have heard of this hardship many times over from the actual cases of my constituents.

The patient has to pay the doctor first if the doctor will not take an assignment—and often the patient simply does not have the money.

This medical insurance plan was designed to assist the patient who had trouble paying his bill. Illness is often accompanied by a lack of cash. That is why we have an insurance program. But under current procedures, the patient is required to pay the bill before he can get reimbursed from the plan. In many cases, this places an unfair burden on the beneficiary.

There is no reason why the beneficiary should not be reimbursed from the plan on the basis of a simple itemized bill. Then he will have the money to pay his medical expense. This is the way commercial medical insurance plans have all worked and worked very successfully.

I am pleased that the bill now before the Finance Committee recognizes the problem that exists. The bill does provide for payment on the basis of an itemized bill. However, the administrative procedures that go along with it are most unfortunate. In solving one problem, it creates more.

Specifically, it requires that if an unpaid itemized bill is submitted by a doctor to a medicare carrier within a grace period, to be specified by the Secretary of HEW, and is for an amount which is determined to be reasonable, the payment is to be made to the doctor. Otherwise payment is to be made to the beneficiary. If the beneficiary submits an unpaid itemized bill during this grace period, the carrier may not pay the beneficiary immediately but must set up a special suspense file. The claim must be held until the grace period has expired, or alternatively, the carrier must contact the doctor to obtain assurance that the physician will not exercise his right to claim payment during the grace period.

While the carrier may notify the patient of the unavoidable delay in such a claim situation, there is no question that the patient will not be happy with the delay and in most cases will not understand the reason for it.

In Connecticut, the medicare carrier, Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., is now mailing out benefit checks on an average of 14 days after receiving a claim from a patient. It has worked hard to get this processing time down. It is doing an excellent job.

But under the proposed new procedure, all would be changed. A simple, straightforward system would be complicated. Across the country, millions of suspense files would have to be set up. Delay would be legislated into the system, after a year of striving to eliminate delay.

Millions of additional letters would flow back and forth. To what end?

There is too much redtape in the world already.

There is virtue in simplicity.

I, therefore, urge that the Senate simply eliminate the problem in the present system by changing the word "receipted" in the statute to "itemized."

This simplifies the present procedure without creating a new procedure.

It eliminates the present problem without creating new problems.

It eliminates correspondence without creating more.

It would improve the service to the elderly to the benefit of patients, doctors, and carriers alike.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed, and will be appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment (No. 385) was referred to the Committee on Finance, as follows:

Beginning on page 47 line 4, strike out all through line 14, page 48, and insert in lieu thereof:

"Sec. 125. (a) Section 1842(b)(3)(B) of

the Social Security Act is amended by striking out the word 'receipted' and inserting in lieu thereof the word 'itemized'."

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] be added as a cosponsor of the bill—S. 1286—to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to facilitate the immigration of aliens seeking to enter the United States to perform labor of a type for which there are not sufficient workers available in the United States, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF NOMINATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, as acting chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I desire to announce that today the Senate received the following nomination:

L. Dean Brown, of Maryland, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Senegal, and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Gambia, vice William R. Rivkin, deceased.

In accordance with the committee rule, this pending nomination may not be considered prior to the expiration of 6 days of its receipt in the Senate.

#### NOTICE OF CHANGE OF HEARINGS ON TAX COURT BILL (S. 2041)

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, I wish to announce a change of time of the hearing for the consideration of S. 2041.

The hearing originally scheduled for 10 a.m. on Tuesday, October 10, 1967, will now be held at 9:30 a.m. The hearing on Wednesday, October 11, will remain at 10 a.m. The hearings will be held in the District of Columbia hearing room, 6226 New Senate Office Building.

#### ACE POWELL, MONTANA'S WESTERN ARTIST

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in Montana we have, in my judgment, an artist who is a worthy successor to the great Charles Marion Russell, who, in my opinion, is the outstanding western artist in the history of the Republic. That man is Ace Powell, who was born of Norwegian parents in New Mexico but came to Montana shortly afterward.

Ace Powell has lived the life of the cowboy, as did Charlie Russell, and he knew Charlie well. Ace had the good fortune of being able to watch the great western painting master at work and, like Russell, through observation he de-



veloped a technique which merits and entitles him to be considered the old master's successor. Like Russell, also, Ace Powell has worked not only on canvas but has varied his talent to take in carving in wood and clay as well.

Ace's life has not been an easy one, but it has been most rewarding. His contributions to the State and the Nation through his talent will be his contribution to many generations through the years and decades ahead.

Ace worked many years among the Flatheads and the Blackfeet, learned the Blackfeet sign language, and is considered one of the Blackfeet Nation's great friends.

It was my good fortune to have a brief visit with Ace and his family recently in Kalispell, and I was delighted to see the dedication with which he is applying himself to his art and the fine works he is continuing to turn out.

Montana is fortunate in having an artist of the ability of Ace Powell. I am fortunate in having him as a friend.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a story on Ace by Carol Woster, of Columbia Falls, published in the Great Falls Tribune, of September 3, 1967, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ARTIST "PAINTS HIS WAY OUT"

(By Carol Woster)

Great painters belong to many different worlds. But whether life has raised them out of a Paris side street or a Montana prairie town, one thing they have in common, an eternal gnawing inside saying, "I want out! I want to be told about!"

A man stops to look at a sunset and exclaims, "How beautiful!" The colors of this sunset rage inside the artist; he analyzes its components in paint. He wants to give it; he wants to make a tangible form of it.

The great artist painter can say what Ace Powell says, "If I go out for an evening, I'm still painting a picture. My whole life is wrapped up in what I am doing." Ace Powell is the man who stands in the presence of a sunset and sees a job.

In 1912, New Mexico became a state. That same year on April 3, in Tularosa, N.M., Asa (a Norwegian name later changed to Ace) Powell was born.

His parents had met while Ace's mother was a teacher in Harlem, Mont. After the Civil War, her father had come to this town to run a trading post. She met Ace's dad, who was running a ranch for Bill Seamen a few miles out of Harlem. The couple married and moved to New Mexico.

When Ace was two years old, the family moved to Apgar, Mont. Here an interesting interweaving of events took place. Ace's dad sold horses. He knew well one of the pillars of Apgar society, Horace Brewster. Brewster is remembered locally as a top park ranger.

Others know him as Charlie Russell's former boss. The cowboy wanderings of Russell had led him to this little village lying under the shadow of Glacier Park's snowy peaks. At different periods, Russell and Ace's dad worked for the same cow outfits in Apgar.

In later years, Russell did many paintings from his Apgar home called "Bull Head Lodge."

Ace tells of this era, "Mrs. Russell used to be snowed under with tourists. I was about 12 or 13 years old and baby-sat for their stepson, Jackie." Ace watched the great western

painting master at work, too. "Most of the time," he adds, "I didn't ask him questions, I'd just observe."

Ace knew the work and years of experience necessary to be able to sit at the easel and paint. He speaks of his childhood years and says, if he was frustrated or sick, he would always turn to art to solve his problems. (A friend, Dick Flood, said many years later, "You always paint your way out of everything!").

At first, Ace was attracted to clay and wood modeling and sketching. Then his young eyes began to see the long and arduous steps to be taken in order to paint a good picture.

There was a period of learning technique and intense discipline. It had to be gone through. He did pen exercises everyday; he taught himself how to put a shape down on paper to look as though it could be touched and felt.

His mother and father encouraged him. "With my dad, I could express my opinion. I felt I had a right to disagree. My dad said, 'You can have anything you're willing to work hard enough for and learn.'"

Ace argued, "I have to go out and find what to say in my painting." His dad countered, "Sit at the easel and paint!"

When Ace was ready to go to high school, there were eight little brothers and sisters in the household. Ace took some of his belongings and went to Browning for school. He paid \$20 a month to board and attend school. He speaks with great fondness of Dr. Douglas Gold, then the superintendent of schools for the Blackfeet Reservation community. "Dr. Gold was one of the great educators in the United States," he reminisces fondly.

Then another crossing of paths took place. A stocky, well-built, dark-haired lad named Bob Scriver was in the same class.

They did not become friends right away. In fact, their friendship started slowly. One year, Powell and Scriver were assigned to illustrate the high school annual. For several days, the two worked hard on the project.

One day Ace remarked casually to Bob, "I'm going to be an artist." Bob said quickly, "I am, too!" The idea came to rest for a period, when Bob announced his ambition to his parents. They discouraged him. So Scriver went on to get a master's degree in music.

Now Scriver has his own painting, sculpture and taxidermy museum in Browning. It is famous in the state and has been nationally publicized. Ace says of his lifelong friend, "He is a great sculptor. He made an art out of taxidermy."

After high school, an experience which gave him a life-long interest and love for the Blackfeet Indians, Ace returned home. With even greater conviction, he told his parents, "I'm going to be an artist." His father replied, "You have the talent. You should be." Slight of build but strong in her ideas, his mother said quietly, "You always cast your bread up stream, Ace."

Powell, the artist, had a lot of hardship in front of him. No money for art school, either—but his beloved parents were on his side.

One thing young Ace felt certain of—they couldn't teach him to paint Montana skies at art school in Paris. He fairly burst with love of America, "I really truly love this country. I love our constitution . . . every part of America." These things he knew, but he was held back by lack of experience.

Life! Young Ace wanted to drink fully from the cup! He became a cowboy east of the divide. He broke horses and lived and worked on the reservation. He learned the Blackfeet sign language. They came to love him, as he loved them. He guided pack trips through Glacier Park and participated in one of the biggest events in Glacier history.

Ace's father and another man, Dallas Disparrow (whose father was from Sheridan, Wyo., and a saddle maker in Kalispell)

packed in great loads of dynamite for contractors opening Logan Pass. It all happened in 1930. Ace says, "That road was built by common labor and dynamite . . . only one caterpillar—not worth a damn," adding, "with the equipment at that time, it was a great piece of engineering."

Ace worked up there on a CCC camp and was in charge of feeding Blackfeet and Flathead Indians encamped in teepees on the pass. They put up cook tents and fed them great stores of beans.

From age 21 to 26, Ace was on the range. He worked for Bill Moyers out of Babb breaking horses.

When World War II came, Ace continued his pattern of different experience by working for civilian pilot training.

About this time Ace just about gave up painting portraits. And Ace will spin a yarn, explaining why. It went something like this.

On assuring the wife of a railroad section hand he was "the Ace Powell, who paints pitchers," he learned she wanted her son's portrait painted and told her it would be \$25. (His usual fee was \$150.)

The mother explained the boy was "like an angel" and asked Ace to include the child's sensitivity in the portrait. The father, on the sly, advised the artist, "I call him Butch. Get a look of the devil in 'im."

The father liked the finished portrait, but the mother said, "That isn't him, he's so sensitive."

Ace recalled, "I told her, 'If you want him to look like an angel, I'll put wings on the little devil, and we'll all be happy.' Everyone was mad. They stormed out. After a year, I dirtied up the face, titled it 'Neglected Child' and sold it to a lady, who gave it to a welfare worker in Nebraska."

"I could go from senator to skid row. I've enjoyed company on all intellectual levels." This Ace felt was necessary. He had to know all kinds of people. He spent time in several "skid" rows in Montana. "God gives us a certain amount of things we have to discipline ourselves for."

Ace Powell was talking about alcohol. "I went there (skid row)," he said. "I got a bottle. I shared it with the rest." He added, "Winos on skid row have a social discipline tougher than any on the streets."

Basic thrusts of Ace Powell's thought today, "Appeal to youth. That's how to perpetuate life." On Montana's Indian Reservations, he is a great friend as well as a great painter. He'll give canvases to an Indian youth, who has been using stretched window shades.

Indian children become wild with excitement, when he appears, always with cookies or sweets for them. Squinty-eyed Indian grandmas brighten at the sound of his name.

He'll quickly tell you what he stands for and believes in. "There's never a substitute for quality . . . don't let the price tag come ahead of the quality of your work." He hates compromise.

Ace comments, "Art doesn't necessarily have to have meaning, but it should make people think." He feels his role is to paint the west between Remington and the jet age.

Montana gave him the rich knowledge of life that he wanted. Experiences mean everything to Ace Powell; he looks forward to the moment, the day—he loves things and people.

In his little studio on a comfortable tree-lined street in Kalispell, Ace is still at his easel and painting. He has thought the long thoughts. Recently, as dusk was falling, silhouetting a tall tree outside his window, he looked out upon nature's fading colors.

With a faraway look in his blue eyes, he leaned away from his painting. "I thoroughly believe in a hereafter." He spoke slowly, "I am a little curious about death," and continued, "my last wish will be that when I die, I won't be suffering but will be able to enjoy the sensation of death, the last greatest event of my life."

# SENATOR JAVITS RECEIVES CONGRESSIONAL DISTINGUISHED SERVICE AWARD

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on September 8, my good friend, the distinguished senior Senator from New York, JACK JAVITS, was honored by the American Political Science Association. He was awarded their Congressional Distinguished Service Award Citation, one of four such awards made by this 16,000-member organization at the close of each Congress. JACK JAVITS richly deserved this award.

In determining who shall receive the award, the association takes several factors into consideration, and I should like to list four of them. They are:

Devotion to public welfare joined with a firm grasp of the skills required of a lawmaker;

High competence measured in terms of effectiveness and concrete accomplishment;

Constructive imagination, hard-headed acumen, and a capacity to formulate and advance objectives of national policy and yet be mindful of the welfare of constituents back home;

The respect of colleagues based on the day-to-day contacts that reveal the true worth of the individual.

Mr. President, in every respect JACK JAVITS meets those qualifications fully, and more.

I ask unanimous consent that the citation be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the citation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL DISTINGUISHED SERVICE AWARD  
CITATION: SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS

Uncompromising in his concern for both equal justice and equal opportunity, Jacob K. Javits is a creative spokesman for urban America.

While striving for solution of the immediate problems of his state and nation, he also anticipates future public policy needs and forcefully advocates appropriate action to meet them. As an early sponsor of expanded protection for the interests of minorities, he was instrumental in developing and mobilizing support for legislative proposals incorporated into the landmark civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965. Equally unsatisfied with second class status for cities, his amendments have shaped and broadened major legislation and programs in the fields of housing and urban renewal, labor and poverty, health care, and education. Fiery and incisive, dynamic and undismayed by the prospect of controversy, he serves as a goad to the national conscience.

The American Political Science Association takes great pleasure in presenting this Congressional Distinguished Service Award to Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York—a perceptive innovator and tenacious activist whose ideas and energy have substantially improved the quality of American life.

## TAX HIKE WILL NOT HOLD DOWN INFLATION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, it is becoming more and evident with each passing day that the administration's proposed 10-percent surtax will not stop inflation. The only possible contribution a tax increase can make to stemming inflation is by reducing excessive demand.

A tax increase will not slow inflation that results from rising costs. Quite the contrary, a tax increase under such circumstances will aggravate inflation because the tax itself becomes a cost.

For the past several months, prices have been rising. They have been rising at a wholly unacceptable inflationary 3½ percent annual rate. There is every evidence they will continue to rise at least that rapidly.

Does this situation call for a tax increase?

Absolutely not. Why not?

Because there is no evidence that prices are being pulled up by demand pressure—by a shortage of facilities or manpower to produce products that are in short supply.

There is no such shortage.

Not only do we have more than 3 million Americans seeking work and unable to find it; but we have, as well, our skilled factory workers working close to the shortest hours in 6 years.

We have new factory orders falling in July and August and, according to preliminary data, probably falling in September.

Even now, our industrial capacity is less than 85 percent utilized—far, far below the optimum.

And where have most of the price increases been recorded? In precisely those industries that are operating furthest below their capacity rate.

Auto demand has fallen off. But auto prices have been raised.

Steel demand was well below last year. But steel prices have been steadily rising.

In chemicals and elsewhere, the same story—demand off, prices up.

Now, just what does a tax increase contribute in this kind of an economic situation? As it further reduces demand, will it help keep prices down? The experience in steel, autos, chemicals indicates the answer.

By increasing costs, the tax increases will contribute to inflation; will worsen it, not lessen it.

This morning's Washington Post, in an editorial entitled "Fiscal Politics," brings up the political implications of action by Congress under present circumstances to increase taxes. This is what the Post says, in part:

Suppose, after a bitter fight, that a compromise surcharge, yielding \$6 or \$7 billion of additional revenues, is passed. And suppose, as seems entirely likely, that the imposition of the tax does not affect the uptrends of prices in any perceptible way. In that event the Administration will be open to the charge of reducing money incomes at a time when the purchasing power of the dollar is being eroded by inflation.

In other words, Mr. President, the average taxpayer is going to say: "Senator, don't do me any more favors like this: to stop inflation you increase my taxes. This takes more out of my pay check. But prices continue to go up. I should thank you for this?"

As an alternative, the Post calls on Congress to forget about the surtax. The embarrassment of doing this, as the Post says, will be eased "as it becomes more clearly apparent that the visions of excessive demand pressures conjured up by

the Council of Economic Advisers and the Treasury aren't going to be realized."

Instead, the Post calls on Congress to look toward the 1969 budget and "lay the basis for a system of national priorities that could guide it in deciding what programs ought to be expanded and which should be reduced or even abandoned."

Mr. President, without such a system of priorities, without some definition of our goals and some evaluation of the most efficient method of achieving those goals, the fiscal nightmare of 1967 will haunt this country for years to come. We will be faced by immense deficits, Federal spending that involves vast misallocation and waste of our resources.

I ask unanimous consent that the Post editorial be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### FISCAL POLITICS

With the shelving of the income tax surcharge by the Ways and Means Committee, the fiscal battle takes a new turn. It opened with salvos of heavy economic artillery: a debate—of sorts—on the Administration's contention that demand is about to outstrip productive capacity and on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints. But now trench warfare along party lines is the order of the day with each side making bayonet charges at the budget while keeping a keen eye on the upcoming elections.

The discussion of expenditure reductions isn't going to be remembered as one of the more elevated exchanges between the branches of the Government. It's a Gaston and Alphonse routine. House members, in a righteous lather over the upward trend of Federal expenditures, invite the President to trim the budget, hoping of course that the knife will come nowhere near their toes. And the President, who can hardly be expected to commit an act of self-immolation, politely suggests that the House first appropriate funds and then worry about cuts.

The skirmishing over the budget is likely to continue for a time, and in the interval some attention should be given to the higher political strategy, specifically the relationship of the fiscal battle to 1968 elections.

President Johnson, whose political generalship should never be underestimated, hinted at a strategy when he said that the failure to pass the surcharge will levy the "tax of inflation" upon the American people. That slogan, coupled with charges of fiscal irresponsibility, could be used against the Republicans in the event that the surcharge bill fails. The Republicans in turn would concentrate their fire on the size of the deficit and the refusal of the Democrats to reduce nonessential expenditures.

But the tax-of-inflation strategy could backfire. Suppose, after a bitter fight, that a compromise surcharge, yielding \$6 or \$7 billion of additional revenues, is passed. And suppose, as seems entirely likely, that the imposition of the tax does not affect the uptrend of prices in any perceptible way. In that event the Administration will be open to the charge of reducing money incomes at a time when the purchasing power of the dollar is being eroded by inflation. That double impact—higher taxes and higher prices—could have a deadly political impact, one that could not easily be countered with arguments about the future integrity of the dollar.

A safer strategy calls for abandoning the surcharge altogether. An about-face would prove embarrassing at first, but the process of extrication would be eased as it became more clearly apparent that the visions of excessive demand pressures conjured up by



the Council of Economic Advisers and the Treasury aren't going to be realized. With the surcharge permanently shelved, the House could then seriously tackle the issue of expenditure control. Hacking at the 1968 budget will accomplish nothing, not even a meaningful reduction in expenditures. The House should be looking toward the 1969 budget and laying the basis for a system of rational priorities that would guide it in deciding what programs ought to be expanded and which should be reduced or even abandoned.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS IMPORTANT TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY—CLII

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, we have heard both provocative and perceptive discussion in this Chamber recently on the proper role of the United States in the world.

I believe that whatever the judgments may be on the limitations and exercise of American influence and American action, the United States stands for something very definite in the world.

Our Declaration of Independence proclaimed certain inalienable rights—not merely for Americans, but for all men.

Abraham Lincoln later observed that there was something in the Declaration giving liberty “not alone to the people of this country, but the hope for the world for all future time.”

I reject any misreading of President Lincoln's words which would infer that we can or should impose our views upon the entire world.

But I do subscribe wholeheartedly to the belief that we, as a nation, should be faithful to the great principles and traditions expressed in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution.

As the world's most celebrated exponent of liberty and equality for all people, the United States should recognize that since we are a very substantial figure on the international stage, we, above all others, cannot be indifferent to the principles and practices which distinguish our system from others.

Ambassador Arthur Goldberg artfully expressed this position before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he said:

And I can say to you that our dedication to these ideals (of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution) is one of the great armories that a representative of the United States in the world community carries with him.

I believe further, Mr. President, that the “something” America stands for in this world is partially embodied in the Human Rights Conventions which are before the Senate.

I urge the Senate to translate our American principles of liberty and equality into legal reality by ratifying the Human Rights Conventions on Forced Labor, Freedom of Association, Genocide, Political Rights of Women, and Slavery.

#### AN INACCURATE DEDUCTION

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in the New York Times this morning, Mr. James Reston has an article in which he criticizes a proposal I made recently

that, in effort to get to the conference table, as of a certain date the United States offer to stop all air and sea action in South Vietnam as well as North Vietnam; this offer in conjunction with an additional offer by the newly elected South Vietnamese Government to negotiate with anybody, and offer amnesty to the Vietcong.

Mr. Reston criticizes the suggestion on the grounds “there is absolutely no evidence that the Communists would negotiate under threat.” This is curious, because one of the members of his office called to ask if my proposal was to be considered a threat, and I told him, as I did other newsmen, that it was in no way to be so considered.

Over a long period Mr. Reston has consistently advocated unconditional cessation of the bombing, presumably in the belief that such action would bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table. Only today, on the same page as his column, the last sentence of the lead editorial states:

Surely the strategic moment has now arrived to try the one gesture—unconditional cessation of bombing—that might bring negotiations.

Perhaps a cessation would bring negotiations. Perhaps it would not; but in any case it is important to consider that every military person, and every civilian with whom I talked in the Vietnamese theater, believes such a cessation would result in more American casualties in South Vietnam.

I was in Vietnam during the 37-day cessation of 1965-66, and convinced myself at that time that this was true; and much testimony from many people before the Senate verifies that fact.

Perhaps most convincing, there are a number of actual photographs of Communist supply efforts by water from Haiphong to the DMZ area which took place during the 4-day cessation of bombing over the Tet holiday. These photographs would seem to justify testimony from some of those who were there that the chief reason for the heavy marine casualties which occurred shortly thereafter resulted from this cessation.

Bearing in mind these photographs and that testimony, I suggested something new in the way of this overall cease-fire, in the hope that such a cease-fire would offer more chance of reaching meaningful negotiations.

Mr. Reston states the Communists “have insisted from the beginning that the bombing must be stopped unconditionally.” But he does not add that they have also insisted—

The U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and cancel its “military alliance” with South Vietnam.

Mr. Reston says:

And the people who feel uneasy with a limited war would have a neat and simple formula: no nonsense, no more ambiguity; either peace or war to the death.

If there is any implication that this was my thinking, he could not be more mistaken. As presented to the Senate since a year ago last spring, it is my conviction the United States is overextend-

ed, politically, militarily, and economically; and this conviction was reinforced on my recent trip, primarily because of new conditions developing in the western Mediterranean as well as the eastern Mediterranean.

This Nation has had large armies of occupation in various foreign countries for many years, in one case hundreds of thousands of men for over a quarter of a century. I do not believe, and have long so stated, that our economy can continue to support present political and military policies and commitments over an extended additional period.

Accordingly, in effort to arrive at negotiations, if the President went further than agreeing to another cessation of bombing over North Vietnam by means of this proposed cease-fire, and that too was rejected by the North Vietnamese, then I believe the decision as to what to do next should be up to this Government; and based on world conditions, that decision by no means should be strictly limited to an escalation of the war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD my original statement and the article by Mr. Reston.

There being no objection, the statement and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### A PROPOSAL LOOKING TOWARD PEACE IN VIETNAM

(Statement by Senator STUART SYMINGTON, October 3, 1967)

I have just returned from a trip to the Far East, Middle East and Europe, visiting Japan, Hong Kong, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Israel, Greece, Italy and Great Britain.

A report of findings and conclusions will be made shortly to the Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. In the meantime, however, one can only view with increased apprehension the nature and extent of the current worldwide commitments of the United States.

In Vietnam the pot has boiled over. In other countries where we have binding commitments, however, the water also is becoming very warm indeed.

In this connection, one notes the strange paradox of the brilliant military victory recently achieved by Israel against sophisticated Soviet weaponry nevertheless resulting in a much improved Soviet position in the Middle East; because both the United Arab Republic and Syria are now so weak militarily they can only hope to be rearmed by the Soviet on the latter's terms (said rearmament is proceeding rapidly, to the point where 70% of their air equipment losses have now been replaced).

The Soviet position is also improving steadily in the Western Mediterranean. Today Algeria is probably the strongest Arab country in their orbit; and if there is any truth in the rumor that General de Gaulle plans to turn over to Algeria the great naval base of Mers el Kebir, the Soviets will obtain further significant leverage in that part of the Mediterranean.

Such a development would, in effect, turn the southern flank of SHAPE; and the original concept of NATO, already heavily damaged in the center by the withdrawal of France, would be weakened still further.

The resources of any country, even those of the United States, are not inexhaustible; and therefore these developments in the Middle East and Europe should also be considered as we in turn consider future policies incident to Vietnam.

I have presented for many months my con-

viction that the United States is overcommitted and over-extended. We need a great deal of money to handle all these commitments along with our growing problems at home, and we do not want to jeopardize the integrity of the dollar.

In addition, and most important, is the matter of American lives. In this latter connection, the campaign here to cease air attacks against North Vietnam is receiving full attention in the other countries. But all civilian and military people abroad with whom I discussed this matter warn that another cessation of the raids against North Vietnam would guarantee additional casualties in South Vietnam (13,500 Americans have already been killed, 85,000 wounded).

Instead of only another cessation in the air attacks against North Vietnam, therefore, I propose that this Government announce, as of a certain date, the cessation of all military action in South Vietnam as well as over North Vietnam; also announce that there will be no reinforcements into the theater.

The Government would announce that these policies were being undertaken in earnest hope that their adoption would result in prompt and meaningful negotiations in the interest of a just peace.

At the same time the United States should also announce that, if after this cessation of all military action in South Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong nevertheless continued hostilities, then the United States would feel free to pursue this war in any manner of its own choosing.

It would appear that the political objectives of the United States have now been achieved through the creation, by means of free elections of the present Saigon Government; and the military objectives of this Government have never included the invasion of North Vietnam, or the occupation of Hanoi, or the taking over of the Government of North Vietnam.

Concurrently with the above proposed announcement of United States policy, the Government of South Vietnam should announce its willingness to negotiate with anybody, and offer amnesty to members of the Viet Cong.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 6, 1967]  
WASHINGTON: DIRKSEN'S DEFENSE OF JOHNSON  
(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, October 5.—The Senate has finally had a serious debate on Vietnam, but in the process it has produced two ideas which could actually make the situation there even worse than it is now.

The first is the Symington idea of a cease-fire coupled with a threat. The Missouri Senator proposes that we stop all military activity, including all reinforcements in both North and South Vietnam on a certain date and announce that if the enemy continues the hostilities, the United States will then "feel free to pursue this war in any manner of its own choosing."

#### SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE

This seems to give something to all the contending factions in the current controversy. The doves would get their cease-fire. If the enemy did not stop fighting, then the implication is that the hawks would be liberated to hit any targets they liked anywhere in North Vietnam. And the people who feel uneasy with a limited war, would have a neat and simple formula: no nonsense, no more ambiguity; either peace or war to the death.

The trouble with this is that there is absolutely no evidence that the Communists would negotiate under threat. On the contrary, they have insisted from the beginning that the bombing must be stopped unconditionally. Accordingly, about the only sure thing in this, other than a rejection from the Communists, would be increased pressure

here at home for a more savage war if the cease-fire didn't lead to the kind of peace we want.

The second idea that came out of the debate was Senator Dirksen's definition of why the United States is fighting in Vietnam. Not only because we are treaty-bound to do so, he said: not only to keep the Communists from imposing their political will on South Vietnam by force; not only in defense of the principle of self-determination, but because the strategic line from Korea through Vietnam is essential to the security of the United States.

"I do not want to see that line broken," Senator Dirksen kept repeating in a colloquy with Senator Fulbright, "so that all of the rest of Southeast Asia is exposed, because if it is, then the whole Pacific coastline of this country will be exposed."

#### PRINCIPLES OR BASES?

Now this is a critical point, for this is what the Communists have always feared: that the United States is fighting there to maintain a strategic stronghold close to the China frontier. It was to remove this fear that the Johnson Administration has emphasized that it wants no bases in Vietnam, and is willing to abide by the will of the people there, even if they decide freely to form a Communist government.

This has been said by the Johnson Administration time and again, both here and at the United Nations, for it was recognized by the President that the Communists would probably never agree to a compromise that left the United States either with bases or a strong military ally in South Vietnam.

Mr. Dirksen, however, has now confused this issue again and given support to the very thing the Communists fear the most. He is not, of course, a spokesman for the President, but ironically and in actual fact he is closer to the President on this issue than the President's own majority leader in the Senate.

Senator Fulbright asked Senator Dirksen: "Do I then understand that the Senator believes a permanent base there is necessary for our security?" Senator Dirksen replied: "No. I think that after stability is restored at long last, they [the South Vietnamese] can set up their own military requirements in order to meet this threat."

To most military experts here, however, this is really a formula for an endless U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. For nobody can foresee the day when any of the South Vietnamese leaders now on the scene can "restore" stability.

#### IT'S NOT EASY

It is not easy to make things in Vietnam worse than they now are, but it is certainly possible. Symington would gamble both on a one-way cease-fire and, if it didn't work, on a bigger and riskier war. Dirksen would fight on for a "strategic line" running through Saigon until stability is restored and South Vietnam can defend itself, which is likely to be a very long time indeed.

There is no doubt that Dirksen felt the criticism of the President was going too far and wanted to help him, but, ironically, he may very well have done the opposite. For he has raised fundamental doubts again about the nation's war aims in Vietnam; and so long as there is the least suspicion in Hanoi that the United States is trying to retain a powerful base or ally in that peninsula, the President's chances of a negotiated settlement are not likely to be very good.

#### VIETNAM

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, several days ago I received a letter in which I was asked two questions. One question was: "Do you have any suggestions of ways and means of bringing the war in

Vietnam to a quicker and successful end?" The second question was: "If your suggestions are carried into effect, when do you anticipate the war would be ended?"

Mr. President, I threw the letter in the wastepaper basket. Then, upon reflection, I took it out, and I dictated an answer. At this time I wish to recite to Senators my answer to those questions.

Yes, I have a suggestion about ways and means that can be adopted to bring the war to a quicker and a successful end. That suggestion is that we stop labeling the United States: One, as the aggressor in the war in South Vietnam; two, as the maker of South Vietnam of a nation of brothels; three, as demandant of unconditional surrender, making it impossible for Ho Chi Minh to go to the negotiating table; four, as the user of a planned and designed method of committing atrocities, cruel and indefensible, among the innocent men, women, and children of South Vietnam; five, as seeking to impose colonial domination upon South Vietnam with a view of exploiting their mineral and human resources; six, as being unwilling to negotiate.

Mr. President, that course would be most constructive in bringing that war to an end.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, Ho Chi Minh will never go to the negotiating table as long as we, and in many instances on the floor of the Senate, heap upon the United States the libel, the slander, and the abuses to which we have subjected our country. Ho Chi Minh is definitely of the belief that we are so divided that we do not possess the will to maintain our honor. He is of the belief that if he waits until the election of 1968, the present President will be repudiated and the Communists of North Vietnam will thus win by default.

How long can a nation endure if its leading citizens unjustly and falsely condemn that nation as being the perpetrator of the wrongs which I have just described?

I mentioned six condemnations. I did not mention a seventh, but I shall now.

The seventh point of condemnation was that in South Vietnam the United States dressed some of its personnel in the uniform of the Communist Vietcong, and then had these boys commit rape upon the women of South Vietnam and death upon public officials, solely for the purpose of putting the blame on the Vietcong.

If I were Ho Chi Minh, when he heard that statement made by a distinguished official of the United States, I would have used it—and Ho Chi Minh did—by circulating it all throughout South Vietnam as to what America is doing in violating every conceivable moral concept of decency.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Ohio has expired.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 additional minutes.



The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. President, Ho Chi Minh will wait. He believes that we are so divided that we cannot succeed in the war. On that basis I think he is right.

About 8 weeks ago, I proposed another pause in the bombing. I did so having in mind that on five previous occasions we had done so, begging the Communist leader to come to the negotiating table. On each occasion he viciously and inconsiderately rejected our proposals.

Senators might ask, Why did I propose a cessation of the bombing? In effect, I said what the Senator from Missouri said a moment ago: to cease the bombing without any conditions and then wait to see if Ho Chi Minh was telling the truth when he said that the stopping of the bombing would be a vehicle which would bring him to the negotiating table. I want to reconfirm the statement of the Senator from Missouri that Ho Chi Minh, in his proposal for peace, said:

Quit bombing the North. Pull your troops out of South Vietnam and recognize that the National Liberation Front's program must be adopted as the existing and proper government of South Vietnam.

I proposed the pause in the bombing, knowing the danger attendant thereon, but I wanted another demonstration to the Senate and to the people of the United States that all that Ho Chi Minh has been saying has been untrue all along. I suggested the pause in the bombing solely to demonstrate to those who contend that we do not want to negotiate, that they are not properly informed.

In other words, I hoped that their tongues would be tied so as to prevent them from saying in the future that the United States is not doing everything reasonable and available to enable it to go to the negotiating table.

I regret, Mr. President, that I have been driven to make these remarks today, but had I not made them, I would not feel at ease with myself.

Within the next few days, a meeting will be held in the caucus room of the Capitol in which it will again be asserted that we are not doing the best we can to get to the negotiating table.

Mr. President, I think we have leaned over backward to get to the negotiating table. I feel that for the purpose of solidifying the thinking of our people, and for the purpose of tying the tongues of those who are slandering and libeling the United States, a pause in the bombing should again be instituted.

It is my country. Let me repeat the oft-used words: right or wrong, it is my country. But on this great issue, it is right. It is not wrong.

With respect to President Johnson, although I have disagreed with him many times, if he has played politics, the best way to play politics now would seemingly be to abandon honor and surrender to Ho Chi Minh; but the President refuses to do so.

I suggest that the war can be brought to a successful and quicker end by a halt and stoppage of the vilification that unjustly and indefensibly is being heaped by our own civil leaders upon our country.

## THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, in the Wall Street Journal for October 2, 1967, there is published an editorial entitled "Which Comes First?"

The editorial takes exception to the expanded expenditures now being approved by the Senate. In particular it suggests that the Senate could slow down the \$142 million expenditure for the supersonic transport. It also calls attention to the fact that the Senate voted for seven times as much for certain safety measures as President Johnson requested.

Yesterday, the Senate rejected efforts to curtail these expenditures, as referred to in the editorial.

I agree with the editorial, which states, in part:

This performance lent at least some support to the President's argument that his suggestions for spending cuts should await completion of action on the appropriations bills. It would do no good for him to propose reduction in a few items if Congress then proceeded to inflate everything else.

Mr. President, I concur completely that cutting these expenditures is the responsibility of Congress.

I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### WHICH COMES FIRST?

President Johnson has let it be known that he's all for cuts in Federal spending. But before he urges any specific reductions, he wants to see what Congress does with pending appropriations bills.

Many Congressmen claim they are enthused about trimming outlays, too. But they want to stand back while the White House wields the knife.

The result of this Alphonse-Gaston colloquy, of course, is that spending proceeds merrily upward, putting still more inflationary pressures on the economy. So it's worth asking where the responsibility really rests.

Congress, it seems to us, has the ultimate responsibility, since it has the final say-so. As the House underlined last week by delaying an appropriations bill, the Administration can't spend a nickel until Congress provides it.

Rep. George Mahon, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, put it very well. Arguing against passing the buck to the President, he said "this would be a confession to the American people of our inability in Congress to discharge our responsibility." It would "make Congress appear to be hopelessly bogged down and incompetent."

As Mr. Mahon was calling on Congress to assert itself on economy, some of his colleagues on the other side of the Capitol appeared to be rushing rapidly in the opposite direction. In the Senate Appropriations Committee, at any rate, thrift was anything but the order of the day.

One item up for consideration, for example, was \$142 million more for the supersonic transport. The SST will be a considerable technological achievement, but it's hard to see, in the current fiscal crisis, that the project's present swift pace is essential. The Senators, though, were in no mood for waiting; they overwhelmingly okayed the full appropriation.

That was far from all. At the same sitting the Senate panel doubled the amount that the House had approved for highway-safety grants to the states. And they voted more than seven times as much for air safety as

President Johnson had requested only a few days earlier.

This performance lent at least some support to the President's argument that his suggestions for spending cuts should await completion of action on the appropriations bills. It would do no good for him to propose reductions in a few items if Congress then proceeded to inflate everything else.

If, however, the upward rush of Federal outlays is ever to be stopped or even slowed, the Administration must assume the primary responsibility.

In this nation's fiscal scheme of things, only the Administration ever is able to consider the vast Federal edifice in its entirety. Appropriations bills go to Congress piecemeal, so that even the hardest-working lawmakers are unlikely ever to see the complete picture.

Increasingly it is the Administration that originates major spending programs, that effectively decides the direction of Federal outlays, if not always their specifics. More often than not, the changes that Congress does make are calculated only to speed spending more swiftly upward.

Both Congress and the Administration might stand a better chance of living up to their respective responsibilities if the financial mechanics of the Government were in somewhat sounder shape. Accounting practices of various agencies still vary so wildly that accurate analysis becomes almost impossible.

It's high time, too, to end all the fiddling with different forms of budgets; the idea usually has been to favor the one that seemed to show the Government in the most favorable fiscal light. Things are so obviously out of hand now that the Administration might as well make a clean breast of it by settling on something close to the cash budget, which includes all Federal transactions with the public.

In any reform effort, even the finest of financial methods will of course provide only a way, not the will. And the will must come, if it ever does, not just from Congress or the Administration but from both.

## THE JET AGE CRISIS

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, man has had to face the constant challenge of keeping up with modern technology, particularly in the area of transportation. This new transportation technology is evidenced clearly today by the development of advanced and improved means of air travel. But because of these bigger and faster planes, commercial aviation is today being overwhelmed by expanding traffic, safety and noise problems. The so-called jet age is bringing with it a challenging crisis which, if not met, could well jeopardize the public interest.

From the beginning of commercial air travel, airlines have had a growth rate unprecedented in the history of American business. The airlines served over 110 million people last year—an increase exceeding 474 percent over 1950. It is estimated that they will double their traffic by 1971 and triple it by 1975. Within this very decade, air passenger traffic will reach the 454 million level.

To provide for this phenomenal growth, the airlines industry has increased its investment in aircraft from \$3 billion in 1960 to almost \$9 billion in 1966. By 1975, the industry will spend some \$18 billion for new equipment and facilities.

New planes are being developed to fly more passengers at faster speeds. Boeing's 747 will be capable of handling 500 people, and Lockheed is presently work-

ing on plans for an 800-passenger aircraft. The much publicized SST, a project approved yesterday by the Senate, will have a capacity of 250 passengers but it will carry them at speeds around 2,000 miles per hour, over three times the present speed of commercial aircraft.

Today, the airlines operate approximately 2,000 aircraft and this fleet is expected to grow to around 3,500 aircraft by 1977. But this is not the entire picture. By 1977, the Federal Aviation Administration expects a doubling in the general aviation fleet to a level around 180,000, of which 8,000 will be business jets.

This growth has had, and continues to have, a bolstering and healthy effect on the Nation's economy. And yet, growth also multiplies the problems. It increases the probability of accidents, heightens the threat of mass congestion, increases the discomfort of noise, and presents a thousand other complex problems relating to the jet age.

On July 19 of this year, a tragic air crash over Hendersonville, N.C., killed 82 people, including newly-designated Secretary of the Navy John T. McNaughton. A small, private plane crashed into a Piedmont Airlines jet shortly after its takeoff. The real tragedy of this crash is that it could have been avoided. News reports place the small private plane off course, and the Asheville airport did not have the radar facilities by which the small aircraft could have been warned and the accident possibly prevented.

I find it alarming to learn that of the 547 airports used by the public in airline service, only 234 have control towers and 105 have radar surveillance of the traffic arriving into and departing from the airport. In my own State of California, I am shocked to learn that the following cities are without tower service: El Centro, Marysville, Merced, Redding, Santa Maria, and Visalia. Equally disturbing is the fact that the following California cities have no radar service at their airports: Bakersfield, El Centro, Modesto, Palm Springs, Santa Barbara, Santa Rosa, and Stockton.

With air traffic increasing almost daily, our air corridors are increasingly becoming crowded and the danger of mid-air collisions are mounting daily. No airport having airline passenger service can afford the risk of being without a control tower and radar. The costs for providing these services may be considerable; but I suggest that they may be undertaken in a well-planned and responsible manner within a reasonable time period. Certainly, the protection of human life must require no less.

The 14 mid-air collisions of 1963 did not involve one commercial air carrier. Last year, there was a total of 25 such collisions. In 1967, we have witnessed already 14 mid-air collisions and three of them—including the one in which Secretary-designate McNaughton so tragically lost his life—involved commercial air carriers. These distressing figures will, in all likelihood, exceed those of last year.

It is time that through our forward-looking air technology, we are developing more efficient and sophisticated aircraft.

But with the bigger jumbo jets such as the 747's and SST's, will come higher speeds, greater loads, and very significant increases in passengers per aircraft. The dark shadow of disaster, particularly with so many lives at stake, will follow closely every plane into the air.

The complex problems of air safety do not lend themselves to simple answers. Greater strides must be made in aviation safety, in the air and on the ground, for both commercial and general aviation. I understand that a number of major corporations are engaged in the research and development of a collision avoidance system. It will be 5 years, however, before it can be put to general use, and will cost somewhere around \$50,000. The device promises to be a great boon toward safe flying and will reduce accidents significantly. The price range, however, will make it prohibitive for smaller aircraft, the planes which make up the great bulk of increased air traffic. Cheaper devices must be sought if an effective collision avoidance system is to be achieved.

"Alpha-numeric" systems are being planned for installation at many major airports. These systems would identify the plane and the altitude at which it was flying; it would thus be easier to insure that no two planes were flying on the same level or too close to each other. The Air Transport Association, however, estimates that only one-third of the major airports will be ready to install these by 1970.

Too often, those directly involved in aviation think only in terms of sophisticated and expensive devices as solutions to the problems of air safety. There are two areas wherein, from both a cost and engineering standpoint, improvement can be made at reasonable cost. The first is a more expeditious system of clearing the runways and taxiways in order to avoid delaying aircraft landings and the second is a more realistic solution to the air traffic congestion existing at major air terminals now. I will touch on each of these subsequently.

Other safety devices must also be researched and developed. Planes should be made more "crashworthy," escape systems can be improved, more sensitive smoke- and fire-detection equipment installed.

The bitter tragedy of a midair explosion wherein lightning is believed to have been involved, has led to action by the FAA in spelling out an explosion suppression device for our air carriers. After years of research and testing, the majority of which was funded by the manufacturers and two of our air carriers—Pan American and TWA—the equipment is available. In fact, it has already been installed on the aircraft of TWA. The research on emulsified fuels offers a hopeful solution to the problem of neutralizing fuels in the event of a crash.

Automation wherever it will increase efficiency also should be put into effect. Pilot training programs can be more thorough and uniform for more effective regulation. The Federal Government should conduct and support further research on weather and terrain conditions. This information should be accurate and be kept up to date. Private

industry has played an important role in studying and developing invaluable safety devices. Surely, Government must continue to help and encourage these endeavors.

Today, airlines are the most heavily used form of transportation: 59 percent of all intercity traffic is now done by flying, and this is more than both the railways and buses combined. By 1970, airlines may very well be flying 100 billion revenue passenger-miles. The great expansion in all forms of air traffic—freight, passenger, and general aviation—has been terrific and this has put a severe strain on facilities now existing. Air traffic has been growing at a rate much faster than the systems capable of accommodating it. Most of our airports already are strained beyond their peak capacity. Within the next decade, expansion will be at a rate far more rapid than the last and the concomitant problems will increase exponentially.

Many aviation experts charge that we are in the midst of an airport crisis whose ramifications will be dire indeed—a crisis which did not have to happen because we have the technology and resources which could have averted it. Already congestion and delays have reached proportions that are intolerable. Much of this has been the result of poor planning.

On the access highways to the airports, in the parking lots, at the ticket windows and baggage counters, on the runways, in the skyways—everywhere we turn, we see and experience gigantic traffic jams. There is hardly a commercial airliner in the country that does not get delayed at least once a day at an airport.

According to figures supplied by the FAA, delays in 1965 amounted to 130,000 hours. The cost of delays at 23 major airports—including Los Angeles and San Francisco—to the airlines was about \$28 million. This cost is figured mostly in terms of extra crew time and increased fuel consumption. It does not include the ill will engendered by the long waiting periods and the anger caused by missed appointments. There were some 7 million man-hours of passenger delay last year. My distinguished colleague and friend Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON, of Washington, has estimated that this would be some \$50 million worth of productive earning time which was not performed last year.

A recent study of delays on the ground subsequent to landing or prior to takeoff indicated that on the San Francisco International Airport alone:

The existing facilities of the San Francisco International Airport are nearing the saturation point and are inadequate to accommodate the forecast growth of future aeronautical activities.

These delays cost air carriers over \$700,000 in a 1-year period. A system to facilitate and improve the ground control of aircraft and the hardware to implement it is now available. A high FAA official has stated:

FAA is most interested in establishing an airport ground guidance and control capability at major high-density airports. However, we are not at the present time in a position to fund such installations.

The jumbo jets will tend further to add to the problem. Deplaning and em-



planing of these aircraft, arriving and departing within minutes of each other, will cause overwhelming delays and congestion.

Twenty-three major hub airports are now reaching the complete saturation point. A short-range solution would be to increase the capacity of existing airports by constructing new runways and extending old ones wherever feasible.

There is no doubt that the need for more airports is great, everyone wants more airports, but because of extreme noise, increased traffic, and other nuisances, they want it in other people's neighborhoods. Too often in the past, airports have been badly conceived, poorly planned, and inconveniently situated. There is no doubt that entirely new facilities are needed but more concern should be given to the surrounding areas in such planning.

Terminal and runway congestion can be relieved somewhat by removing general aviation from commercial terminals. This can be accomplished by developing a system of satellite airports around the city. Such a system would also reduce the hazards of any collisions between smaller aircraft and commercial aircraft. At a recent aviation gathering, Mr. Sherman Fairchild, an eminent figure in the aviation manufacturing community, cited the requirement for forward thinking in this problem of developing an adequate system of satellite airports. He referred specifically to STOL—short takeoff/landing aircraft—as one of the effective answers to this problem and these aircraft are presently available. He stated in part:

A large segment of traffic can conceivably be moved from existing runways to operate at the same airport but in short and vertical take-off modes thus alleviating to some extent runway and "stack" congestion.

I think that it is very easy to see that, so long as there is congestion, the airports will not be able to handle the larger planes because they simply will not have the facilities for it. The significance of this to the manufacturers will be that they will not be able to sell as many aircraft as would otherwise be the case. To the airlines, minimal delays are a necessity if they are to reduce costs and insure a reasonable return on their investment.

An important aspect of the aviation-airport problem which effective planning must take into account is aircraft noise. According to a report made public on August 3, 1967, by the Office of Science and Technology, sonic booms do not seem to be harmful. Nevertheless, the report indicates that people find sonic booms very difficult to get used to. They remain a great annoyance to those living around and nearby airports.

The aircraft industry, along with NASA, is now developing a quieter jet engine. But I doubt whether this is enough. Consider the increase in air traffic, the great changeovers from props to jets, and the development of SST and jumbo jets—all of this will still mean greater noise despite the reductions which would be brought about by quieter jet engines. We must push for better flight procedures and more careful airport planning.

I have been informed that there are

now studies underway on how to cope with the noise problem around Los Angeles, O'Hare, and Kennedy International Airports. These studies are expected to result in proposals by the FAA and HUD. I look forward to these proposals in the hope that we can alleviate some of the annoyances.

I was pleased to see that the Los Angeles Department of Airports is proceeding with a pilot program to soundproof homes near the Los Angeles International Airport. This is the type of program which may reap a significant approach to the noise problem.

With the extensive economic burdens facing the Nation this year, money, of course, remains a substantial problem. The FAA estimates that as much as \$3 billion is needed for airport construction by 1971 and \$6 billion by 1975. Our present level of funding only provides for \$70 million per year under the Federal aid to airports program, and this would seem hopelessly short of coping with the problem. For these reasons, I was most pleased by the recent actions of the President and the Senate. The President recently called for a comprehensive Government plan to expand and improve the Nation's air traffic control system that would cost over \$5 billion. Only yesterday, the Senate approved over \$618 million for air traffic management and facilities. These certainly are steps in the right direction.

But money is not the only problem. There is also the challenge of proper planning. I regard it as being unfortunate that there is no planning on a national level for the entire aviation system. This can be traced largely to the fact the Nation's public airports, with very few exceptions, are under private or municipal control. In effect, this means a different program for each airport. Because of an inability to anticipate problems, many airports find it impossible to develop along with the jet age. The result has been, and is, that many airports are outdated in this era. We need a policy for the entire Nation, coordinated on a national level. The planning must be comprehensive and forward looking, and it must deal with the entire airport system.

Problems of aircraft and passenger safety, traffic, congestions, delays, noise, runway and terminal development, automation, and other aviation-related problems are all becoming more acute. We can effectively cope with these problems if business and Government coordinate their efforts in responsible, imaginative, and creative planning. If this coordination can be achieved, then America will be prepared to accept the challenge of the jet age.

Mr. President, I hold a letter from a very able American, and a very good friend of mine, Joseph D. Caldara, major general, U.S. Air Force, retired, who is now the president of Flight Safety Foundation, Inc. He sent me an article published in the New York Times under date of September 17, 1967, entitled "FAA Is Pressing for More Funds in Safety Drive," written by Evert Clark. I believe his letter and this article are relevant to the points I have attempted to make in my address.

I ask unanimous consent to have the letter and the article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FSF FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION, INC.,

New York, N.Y., September 18, 1967.

HON. THOMAS H. KUCHEL,  
Senate Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR TOM: An extremely interesting account in today's New York Times on air safety and the problems the FAA is having in funding it touches on a most critical subject. The opening sentence, "The Federal Aviation Administration, fearing it cannot keep pace with air travel growth is fighting the White House for more air safety funds," is the reason for this letter.

Over the years I have seen, sometimes to my horror, vital decisions affecting the safety of flight deferred until after an accident or, worse yet, after a series of accidents. Such decisions based on emotion rather than analytical fact generally fall far short of providing the necessary or even a realistic solution.

The recent mid-air collisions, the inexcusable delays that are costly in both time and money, and the already sorely lacking traffic control capability, as attested by our constant communications within the industry, point the way to additional disasters unless positive action is taken now.

The article also stated, "Only if top Administration officials become convinced that air safety might develop into a troublesome political issue are they believed likely to approve the supplemental request for funds for the fiscal year . . . to be about \$100-million." In addition to the political issue of a failure in air safety to the economic aspect of one accident can easily exceed the \$100-million requested.

While I am sending a letter similar to this to the President, I am taking the liberty of calling the very real and present danger of potential disaster in the air to the attention of each member of The Congress. As a professional in the discipline of air safety—and all we are really talking about is efficient flight—I urge you and all the members of The Congress to take the action necessary to provide this vital funding for this all-important effort.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH D. CALDARA,  
Major General, USAF (Retired).

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION IS PRESSING FOR MORE FUNDS IN SAFETY DRIVE—PLEADS FOR WHITE HOUSE AID TO ADD TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, TOWERS AND EQUIPMENT

(By Evert Clark)

WASHINGTON, September 17.—The Federal Aviation Administration, fearing it cannot keep pace with air travel growth, is fighting the White House for more air safety funds.

To date the White House and the Budget Bureau have resisted the pressure. The agency's greatest need is for more air traffic controllers, but it also wants more money for control towers and electronic equipment.

Only if top Administration officials become convinced that air safety might develop into a troublesome political issue are they believed likely to approve the supplemental request for funds for the fiscal year 1968. The amount involved is said to be about \$100-million.

If a denial of the request were to be followed by a major accident involving air traffic control, the safety issue could be catapulted into a political controversy.

Congress, concerned about two midair collisions this year involving airlines, has recently shown considerable interest in air safety problems.

## FATAL ACCIDENTS CONTINUE

There were 10 fatal airline accidents in the first eight months of this year. The annual average for the last five years was 12. Crashes this year have taken 217 lives, compared with a five-year average of 293.

The F.A.A.'s regular budget request for the fiscal year 1968, which has passed the House but not the Senate, is the first in four years that would permit the recruiting of new controllers in any volume.

Even then the \$811-million requested would add only 648 controllers and 121 maintenance men to the 14,000 controllers and maintenance men who now run the traffic centers and the control towers.

But David D. Thomas, deputy administrator, indicated that this increase was only about one-third of what was really needed. The deficiency, he said, would be made up, as it has been in the last few years, by asking each controller to work harder.

"The way air traffic is growing now, with the budget now before you, if each air traffic controller did exactly the same amount of work that he is doing this year, it would take 1,500 more positions than you have in the budget just to keep up with the traffic," Mr. Thomas said.

"We are actually expecting him to do 8 to 10 per cent more work next year, with the equipment we are furnishing him and the improvement we are making in the traffic control system."

He explained that the productivity of the air traffic control system—that is, the number of take-offs, landings and overflights it can handle—had already been increased by 178 per cent of what it was in 1963, without the hiring of any appreciable number of new controllers.

In other words the system has been able to handle far more traffic, partly because electronic aids have improved but chiefly because individual controllers now deal with many more planes on a radar scope at one time than they ever have before.

Agency officials told Congress last May of their "urgent" air traffic problems and said that they might return to ask for more money if conditions worsened and the Administration approved such a request.

Gen. William F. McKee, the agency's chief, testified that F.A.A. traffic forecasts prepared only a few months before had already been exceeded.

"I am concerned about the number of personnel, particularly in our air traffic control system," he said.

Since he testified, the House has acted on the budget request. It did not cut money for controllers, but it did make cuts that would force the agency to defer 12 new control towers and six new radar installations.

These improvements were planned before the current budget was submitted. The budget does not include any new money for further tower or radar installations.

Typifying the Administration's budgetary problems, the Budget Bureau cut \$70.2-million from the agency's proposed 1968 request before the request went to Capitol Hill.

It would have cut more, but General McKee made a strong plea to the President and the budget director that he have at least a handful of new controllers.

The agency is now in the position of having to ask the Budget Bureau and the President for still more money just to keep pace with traffic growth.

It does not pretend that the supplemental request would permit it to go ahead of the problem.

# SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCELERATING TECHNOLOGY—ADDRESS BY SENATOR BAKER

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, in a recent address before the Association for

Computing Machinery, the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BAKER] spoke of "the upcoming sociotechnological revolution."

Already the changes which science and man's inventiveness are making in our living environment and in our institutions pose a threat to some of the most basic values of our society.

At the same time, we know that technology, if made to serve the long-term best interests of mankind, can enhance the quality of life and the prospects of achievement for each and all of us.

I happen to know that the Senator from Tennessee has informed himself thoroughly on the societal implications of accelerating technology. I hope that other Senators will give thoughtful attention to what he had to say to the Association of Computing Machinery, for his remarks have a special meaning to us as legislators. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Senator BAKER's address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TEXT OF ADDRESS BY SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENNESSEE, BEFORE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, AUGUST 30, 1967, WASHINGTON, D.C.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear and discuss a matter of mutual interest, the upcoming socio-technological revolution. I bring you the genuine regrets of my colleague, Senator Muskie, that he could not be with you today. I think it would have been especially appropriate and significant had he been your luncheon guest and had the opportunity to discuss the creation of a Select Committee of the United States Senate for Technology and Human Environment, S. Res. 68, of which he is the author. However, as you know, he is part of a special mission designated by the President to observe the conduct of the elections in South Vietnam.

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to enthusiastically support Senator Muskie in this important effort, and before I discuss the aspects of the proposal itself, I would like to speak in broader terms and paint with a broader brush for just a moment.

Your field of interest is as broad as the entire scope of the activities and the environment of mankind. The computing sciences provide the tools and techniques which permit us to bring coherence and organization to the exploding body of knowledge which will directly affect every life and all our governmental institutions both now and for the future. Without the computing industry the new burgeoning science of cybernetics would be only an abstract concept and "the art of steersmanship," as the American College Dictionary defines cybernetics, would be impossible of attainment.

In the social sciences as distinguished from the purely scientific, your industry and talents and imagination will permit us to, for the first time, engage in scientific and systematic inquiries into the nature of existence and the form and substance of theory in a logical, useable and useful form.

For the first time theoretical science, applied science, engineering, economics and government are discernibly interacting, and thus the reason and the necessity for the creation of a Select Committee such as proposed by Senator Muskie in order to assure that the governing process, which in the democratic form is itself a computing machine of sorts, keeps pace with and maintains an awareness of the forces and vectors of change and opportunity.

Let me speak of one aspect of the socio-

technological revolution that is basic to all our considerations.

We are about to enter an age of vast, unbelievably cheap power. We will see the unlimited availability of nuclear power in the next few years at almost zero fuel cost. This production of power at zero fuel cost will transform our society in nearly every aspect.

As Dr. Alvin Weinberg, director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, has said: "the advent of very cheap, ubiquitous and inexhaustible nuclear energy, through the development of the breeder reactor, will make a qualitative change in man's relation to his environment."

Energy is the ultimate raw material. If we make energy available at almost no cost, then we will be faced with a revaluation of everything that is produced.

Even now we are working hard for implementation of a proposal by former President Eisenhower and Admiral Lewis Strauss to provide fresh water for the strife-torn Middle East with nuclear power plants. This is already practical and if adopted, will revolutionize the Middle East, hopefully bringing peace and prosperity to that troubled, arid land.

With Breeder Reactors producing this near costless energy, the promise is even greater.

But revolution is a concept that is fraught with peril. For, as we have seen in the revolutions perpetrated by man across the course of history, they can be for good, or they can be for bad.

Every Fourth of July, we celebrate with pride and patriotism the American Revolution in which our forefathers revolted against the mother country and declared themselves forever free of tyrannical oppression.

But we also know of the revolution of the Fidel Castro variety where one despot is replaced with an even more ruthless tyrant.

So, revolution, if not carefully controlled, can enslave rather than free.

It is, therefore, imperative that we begin now to plan for the great technological revolution which is almost upon us.

We must make the necessary adjustments and preparations to assure that this revolution works for our benefit, that it makes us freer, and that it does not destroy the basic values upon which our nation was founded.

You are well aware of the fears expressed of the "big brotherism" aspects of the computerized society. And you've heard the humorously told accounts of people fighting frustrating battles against an immutable computer which insists on sending a bill which for some reason or other is erroneous.

These stories and jokes are funny today. But tomorrow when our society becomes completely dependent on computerization, they could become nightmares, unless we plan for the new age computers are bringing us.

The anguish of the economic dislocation in the coal mining areas of West Virginia and Tennessee is an illustration in miniature of the problems that may beset this nation on a much broader scale as a result of new automative techniques, on the basis of new labor saving approaches.

The plight of the coal miner is essentially a problem where our economy has failed to anticipate the disruptive impact of high mechanization in one industry but the new frontiers of science and technology threatens these very same economic disruptive forces throughout the fabric of the entire economy and the problem we are confronted with in the hills and valleys of Tennessee and West Virginia will be multiplied many times over in many other industries unless we have the foresight to anticipate and provide against these contingencies in the immediate years to come.

This exciting prospect of unlimited nuclear energy, and all that one can see flowing from



it has been described by Dr. Weinberg as constituting a "technological fix"—a means of circumventing, through technology a profoundly disturbing social problem.

He used the case of the classical Malthusian dilemma. One hopes through this technology, he said, to buy the time the world needs to work the social changes which will ultimately be needed if we are to control the world's population.

These "technological fixes" help but they alone are not enough.

To attack these problems we need a coherent and coordinated approach of the socio-technological and political implications.

To those of us who are not scientists or technicians, but politicians rooted in the experience of people, their idiosyncrasies, their prejudices and vagaries, the future of automated machines, manipulated genetic structures, self-contained new cities which recycle their own wastes and giant airplanes \* \* \* the nuclear devices that produce costless energy, give us substantial cause of concern on Capitol Hill.

And, of course, in order that no one here may be offended by being excluded from the list of these frightening projections, there is the cybernetic revolution, which Glenn Seaborg terms "the quantum jump in the existence of man," which will have all manner of far-reaching effects on the individual and his environment.

What we lack in the Senate, in Congress, in the Executive Branch, and among our State and local governments is a mechanism for inquiring into the broad impact of science and technology on man's thinking, his health, work, living habits and individual security over the next fifty years. There is a tremendous information gap between the politician and the scientist. We really don't know where we are heading—where the benefits of technology can be best applied, and what the hazards and problems that may flow from such technological application.

In an attempt to meet this information gap, Senator Muskie has proposed legislation which would establish in the Senate the Select Committee on Technology and the Human Environment, composed of members from each of the standing committees most involved with legislation affecting human needs. This committee would provide an excellent forum where scientists and legislators could face each other across the table and discuss the critical environmental problems ahead and what science and technology can do to solve them.

It would provide a central source of information and analysis—not now available in the Senate—comprehensive information cutting across the technological spectrum, which the standing committees and members of the Senate would use in developing their legislative policies.

This Select Committee would have no jurisdiction over legislation or powers of legislative oversight, but its reports and recommendations covering essential environmental problems could well become a foundation for development of national goals and planning involving science and technology as key ingredients in building a modern America.

We are well along with our scientific and technological planning and programming, our system management, our cybernetic progress in the military and defense sectors, and in our efforts to put a man on the moon. There have been problems in these sectors, but extraordinary minds and machines have worked to solve them.

But what does the next fifty years of science and technology hold for man on earth? Is he to be consigned to the ghettos, stalled in traffic, choked by poisoned atmosphere, and subjected to the continuing noise, strain, speed tension and social instability of our increasingly crowded urban and

suburban environments? Can he be released, at least in part, from these intolerable conditions, from the kind of scientific effort that is going forward so energetically in the space and defense fields? And if we bring in the scientists and the technologists, and their 21st Century equipment and ideas, do we have the type of governmental structure and administrative process to implement effectively the rebuilding process? How much of our concepts of free enterprise, of individual freedom and initiative and of democratic decision-making will have to be forfeited in order to plan and to build a new American society along scientific lines?

These are hard questions requiring some very hard decisions. But the internal conditions of many areas urban and rural in this country are getting so serious that we are going to have to make these decisions sooner than we think. Hopefully, a Select Committee on Technology and the Human Environment can help us along the way.

All the witnesses that appeared before our Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations to comment on the resolution were optimistic—that we have—or are rapidly building—the scientific capability to solve environmental problems.

Again, the question—to what extent will the "technological fix" impair the democratic decision-making process, and reduce individual freedom? Could it be that we as legislators representing a hundred and ninety million people are looked into a technological system over which in the long run we are powerless to control?

Many witnesses see this high energy civilization coming on us before we may be ready to cope with it. They see the impact of trillions of kilowatt hours of low cost electricity spread across our Nation by massive interconnecting grids as revolutionizing nearly every facet of our American life.

They picture cities built in the nature of a closed system, powered by huge atomic reactors which will breed their own fuel run by automation. These cities could produce their own materials, recycle their water, sewage, and industrial waste, have modern efficient heating, housing and transportation facilities, and concentrate heavily on education, research and development, along with service industries as contrasted to productive industry.

Other than atomic power, computerization would be at the heart of the operations of such a city. The computer complex would be the city's largest decision-making body.

What kind of a government would such a city have? What kind of political decisions would be needed? What kind of competition would there be? How much private ownership? How much individual freedom would a person have? There are many interesting questions here, which no doubt a Select Committee would consider.

Never before in our Nation's history has it been quite so critical that we shorten the 10- to 20-year gap between basic research discoveries and their practical applications. Never has it been quite so critical that Congress legislate intelligently so that taxpayers, impatient to achieve effective solutions to a myriad of social problems, get their money's worth from each dollar spent.

The Select Committee will be a major first step in preparing for this technological revolution I have discussed with you today. But an important next step should be given immediate consideration, perhaps as the first major inquiry of the Select Committee.

This would be the question of establishing coherent National Socio-Technological Institutes that could mobilize around the great social problems that mar the quality of our life. Such institutes would be concerned with the city, with race relations, with crime, with civil defense and with the environment. The institutes would have both social scientists and technologists working in daily give-and-take, exchanging views and keeping

each other honest. Some of the institutes might represent a redeployment of existing government laboratories but others would spring up anew. Some might be university-connected; others would have no such connection. But, above all, the institutes would have a coherence in their attacks on these profoundly different questions.

The thought that I really want to leave with you in summing up is that all of us—you in the computer manufacturing industry—we in the Congress—have got to do a great deal more thinking about where science and technology is leading us, and what kind of mechanism we can devise for coordinating the information as to what is happening, and what benefits and hazards are developing as a result of all this activity.

Second, the time is long overdue for the development of national goals and planning with respect to relationship between our scientific and technological achievement and the improvement of our human environment. We can no longer rely on Federal grants in aid and State and local administrators to solve the problems of our cities. Science and industry have got to be brought into the picture.

Third, we have to think seriously about the kind of creative Federal system of government that will best serve our needs in the 21st Century, preserving to the greatest extent possible individual freedom, and the democratic process of decision-making.

And finally, we must develop a national purpose, to which everyone is dedicated—to rebuild, refurbish, rejuvenate this Nation at every level of human activity to reduce the widening gap between affluence and despair that is threatening the strength of this Nation as we approach the 21st Century.

#### MORMON TABERNACLE—A CENTURY OF HISTORY

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, today marks the 100th birthday of one of the world's great religious landmarks—the historic Mormon Tabernacle on Temple Square in Salt Lake City.

It was on October 6, 1867, that the Mormon leader Brigham Young called to order the first meeting held in the building. It was a general conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Since then, the church has held within its walls such semiannual gatherings every year, and they are now seen and heard around the world through the wonders of modern communications.

Many of the world's great personalities have visited or spoken in the tabernacle, including at least 11 Presidents of the United States.

Numerous other world statesmen, educators, clergymen of other denominations, and other dignitaries have felt honored to occupy its tiered stand. Millions of visitors have made it a "must" stop when touring the intermountain area.

The elliptically shaped edifice, which seats 8,000, is perhaps best known for the famous 375-voice choir of the same name which it houses. The Mormon Tabernacle Choir has presented nationwide broadcasts since 1949—the oldest continuously presented musical program on radio. It is heard each Sunday morning, along with "The Spoken Word" by Richard L. Evans.

Experts on sound have acclaimed the uniquely structured building as having some of the finest acoustics in existence. This complemented by its huge organ of

11,558 individual pipes, has provided an excellent setting for many of the world's great instrumental and vocal musicians who have performed in the tabernacle.

However, most important of all, the tabernacle stands today as a monument to the faith and perseverance of a people who—when driven from the East by religious persecution—preferred to face the unknowns of an untamed West rather than relinquish their cherished beliefs.

An article detailing the construction of the Mormon Tabernacle was published in the September 30, 1967, "Church News" section of the Salt Lake Deseret News. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**TABERNACLE: NOTED BUILDING HAS A BIRTHDAY**  
(By George L. Scott)

The historic Salt Lake Tabernacle on Temple Square is 100 years old this October. It still stands as the main gathering place of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In 1867, the Tabernacle had the freshness of new construction when President Brigham Young called the first conference to order on Oct. 6.

It had taken two years to plan and four years to build. Much work was still to be done although it was serviceable at that time for the conference session.

William H. Folsom and Truman O. Angell, architects, and Henry Grow, master mechanic, with hundreds of pioneer builders took pride in their part of the work.

The huge Tabernacle auditorium, elliptical in shape, 250 feet long, 150 feet wide, and 80 feet in height, rested upon pillars or buttresses of red sandstone quarried from the mountains east of Salt Lake City.

These buttresses stand 10 feet to 12 feet apart in the whole circumference of the building and support wooden arches that span the 150-foot width. It is the largest work of timber roof framing surviving in this country today.

Despite its enormous size, the Tabernacle was constructed completely by hand. All materials were hand-fashioned because of the lack of shops, foundries and mills in the infant Mormon settlement during those years.

The cornerstone was laid in July of 1864. Crews of men, sometimes totaling 250, worked on the Tabernacle as carpenters and masons plus a crew of 70 plasterers.

One of the most interesting aspects in its construction was the knowhow of a convert bridge builder, Henry Grow. He had built a bridge over the Jordan River using a patented system of construction known as the Remington latticed bridge in which planking and pegs were used.

He gained permission from the Remington inventor to use this pattern of construction to build the Tabernacle roof. Today, those planks and pegs bound with rawhide which made the Tabernacle roof possible, are still used.

The bridge-like arches spring from 13 piers at each end of the Tabernacle, forming semi-circles and join with other arches that rise from 30 piers on the north and south sides. Height from the floor to the ceiling is 70 feet. The bridge-like structural work between ceiling and roof is 10 feet thick.

With the arches in place, lath tacked on with imported nails, the big plaster crews of men went to work. They used plaster embedded with horse and cattle hair, which was laid on the lath nailed to rafters and in turn to little wooden hangers suspended be-

low the lower-most struts, braces and the ribs of the framing system.

The underside of the rafters was cut to conform to the profile of the ceiling's vault curve.

Oddly enough, there has been little cracking of the hair reinforced plaster and since the double shell of the roof and ceiling provides ideal protection of the structural system, there has been little, if any, deterioration of the framing units.

No plate glass was available for Tabernacle windows, so the builders placed smaller window panes in frames between the piers which added up to a total of 2,500 lights of glass—a window-cleaning task that would make any housewife shudder.

The gallery was not built until 1870. It circles the entire Tabernacle except the choir seats. This had a pleasing effect in reducing the feeling of vast emptiness overhead in addition to adding hundreds of seats which brought the total seating capacity to 8,000. The gallery measures 395 feet from one end to the other and is 30 feet wide. It is supported by 72 columns.

Years later a children's room was provided at the back where mothers could take youngsters whose voices, when not controlled, could be heard all over the Tabernacle.

The Tabernacle's simple lines keep it a major point of interest for tourists as it is distinctive from other houses of worship.

Unlike today, Church authorities in 1867 did not know what acoustical problems they would encounter as they assembled in the Tabernacle.

President Young made preliminary tests speaking to different persons in various parts of the Tabernacle before services began for the first time to find out how the speaker could be heard.

Today, the remarkable acoustics of the Tabernacle astound the thousands of tourists who listen to a pin drop on the pulpit.

Little do they know of the scientific work and hard labor that made it possible for them to hear the tick of the pin that is dropped, even when they are in the rear of the Tabernacle, 200 feet from the pulpit.

Neither did the pioneers dream that their Tabernacle would be the center of worship for people all over the world by means of radio and TV, now operating on a color-TV basis.

This technical equipment is now stationed in a studio just below the south side of the choir seats. TV stations in 49 states will carry the voices of General Authorities and the Tabernacle Choir to millions of people.

A closed-circuit radio will carry the Saturday night's priesthood meeting to stakes and missions in the United States and Canada.

The Church-owned shortwave radio station WNYW in New York also will beam conference sessions to Europe, Africa and Latin America in English, German, Spanish and Portuguese.

This is in contrast to the fact that it took nearly four years to build the Tabernacle before the railroad had reached Utah and all imported material had to be hauled in with ox teams from the Missouri River.

Thick wooden shingles which shed rain and snow for 63 years gave way to a new metallic covering in the 1930s.

Original cost of the building was approximately \$300,000, not including the cost of the organ.

The Tabernacle organ, which has been enlarged several times since its original installation, had one-third of its initial 2,000 pipes installed for the first meeting. The organ casement was then only 15 feet high but reached upward of 40 feet when completed. While not completely tuned, they were able to use the organ to accompany the first Tabernacle Choir.

Joseph Ridges, instructed by Brigham Young to build an organ for the Tabernacle,

was able to take only \$900 from Church funds when he went to New York and Boston to purchase items for the organ that could not be manufactured in Utah.

These items included spring wire, thin sheet brass, soft fluff leather for the valves, ivory for the keys and other items. These were brought to Salt Lake by ox team from the nearest railroad.

Mr. Ridges described the building of the organ at a testimonial in his honor. He said:

"We wanted immense quantities of glue, so we made banks of fires just outside the Tabernacle walls and put on big iron pots. We wanted cow hides to chop up and boil down into glue. We got them. The cows simply died. We also wanted calves' skins to hinge the ribs of the great bellows and, well, the calves died also."

The organ builder said there was not a man in Utah who knew the first thing about an organ. He had to teach each of the 10 assistants who aided him in building the organ.

Although preliminary work had begun in 1866, the base of the organ was not laid in the Tabernacle until the summer of 1867.

The organ had two manuals, the great and swell, both heavily filled and the pipes on large scale. The pipes numbered upward of 2,000. Today the organ has 11,588 pipes—one of the world's largest organs.

The organ's design, described in an 1868 edition of the Deseret News, stated . . . "The front will be formed with flutings, panels, and pillars in the Corinthian style, tastefully carved and crowned with pyramidal tops . . . which will rise over 40 feet above the floor . . ."

"We can't preach the Gospel unless we have good music," said President Brigham Young.

It was not until 1869 that the work on the Tabernacle and the organ neared an end. Dedication of the Tabernacle, however, did not take place as a formal place of worship until the October conference of 1875.

At first the organ was pumped by hand prior to 1875 when a large waterwheel was installed in the basement of the Tabernacle to pump air into the organ. Water was taken from City Creek which at that time ran along North Temple Street. Electricity eventually replaced the waterwheel production of air for the organ pipes.

Few of today's members realize that there was another tabernacle on Temple Square, also with an organ, before the present Tabernacle was constructed.

It is now known as "The Old Tabernacle," finished in 1852. Its adobe walls stood on a rock foundation in the southwest corner of Temple Square. It measured 126 feet in length and 64 feet in width, had a sloping roof covered with wooden shingles and seating for 2,500. The original Tabernacle Choir was organized in this building and sang regularly at Sunday meetings.

This "old" tabernacle was torn down in 1877 to make room for the present Assembly Hall on Temple Square.

There have been times when the Tabernacle was endangered.

On March 14, 1959, a flash fire threatened serious trouble when a light globe set a drop cloth on fire.

The fire was discovered by Ray Loveless of KSL who with Roy M. Darley, organist, sounded the alarm and then put out the fire with a fire extinguisher before fire trucks arrived.

Damage was caused in 1962 when two sprinkler pipes burst above the ceiling, causing seepage.

The following year, the Tabernacle was insulated against fire with new insulation in the eaves and partitions to aid in temperature control and fire protection. More than 10,000 square feet of rock wool insulation was placed over the rafters, sprinkling pipes and partitions.



In the same year, a coat of paint placed over the outside stone walls of the Tabernacle was removed, restoring the original look of the stone walls and buttresses.

Today, as "The Saints Come Marching Home," they will enter their 100-year-old Tabernacle with a feeling of pride for its sturdy walls, newly renovated interior, painted walls and varnished benches but above all—its memories of a great pioneer heritage.

#### THE SLEEPER OF THE 89TH CONGRESS GOES TO WORK

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, 2 years ago, when President Johnson signed the State Technical Services Act, he predicted that the act would "do for the American businessman what the great Agricultural Extension Service has done for the American farmer. It will put into their hands the latest ideas and methods, the fruits of research and development." The President referred to the act as the "sleeper" of the 89th Congress.

Today, I am happy to report that the "sleeper" of the 89th Congress has gone to work, and that in the State of North Carolina an outstanding job has been done. This program is funded, in part, by Federal moneys, but the actual transfer of new technology is accomplished through State and local organizations, and the success of the effort depends upon local initiative, direction, leadership, and support.

Recently, Dr. H. F. Robinson, dean for research at North Carolina State University, reported on some of the projects underway at the university. I should like to describe a few examples, to give the flavor of this program, and to illustrate what has been happening since this experimental program went into effect.

More than 1,000 persons enrolled in television courses teaching industrial statistics and industrial engineering.

A manufacturer of brass products was experiencing a high reject rate. Investigation revealed the problem to have its origin in contamination of a solvent used in his production process. With the problem pinpointed, it was soon remedied, and rejects were practically stopped.

A firm making ornamental concrete products had a breakage-in-handling problem. The problem was solved by making changes in the ratio of the raw materials mix, and in the processing methods.

A furniture manufacturer had profit margin problems, in spite of a good line of products. He solved the problem by getting the latest technical know-how on cost estimating, and on breakeven analyses for his output.

These case histories by no means tell the whole story of North Carolina and State technical services. However, it is abundantly clear that this pioneering attempt to extend the benefits of advanced technology throughout the country has already demonstrated its value.

#### FIRST MEETING OF PEASE CHAPTER OF AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, a kick-off dinner was held at Pease Air Force Base, Portsmouth, N.H., on September 16, marking the first meeting of the newly chartered Pease Chapter of the Air Force

Association. Principal speaker on this occasion was Lt. Gen. Jack L. Catton, U.S. Air Force, one of the most able and distinguished of our ranking military leaders.

An extremely fine commentary on General Catton was published in the Exeter, N.H., News-Letter of Thursday, September 21. It was written by this fine newspaper's highly knowledgeable publisher, Mr. James P. Lynch. I ask unanimous consent that his column, entitled "Down in Our Corner," be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

As Mr. Lynch points out, this was in the nature of a homecoming for the general, whose skill and dedication helped build for Pease its reputation as one of our great, if not our greatest, air base facilities. He was a welcome visitor indeed, and I am sure he knows that New Hampshire's latchstring is always out to him.

Mr. Lynch describes General Catton as "a man of destiny" and that may well be so. I would heartily concur that he does not know the meaning of defeat, no matter how difficult the odds, and I have no doubt that he will have continued success wherever his future course is charted, whether it involves increasing responsibilities as a military decision-maker or whether he eventually directs his talents to industry or politics. Of one thing we can be sure, Jack Catton will continue to make immense contributions to the good of our Nation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Hampshire?

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### DOWN IN OUR CORNER

(By James P. Lynch)

"If you think the many outstanding changes during the past 10 to 15 years have been spectacular then they are nothing in comparison with the various plans in the making for the next 10 to 15 years."

These were the words expressed by Lt. Gen. Jack J. Catton, USAF, deputy chief of staff, plans and resources, at the kick-off dinner of the Air Force Association last Saturday night at Pease Air Force Base.

General Catton, a former division commander at Pease, seemed to be delivering a challenge as well as words of advice. He talks from several years' military experience and not from hearsay.

To many his address lent encouragement for what lies ahead. His positive approach in these confusing times is a good illustration that this great nation is not short of exceptional leaders.

While his speech was devoted strictly to our military position, it could also be considered a warning to the people to exercise extreme caution in choosing elective officials.

His projection of our future accomplishments makes it compulsory that we avoid a negative approach. There can be no compromise.

This is true not only in matters concerning the military, but also political, statesmanship and business decisions.

At present General Catton is part of that military complex called the Pentagon. He is one of many thousands who go about their business each day attempting to keep this nation in the lead.

#### RETURNING "HOME"

When General Catton arrived at Pease Saturday it was in a sense returning home. While stationed here he was considered one

of the best ambassadors in the state. He liked New Hampshire, and he wanted everyone to know this.

His assignment was too short, although militarily it was considered of average duration. But insofar as General Catton is concerned, he was always classified as one of the greatest men in uniform to come to the area.

#### NOT FORGOTTEN

While he no longer directs the destiny of Pease, he is still looked upon as one of the leaders by those who knew him while he was here.

Undoubtedly a number of those who listened to him the other evening felt more confident of this country's future, because men like General Catton are the decision-makers.

He was not here the other evening to seek glory or praise but rather to express his personal and quite experienced views on circumstances confronting our nation in the past, the present and the future.

#### TYPICAL EXAMPLE

General Catton's successful rise may sound like a Horatio Alger story, but in reality it typifies the opportunities available to the people of this country.

It was no easy task for the general, especially since he was a polio victim. While this did create an obstacle, he proved he could conquer the situation.

When he was assigned to Pease he was the youngest general in the Air Force. Eventually he lost this recognition because time does not stand still. Nor did General Catton.

#### ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS

After a few interim assignments, the Catton address was shifted to the Pentagon. Also the one star of a brigadier general was replaced by the two stars of a major general. Then this summer there was another star added and he became lieutenant general.

While the advancements brought greater recognition, they also meant further responsibilities. But General Catton is a man who likes to face challenges and then conquer them. His whole career has proven it.

#### UNFORTUNATE SITUATION

The genial general is not a resident of New Hampshire which, indeed, is unfortunate. Nor is his scope of thinking limited to state boundaries.

He is a man of vision who believes in the future of his country. More important, he is helping shape its destiny.

In the days ahead both political parties would do well if they kept their eyes on people like this young general. He would be a great asset to either party.

While his subject of conversation is primarily on national and international matters, he always avoids getting into discussion of politics and politicians.

#### NO DESIRE

To him this is another field, and he has no desire to be a political general. He has the utmost faith in his branch of the military service, and dedicates himself to this cause.

Yet, while he is projecting the future for 10 and 15 years, it may be wise for the political opportunists to have their eyes on these men of destiny.

General Catton is impressive without attempting to play the role. He indeed would be able to establish an exceptional image if, in time, he chose a political career.

#### NOTHING NEW

He would not be the first military officer who turned to politics once out of the service. Some have been successful, while others met defeat.

Insofar as he is concerned, his history has proven that the odds favor him with victory. Some say that Jack Catton doesn't know what the word defeat means. They could be accurate.

The primary reason is because he is not

willing to lose when he knows more effort will produce success.

Unfortunately when men of his ability get out of the service, they are quickly grabbed by private industry for a lucrative position. Elective office cannot compete with the high salaries available outside.

#### WILLING TO SACRIFICE

Yet many of these men have demonstrated they are willing to sacrifice high remuneration in order to serve their country in the military. Thus, they should be encouraged to enter a field where they can continue to serve.

If we are to face the challenge ahead so aptly described by General Catton the other evening, then it is quite necessary that we strengthen not only our military manpower but also our political structure.

#### REMOVING BARRIERS

In doing so it would open an avenue of interest to many of the leaders of the former group. They want to see a strong front on the military scale. They have much to offer, too, in assuring similar strength in the political field.

Unfortunately some quarters would prefer to avoid encouraging career military men to actively participate in politics after they leave the service. This is detrimental to the welfare of the country.

#### OPEN INVITATION

Politics should be an organization of inclusion not exclusion. Everyone should be encouraged to actively participate not only in the election but also in the primaries.

There are those who prefer to avoid getting involved in the latter in order not to commit themselves in regard to party designation. In doing so they are allowing political bosses to make the choice of primary candidates, and thus they must be satisfied with the results.

### FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCE BILL

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, yesterday's edition of the Washington Evening Star contained an excellent column by David Braaten which puts the Federal election campaign finance bill in its proper perspective.

Mr. Braaten points out that this measure is more popularly referred to as the "Great Treasury Raid of 1967" and that it would compel the taxpayers to put their money in the political pot.

As I have already noted in this Chamber, I am unalterably opposed to this proposed legislation, and I believe my feelings are shared by an overwhelming majority of the American people. I hope the Senate will reject the bill.

I bring the column to the attention of the Senate and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the column was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE "RIGHT" TO SUPPORT POLITICIANS (By David Braaten)

Assuming that Congress passes the "Honest Election Law of 1967"—and with a title like that, who can afford to vote against it?—a major step toward reform in the American electoral system will have been taken.

The "Great Treasury Raid of 1967"—to give the campaign-subsidy bill its less popular, if more accurate, name—will result in disbursement of roughly \$40 million to candidates of the two major parties next year, helping them fill the gap between campaign expenditures and the largesse of wealthy friends and other favor seekers.

It may be no coincidence that the sum is

the same as that being put up for rat control. After all, the campaign-fund bill's backers reason, who would begrudge politicians the amount of money being allocated to rats?

The historic significance of the campaign-subsidy bill is that it will mark the point at which the American voter is finally going to be penalized directly for voting. The more we vote, the more we pay, the bill provides.

That is how far the democratic process has progressed from the days when a man could expect to collect five bucks or a couple of glasses of whiskey every time he voted.

The change was inevitable, of course, once they began curtailing off voting booths, thus preventing the buyer from making sure the seller was living up to his end of the transaction. Office seekers were then forced to rely on the indirect payola, the campaign promise that appealed to the voter's special interest.

It didn't take long for the electorate to realize that this kind of bribe was unenforceable, but by then the remorseless illogic of the thing had taken over. It was impossible to reverse the trend and go back to the good old honest vote purchase system.

Now, the traditional American view had always been that seekers after public office were, through no particular fault of their own, less fortunate members of society, to be pitied and cared for by the productive citizens of the community. "The politicians we always have with us," was the phrase.

Yet somehow, when nobody was looking, they achieved a state of equality with the voters. They got to the point where they were demanding and expecting support as a right, instead of begging and hoping for it as a boon. Some people blame it all on Franklin Roosevelt, but this is probably unfair.

At any rate, once the politicians discovered such bureaucratic devices as the voice vote, executive orders, confidential caucuses and supplemental appropriations, voter control was finished. Undeclared Asian wars and the Rayburn House Office Building should really have come as no surprise.

The campaign-subsidy bill is simply the end result of a process that began when Congress first realized it could raise its own salaries, pad the payroll with relatives and pocket unspent petty cash from the stationery allowance—all without a rollcall.

Last spring, Senator Russell Long, in a quixotic attempt to turn the clock back, tried to make the campaign-subsidy system voluntary, requiring a taxpayer's conscious decision to allot \$1 to the political pot. But the crux of the new welfare-campaign philosophy is that the contributor-taxpayer must have no option. That way, the politician-recipients realize, lies party bankruptcy. Thus Long's effort was doomed from the start.

There are some who worry about the social implications of campaign handouts. Why, they ask, would a political candidate go out and work for his campaign funds when he can just sit back and collect all he needs from the government. Where is the incentive?

An especially pernicious feature of the subsidy bill, the critics feel, is that funds will go to both parties impartially. No longer will success at the polls be rewarded and failure punished, in the old American manner. What can be better calculated to sap a politician's self-reliance, his good old-fashioned get-up-and-go?

And finally, thoughtful observers point to the alarming trend among American politicians toward office seeking as a way of life. Already there are third and fourth generation campaigners cropping up in some constituencies. Should this be encouraged? As someone, probably wise old Ben Franklin, phrased it: "Once a man hath supped at the public trough, it be hard indeed to wean him away to honest pursuits."

Yet the logic of the campaign-subsidy system, is inescapable: If public office is a public trust, should not the seeking of it be a private right?

### WRONG DISCOUNT RATES CREATE ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS AND INFLATIONARY PRESSURES

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, another leading analyst has noted that current Government discount rate policies lead to serious resource misallocations. According to Robert L. Banks, a specialist in the economics of transportation:

The method by which the interest/discount rate is determined is inappropriate and ought to be changed.

At present, there is a significant gap between the discount rate applied by the Government to its projects and the rate employed in the private sector. The Government rate, based on the historical coupon rate on long-term securities, is 3½ percent at the present time; in comparison, the relevant private sector rate is at least 10 percent and, in a good many instances, as high as 15 percent.

In a paper submitted to the Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Economy in Government, which has been studying the programing-planning-budgeting system—PPBS—Mr. Banks says that the low Government discount rate leads "to faulty economic evaluation. A new formula is needed."

Mr. Banks is not alone in feeling that the Government system of discount rate formulation is wrong, and that it creates untimely economic dislocations. In testimony before the Economy in Government Subcommittee, a panel of three top economists strongly emphasized that virtually all the economics profession agree that the Government's policy is very unrealistic and wasteful. This is a powerful indictment.

When the "wrong" discount rate is used in benefit/cost analysis, some projects which would never be considered are approved. These projects then compete for scarce resources with higher-return investments in the private sector creating economic dislocations and inflationary pressures.

Congress holds the legislative responsibility to approve only those projects which can contribute positively to a stable economy. Utilization of the low discount rate in public works programs alone is wasting billions of dollars each year. It is up to Congress to act now to stop this dangerous drain on the economy.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Banks' paper, entitled "The Role of the Discount/Interest Rate in Evaluating the Economic Efficiency of Government Financed Transportation Projects," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE ROLE OF THE DISCOUNT/INTEREST RATE IN EVALUATING THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT-FINANCED TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS

(By Robert L. Banks)

My name is Robert L. Banks. I am a transportation consultant specializing in economics of the several modes of transportation. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the question of the appropriate interest, or discount rate to be used in assessing the economic feasibility of government investment in transportation projects.

My comments will be directed specifically



at the discount/interest rate used in evaluating water resource projects. Analysis in this area is probably more advanced than in most other areas, and the techniques employed therefore point the way for studying other government investment projects. It is particularly important that this path finding analysis conform to sound economic principles.

In constructing the benefit-cost ratios which it presents to the Congress as a part of the appropriation procedure, the Corps of Engineers computes average annual benefits by a discounting process, and these are compared with average annual cost of operation plus interest and amortization computed in the manner of an equal-payment mortgage. The same discount/interest rate is used for both purposes.

Although I am particularly concerned with water resource evaluation, my comments would be relevant to appraisal of other government projects, especially where a choice between alternative investments is involved.

What brings me before you is my belief that the method by which the interest/discount rate is determined is inappropriate and ought to be changed. Since publication of Senate Document No. 97 in 1962 the discount rate has been "based upon the average rate of interest payable by the Treasury on interest bearing marketable securities of the United States outstanding at the end of the fiscal year preceding such computation which, upon original issue, had terms to maturity of 15 years or more."<sup>1</sup>

This formula has produced a rate of 3½ percent for use over the past several years. I believe this rate to be unrealistic at present; its use can lead only to faulty economic evaluation. A new formula is needed.

The paramount objection to continued use of the present formula is the subject of the balance of my testimony, but an incidental objection is the use of *coupon rates* of interest, rather than *yields* in application of the formula. The 3½ percent was calculated by the Treasury Department on the basis of coupon rates. Such rates are a fiction; rarely do securities sell at precisely their coupon rate. Yield, on the other hand, is a measure of the cost of borrowing. If in benefit-cost calculations the cost of borrowing by long term debt is to be determined by the interest rate (which I will argue against), the cost should at least be computed on the basis of bond yields, not coupon rates.

Before proceeding, I should also make clear that the issue of proper interest rates to be used in evaluating the economics of governmentally financed projects, which is the subject of my testimony, should not be confused with the question of what interest rates the government should charge for its various loan programs. The latter issue is beyond the scope of my testimony. I am concerned only with the rates employed in evaluating economic feasibility of public works projects. This is a separate issue and can be discussed most fruitfully in isolation from the heat of controversy which so often surrounds the question of rates charged by the government.

#### I. BACKGROUND

The selection of an appropriate rate has had considerable attention in academic circles for the past several years, and is increasingly recognized as a national issue. As the government sector grows larger in the national economy, and more and more public money is invested, the urgency becomes

greater than ever before. Moreover, the new planning and programming approach to budgeting which involves appraisal of alternatives, places a premium on well-founded inputs, one of which is the discount rate at which intertemporal differences are equalized.

One of our national goals is efficiency in the use of our resources. Misunderstanding of government investment projects stems in part from the vagueness of specifying goals of social welfare functions and confusion surrounding means of achieving them. National welfare goals are, of course, manifold. The goal of efficiency, with which I am concerned, involves the maximization of social output over time for any given input of resources. In benefit-cost analysis, decision-makers want to maximize the present value of total benefits less that of total costs. The aim is to achieve an economically efficient allocation of limited resources.

Another, and different, goal might be to minimize the inequality of income distribution among regions or social classes. In the establishment of the Area Redevelopment Agency and its successor, the Economic Development Administration, for example, this objective was quite clear. Not so clear is the tendency for waterway development projects sometimes to be authorized for similar reasons, but clothed in a favorably benefit-cost ratio and ostensibly approved as an economically sound project. Good management requires that even when a goal other than efficiency is held paramount, the benefits and costs be properly measured so that the true net costs or benefits are known. Economic efficiency may be secondary in considering a particular project, but it may still have a bearing on the method by which the social objective is achieved.

There are any number of goals other than economic efficiency which also might be fostered through public investment in waterways and other forms of intercity or urban transportation. Some, such as the goals of the Northeast Corridor High Speed Ground Transportation Project, the Federal airport and air navigation facility programs, urban transport measures and the supersonic air transport program have been pursued without any real pretense of quantifying economic benefits. Their value has been sensed or appraised by intuitive means, not by formal methods resembling benefit-cost analysis. This approach leaves us in the dark as to the efficiency of expenditures, but we at least understand that we do not have a measure of their efficiency.

As to water resource development projects, on the other hand, we are led to believe that they are approved only upon their economic merit: a benefit-cost ratio is computed for each, and benefits in excess of costs, as estimated by the Corps of Engineers, indicate economic feasibility. But if the benefit-cost analysis is improperly executed, we delude ourselves. An incorrect interest rate contributes to this delusion.

#### II. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF DISCOUNT/INTEREST RATES IN BENEFIT-COST CALCULATION

Benefit-cost analysis is an administrative technique used to appraise the economic efficiency of a proposed investment project. There are many imponderables in the enumeration and valuation of both benefits and costs, but only the interest rate is of concern here. I shall demonstrate why and how the benefit-cost ratio varies inversely with the discount/interest rate, other things being equal. The policy implication of this relationship is that an inappropriate rate of discount/interest rate will make a project appear to be economically more or less desirable than it really is. A rate that is too low can even mean the difference between a favorable and an unfavorable benefit-cost ratio.

One of the outstanding characteristics of government projects where large physical

plants are involved is that benefits and costs accrue in different time patterns. Typically, the period of project life can be divided into two distinct stages. In the earlier period annual costs are normally in excess of benefits and there is an annual loss. Net profit comes, if ever, in the later stage of project life, after use and benefits have had opportunity to build up. The benefit-cost ratio reflects the balance between discounted values of the sum of annual profits and those of annual loss as defined above.

The impacts of discounting upon profit and loss are different. The total sum of annual profit returned in the *later* stage of project life will be discounted more heavily than that of annual loss, which accrues in the *earlier* period. Moreover, even if the annual flows of benefits and costs over the life of the project are constant, the *discounted* values of benefits and costs vary with the discount/interest rate selected. Because of the timing of net costs and net benefits, discounted benefits shrink at a much faster rate than discounted costs if a higher rate of discount/interest is chosen.

In numeric terms, the effect is as follows: Let us assume that a hypothetical project has a 50-year life. Let us assume further, for the sake of simplicity, that all costs, of whatever nature, amount to \$400,000, and that these are all incurred in a single year, the fifth year of project life. Similarly, we will assume that all benefits, amount to \$400,000, and that these are all incurred in a single year, the fifth year of project life. Similarly, we will assume that all benefits, amounting to \$1,000,000, occur in a single year, which we will choose as the 25th year of project life, so as to conform with the usual temporal sequence. If a discount/interest rate of 3½ percent is used, the discounted or present value of the benefits is \$463,300, and discounted costs amount to \$342,960. The resulting benefit-cost ratio is 1.35 to 1.

If, on the other hand, a rate of 5.5 percent were to be used for the same project, the discounted benefits and costs are reduced respectively to \$262,200 and \$306,050. The benefit-cost ratio is also reduced to 0.86 to 1, indicating that the project will yield a net loss to the economy.

It will be noted that in this illustration the switchover point from a favorable to an unfavorable ratio occurred within a rather narrow range of interest rates.

#### III. AN APPROPRIATE INTEREST/DISCOUNT RATE

It is clear that a benefit-cost calculation is valid only if an appropriate interest rate is used. Scholars have considered at length the question of a proper rate.<sup>2</sup> They are not in complete agreement as to what the rate should be, or by what formula it should be determined. However, I think it is accurate to state that none believe that a rate as low as 3½ percent has been adequate for the past decade or more. The concept which finds most support in their writings is that the economically relevant interest rate is the one which measures the opportunity costs of the funds utilized by the project.

The heart of this concept is that any government project must use up economic resources. In the absence of the project, the resources would be left to private investment which would yield a certain amount of real output in the future. The opportunity to invest and earn a certain rate of return for a different use by the *private* sector is foregone as a result of governmental investment. It is a loss to the private sector. This loss is known in economic theory as the opportunity cost of that government project.

This definition leads us away from the notion that interest cost, or appropriate discount rate is adequately reflected by interest rates on some selected group of government bonds.

<sup>2</sup> See Selected Bibliography attached.

<sup>1</sup> Policies, Standards and Procedures in the Formulation, Evaluation, and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and Related Land Resources, The President's Water Resources Council, Senate Document No. 97, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., May 29, 1962, p. 12.

It states that true cost includes cost of all resources used by government, including those diverted by taxation from use in the private sector. There is a lack of unanimity among economists as to the specific value of this social cost, largely as a consequence of the practical problems of measurement, but I am aware of no one who argues that it is much below 5 percent at present.

#### Characteristics of the appropriate rate

The appropriate rate of interest/discount has several characteristics. First, it measures the true opportunity cost of any government project. If it is used, the same degree of economic efficiency will be achieved from the allocation of resources to the public sector as would otherwise be attained from their use in the private sector. Thus, the social goal of efficiency is satisfied.

Secondly, it is not arbitrarily selected. A rate linked to other and more limited criteria, for example, the coupon rate or yields on long-term government debt, ignores the fact that a large part of the funds to be invested by government are raised through taxation, which involves different costs to different taxpayers.

Third, it is a weighted average, reflecting time preference and expected rates of return from investment of all taxpayers.

#### Cost to society

Departure from the appropriate interest/discount rate necessarily results in an inefficient allocation of resources. In addition to violating the social goal of allocative efficiency, use of the wrong interest/discount rate conflicts with advances made in the past several years in defense management. Principles pioneered in the Defense Department focus mainly on cost-effectiveness. The application of this management technique to all Federal budget divisions is now being extended to other agencies through program budgeting.

As indicated earlier, there may be good reason for pursuing programs for reasons other than economic efficiency, but this does not relieve the government of the need to know the true economic cost, nor is it reason to distort analyses of true cost.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

In evaluating government projects the social goal should be unequivocally understood. A principal goal, as I see it, is to achieve an optimal allocation of our limited resources. I believe that if a project is designed to serve other purposes at the expense of economic efficiency, it should be authorized explicitly in terms of those other goals.

To avoid distortions in the benefit-cost calculation an appropriate interest/discount rate should be calculated on the basis of the opportunity cost principle. In the current situation it probably is in excess of 5 percent. Use of a rate below this range will only permit skim milk to masquerade as cream. The present practice is not only economically indefensible but it is also incompatible with our political and social philosophy. For these reasons the interest/discount rate issue requires review.

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#### DEATH OF MAJ. CLIFTON C. WILLIAMS, JR., U.S. MARINE CORPS

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, the hearts of Alabama and the Nation were saddened yesterday with the announcement by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that one of our most able astronauts, Maj. Clifton C. Williams, Jr., of the U.S. Marine Corps, had died in an airplane crash.

Major Williams was a son of Alabama, and the tragic accident which took his life occurred while he was on a flight from Cape Kennedy, Fla., to Brookley Air Force Base, at Mobile, where his parents reside.

I had the pleasure of meeting Major Williams shortly after he had been named as one of the third group of astronauts in the fall of 1963. I was at once impressed by his leadership qualities, his boundless enthusiasm, and the justifiable pride he took for having been selected as a pioneer in the new space frontier. But what most impressed me about this remarkable and talented young man was his keen knowledge and understanding of the importance of his vital mission to the peace and security of America and the free world. This can only signify a deep sense of purpose, devotion to public duty, and love of country.

Yes, Mr. President, Major Williams did indeed know the meaning of freedom and democracy, and America can ill afford to lose young men possessed of such loyalty and devotion.

Mr. President, I know that I speak for all of Alabama in extending my heartfelt sympathy to the widow of Major Williams, to his precious young daughter, and to his parents on the loss they have suffered.

#### NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS DIRECT ELECTION APPROACH TO ELECTORAL REFORM

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, a membership survey recently conducted by the National Small Business Association upon the question of electoral reform produced some significant results.

According to the association's tabulation, 91 percent of the members responding to the survey favored direct popular election of the President and Vice President. Only about 5 percent preferred a proportional electoral system, while less than 1 percent advocated the district system of electoral votes. Signifi-

cantly, less than 3 percent of the persons responding to the survey indicated that they desired no change whatsoever in the existing method.

The National Business Association is to be commended for its continuing interest in this subject. The groups and organizations which have expressed support for the direct election method of electoral reform have been growing steadily.

The National Small Business Association, which has for several years maintained a steadfast interest in electoral reform, was largely responsible for filing the unique suit of Delaware against New York last term in the U.S. Supreme Court. In this suit, which the Court declined to hear, 13 States joined in asking that the existing winner-take-all electoral system be declared unconstitutional. While the Delaware brief requested the Supreme Court to "open the door" and "point the way" by providing "equitable interim relief," it pointedly recognized that "ultimate correction may best be achieved by constitutional amendment."

It is my hope that in the near future the Senate will have the opportunity to consider an amendment designed to assure the direct popular election of the President and Vice President.

Mr. President, the July 1967 issue of the Small Business Bulletin of the National Small Business Association contained two very informative and worthwhile articles analyzing the presidential election system and describing the recent attempt to secure judicial relief. I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### WHAT IS THE FAIREST WAY TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT?

The flexibility of the Constitution is in large measure responsible for its durability. We are forever indebted to those men who, with profound wisdom and inspired foresight, drafted our basic law, not as a monolithic code of irrevocable statutes, but as a viable basis for the government of a free people, sufficiently elastic to meet the changing needs of changing times.

One of the needs which is becoming more and more imperative is an alternative to the present electoral college method of electing our presidents and vice presidents.

"Archaic, undemocratic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and dangerous"—that is the way the electoral college method of electing a president is described in a recent report of the American Bar Association.

#### HOW SYSTEM WORKS

Under the U.S. Constitution each state is required to appoint presidential electors, who, in turn, elect the President and Vice President of the U.S. The laws of each state provide for popular election of presidential electors but allow each voter to vote for all of its electors on a general ticket. The result is that all of a state's electoral votes are cast as a unit for the presidential candidate who wins a plurality of its popular votes.

The state unit system allows all of a state's votes to be cast for a candidate opposed by as many as 49 percent of its voters. Votes cast for the losing candidate within a particular state are treated as if they had been cast for his opponent. The barest popular vote plurality is converted into a unan-



imous state vote for the winning candidate.

The state unit vote system is a "winner-take-all" system. All electoral votes go to the plurality winner in the state. Thus in the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon race, New Jersey voters cast 1,385,415 votes for Kennedy and 1,363,324 for Nixon. Although Nixon trailed by only 22,091 votes out of 2,748,739, New Jersey's entire electoral vote was cast for Kennedy. In effect the 1,363,324 votes cast for Nixon in New Jersey were discarded and cancelled, isolated from those cast by voters of the same party in other states.

Distorted and inequitable results are always possible when each state's electoral vote for its plurality winner is combined with the electoral vote for plurality winners in other states to determine the President of our country. Thus only three years ago Lyndon B. Johnson won 61 percent of the popular vote in the nation, but received 90 percent of the electoral vote.

The electoral college method has been used in 45 presidential elections. Under it 14 Presidents have been elected who did not obtain a majority of the popular votes cast in the election, and of these 14 minority Presidents, three of them each received fewer popular votes than his major opponent. They were John Q. Adams (1824), Rutherford B. Hayes (1876) and Benjamin Harrison (1888).

In 1916, a shift of 1,904 votes for Hughes in California would have awarded its 13 electoral votes to him and resulted in his election even though Wilson would have remained the national electorate's choice by more than 587,000 votes. In 1948, a shift of 29,294 votes in California, Illinois, and Ohio would have elected Dewey by two electoral votes, although Truman would still have had a national plurality of more than 2,077,000 popular votes.

In recent Senate testimony, Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School said the fact that the popular vote winner has been the Presidential winner in 93 percent of our elections is not enough. "This is like boasting that 93 percent of the planes leaving Washington airport arrive at their destination," he said.

Analyzing the electoral college system, Professor Freund said:

"The rise of political parties, with their designated candidates, converted the electoral college into a group at best of useless ciphers and at worst of dangerous mavericks. Moreover, the other central feature of the present system—the unit count in each state—came about in contravention of the original (Founding Fathers') understanding, through the unilateral action of the largest states in the early nineteenth century, and a similar response by the smaller states in order to keep such leverage as they could in the total electoral count. Beyond the historical anomalies stand the practical inequities and risks of the system."

#### ALTERNATIVE REFORMS

Although pressures for reform of the electoral college system are growing in intensity, and amendment will be achieved only after a long and hard legislative and educational campaign. The Constitutional amendment process requires approval by two-thirds of the members of Senate and House and ratification by three-fourths of the states' legislatures. Hearings on proposed amendments are now being held by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments.

#### DISTRICT SYSTEM

The specific nature of reform is optional in the sense that there are several alternatives. One is the district system by which electoral votes would be awarded to the plurality winners in Congressional districts for those electoral votes corresponding to Representatives. In testimony before the Senate

it had been pointed out that the District system would still involve the risk of the present electoral college system wherein the candidate with the highest popular vote would not necessarily win the election. The ballots of those who voted for the loser would be discarded as under the present system. The District system would give a premium to Districts with a light voter turnout. It would accentuate controversy over gerrymandering—where district lines are to be drawn—and other problems of apportionment.

#### PROPORTIONAL METHOD

Another variant of reform would be to divide each state's electoral vote proportionally according to the percentages of statewide popular vote. Senate testimony opposing the proportional approach emphasizes that the method (1) would retain the inequitable features inherent in the allotment of electoral votes to the states and (2) would not take account of voter non-participation.

#### DIRECT, POPULAR VOTE

Another alternative would be the election of a president and vice president by direct, nationwide popular vote, thus ignoring district or state lines. Objections to this method, as presented in the Senate hearings, are that direct, popular vote would encourage the proliferation of splinter political parties, damage to the state-federal system, and would require sacrifice by the smaller states of their two bonus electoral votes as represented by their U.S. Senators.

Most students of the electoral college system agree that the larger states would be giving up more than smaller states by their support of the direct, popular vote method. The present electoral college system gives excessive power to organized groups, enabling them to swing the entire electoral vote of a state to one candidate or the other. The American Bar Association pointed out in its report that under the present system it is conceivable a candidate could win the popular vote of 11 large states and one small state by a slight margin and therefore win the election, although having less than 25 percent of the total popular vote cast in the country.

It is maintained that a provision requiring a candidate to receive 40 percent of the popular vote to be elected would give splinter parties less leverage under the direct, popular vote method than now enjoyed by them under the present system. One Constitutional amendment proposed provides for a national runoff election between the two top candidates in the event that no candidate receives at least 40 percent of the popular vote.

#### EQUALITY NEEDED

There is growing support for direct, popular election. Advocates of this method declare that, on principle, it is the fairest method; that the President is the president of all the people; that the constituency of the president transcends state lines, district lines, and every man's vote regardless of where he lives should be of equal weight to every other man's vote in choosing the president; and that the right and duty of all citizens to participate, and share responsibility equally, in providing good national government is encouraged by direct, popular vote.

#### DISTORTION OF POPULAR VOTE BY ELECTORAL COLLEGE (1960 ELECTION)

	Kennedy		Nixon	
	Popular vote	Electoral vote	Popular vote	Electoral vote
Illinois.....	2,377,846	27	2,368,988	0
Indiana.....	952,358	0	1,175,120	13
2-State total..	3,330,204	27	3,544,108	13
Percent.....	48.4	67.5	51.6	32.5

Thus, the winner of a clear majority of the popular votes cast in the two states received less than one-third of their electoral votes. In the adjoining states of Virginia and Maryland, voters who supported Kennedy suffered a similar fate:

	Kennedy		Nixon	
	Popular vote	Electoral vote	Popular vote	Electoral vote
Maryland.....	565,808	8	489,538	0
Virginia.....	362,327	0	404,521	12
2-State total..	928,135	8	894,059	12
Percent.....	50.9	40	49.1	60

Again, the unit-votes by states converted a two-state popular vote minority into a sizable electoral vote majority.

#### NSBA LONG ACTIVE IN PUSH FOR ELECTORAL REFORM

For several years the National Small Business Association, in its publications, in seminars, and in its community education program, has spotlighted forcefully the inequities and dangers of the electoral college method. Congress repeatedly has failed to act to overhaul the antiquated system.

It was primarily for this reason that the National Small Business Association made available the money needed for research and printing in connection with the suit filed last year in the U.S. Supreme Court by Delaware and 12 other states. To force relief and to give broad exposure to the inequities of the electoral college as implemented by state laws, the Delaware suit asked the U.S. Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional the state unit-vote "winner-take-all" system. Frustrated by Congressional inaction going back to the late 1790s, the 13 states requested the Supreme Court to "open the door" and "point the way through equitable interim relief."

It is generally agreed that reform of our electoral college system has been delayed because of the hope that the judicial branch of government would inject itself into the "political thicket" just as the Courts had done in the field of legislative apportionment.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however, declined to hear the Delaware suit. Although it gave no reasons for its refusal to extend the "one person—one vote" principle to the election of the President, the Court's implicit message was: "This is a grave and fundamental matter that Congress and the states must decide." The Delaware brief had pointedly recognized that "ultimate correction may best be achieved by Constitutional Amendment."

John A. Gosnell, NSBA General Counsel, was a leading participant in the drafting of the able briefs presented to the Court. In addition to clarifying procedural aspects of undertaking reform, the Delaware suit served other laudatory purposes as pointed out by Felix Morley writing in *Nation's Business* of October, 1966:

"Whatever the outcome, the well reasoned plea . . . will stand out as a landmark in our Constitutional history. . . . The scholarly care behind the presentation is only one of the factors making it distinctive. Here is an elucidation of the subject, as important as it is complicated, helpful to all students of American government."

Neal R. Peirce writing in *The Reporter* (October 6, 1966) made this comment:

"Almost one hundred pages in length, the Delaware brief constitutes a remarkable *tour de force* on all the laws and Constitutional precedents affecting voting rights and the institution of the Electoral College."

Joining Delaware in the suit were South Dakota, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming, Florida, Iowa, Arkansas, Kansas, and West Virginia.

## VIETNAM—CRISIS OF INDECISION

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I would invite the attention of Senators to what I think is a stimulating article on the terribly difficult and divisive subject of Vietnam.

Writing in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Robert Shaplen entitles his article "Vietnam: Crisis of Indecision." In it, he concentrates on the possibilities of a political settlement of the conflict there, providing both a review of the developing and present political forces in South Vietnam and some suggestions for taking advantage of them.

I found the conclusion of his article particularly interesting in view of the obvious escalation of emotion in this body and the Nation concerning the war. He says:

If Vietnam has been a tragic and often misconstrued chapter of this American commitment and involvement (in Asia), the trend toward withdrawal and neo-isolationism, which has become the confused domestic political by-product of the conflict, does not either represent a practical solution or augur well for acceptance of our unavoidable responsibilities in a world that remains highly combustible and revolutionary.

The article contains much that is speculative in its discussion of possibilities for political developments within South Vietnam and among the various structures of power involved in the war, but I believe it adds an important perspective to our consideration of this vital matter.

Mr. Shaplen is the east Asia correspondent of the *New Yorker* and former Newsweek bureau chief in Shanghai. I ask unanimous consent that his article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## VIETNAM: CRISIS OF INDECISION

(By Robert Shaplen)

As the war in Viet Nam moves well into the third year of the major phase that began early in 1965 with the deployment of large numbers of American troops, there are indications that the long and difficult conflict is in a state of irresolution, or what the communists describe as "indecisiveness." This does not mean stalemate, a word Washington officials rightly reject, since the military contest on the ground remains highly fluid and damaging to both sides, while the population and economy of North Viet Nam, subject as they are to an ever-widening pattern of bombing, are obviously being hurt (reports from the North say that half a million persons, including perhaps 100,000 Chinese, are now engaged in repairing the bomb damage). In South Viet Nam, American troops and their foreign allies, and occasionally the South Vietnamese, are continuing to win some major battles and with the help of coordinated tactical air, heavy bombing and artillery attacks are inflicting heavy casualties on the communists.

Despite these losses by attrition, however, and despite their acknowledged difficulties in replenishing their guerrilla ranks, the communists have held their own, are still able to strike back effectively, and have managed over the last six months, through continued infiltration from the North and some recruitment in the South, to increase their total number of men fighting in South Viet Nam from 260,000 to approximately 300,000, of whom some 60,000 at present are North Vietnamese. According to accounts of pris-

oners and defectors, as many as two-thirds of the four or five thousand men being infiltrated each month in small units into South Viet Nam are being lost within a period of months, through bombing of infiltration routes, as a result of illness (chiefly malaria or intestinal disorders) or in battle. Nevertheless, the replacements keep filtering through the Laos corridor, and in addition the North Vietnamese have committed as many as three full divisions at a time across the Demilitarized Zone for action in the First Corps area, the northernmost part of South Viet Nam; elsewhere, the communists have shown signs of shifting their strategy and tactics and of being less prone to engage in large-unit actions—company-size or better—unless, in their calculation, they either have the advantage of superior strength or total surprise, or unless special circumstances seem to warrant the risks. Their basic weapons, mainly of the Chinese-manufactured 7.62 millimeter family, are as good as or better than ever, and as plentiful, in spite of increasing losses of guns in battle and the Allied capture of some large ammunition caches, while their recent employment of sophisticated Russian howitzers, artillery, mortar and rockets, especially in the area just south of the D.M.Z., has enabled them to retaliate in kind for some of the artillery and bombing punishment they have suffered.

The American response to this sustained communist challenge has undergone some adjustments and alterations of its own as it has become apparent that the Allied momentum of 1965 and 1966 has slowed down and that, notwithstanding their superior firepower and mobility, the Allies cannot provide a knockout blow in 1967 any more than the communists were able to achieve such a blow two years ago. Faced with obligations elsewhere in the world, and eager to avoid having to call up reserves, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, despite some hawkish pressure from high-ranking members of the military establishment and of Congress, have limited the additional troops likely to be sent to General Westmoreland this year and early next to two reinforced divisions.

Even if the Koreans and Australians add some more troops, if the South Vietnamese increase their draft calls, thereby building up a total Allied force of some 1.3 million, the war on the ground is not likely to be anything but "indecisive." The communists cannot be expected to fall below the 1:4 ratio of total strength, and the ratio is actually less since a larger proportion of their men is engaged in fighting. In other respects, most importantly in organization of the countryside, the Viet Cong are still considerably ahead of the South Vietnamese. In the murky area of pacification and revolutionary development, after several years of repeated experimentation and reorganization, progress on the government side is still excruciatingly slow. There is a belated awareness that the regular South Vietnamese forces (ARVN) will probably never be galvanized and motivated into providing proper security for the revolutionary development teams, and that the job should be given to the local or Popular Forces, who are to be paid more money (they are still by far the poorest paid of all Vietnamese troops) and given better weapons. This overdue step may slowly improve the situation, but most observers with long experience in Viet Nam have become thoroughly skeptical that the pacification program, under the present complicated and fragmented social-economic and political-military dispensation in the country will ever really get off the ground. Consequently, there has been a shift in thinking and a new concentration on improving certain aspects of the political situation, which is at least more flexible if also more explosive. An improvement politically

should all along have been a parallel objective to successful pacification and revolutionary development, which together define a good counterinsurgency program; but unfortunately it has not worked out that way.

If there are some Americans, including some in the highest places who still believe that the war can be won militarily, or that at least the government in Hanoi can be forced by bombing and by military pressure in the South to come to the conference table, there are increasing numbers who now feel that the way to bring the conflict to an end is through political accommodation in South Viet Nam. This trend of thinking coincides with signs of a new line of thought among the North Vietnamese. While so far they show no indication of giving up or diminishing their commitment, the communist leaders directing the war effort are beginning to talk more and more, as captured documents reveal, of reaching that "indecisive" period when it will pay them to start "fighting while negotiating." General Nguyen Van Vinh, chairman of the National Reunification Commission of North Viet Nam, which directs the war in the South, still speaks of achieving "decisive victory within the next four years," but he has frequently modified this by declaring that "our policy is to continue fighting until such time as we can fight and negotiate at the same time" and has added that "while negotiating we will continue fighting even more vigorously." Vinh, further, has emphasized that "it is possible that the North will conduct negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South will also participate in negotiations while continuing to fight."

It seems likely that these possible courses of action were high on the agenda of discussion during the July meeting in Hanoi of North Vietnamese diplomatic representatives summoned home from their posts. Another topic that undoubtedly came up concerned the future relationship between Hanoi and its South Vietnamese offspring, the National Liberation Front, which it dominates and controls more thoroughly than ever but which nevertheless still contains non-North and even non-communist elements. Inevitably, if the fighting-while-negotiating phase is coming closer, the position of the N.L.F., which Hanoi has always alleged is an independent entity, will become crucial; Hanoi will have to face the problem of maintaining tight controls over the Front while simultaneously pretending to give it a looser rein. Finally, the July meeting in Hanoi and continuing discussions among North Vietnamese Communist leaders have surely been concerned with the critical national manpower and resupply problems created by the bombing; these are directly related to the complicated question of Chinese internal disorder and to China's capacity and willingness to continue sending unlimited help to North Viet Nam, primarily guns and bullets, without obtaining a pledge from Hanoi favoring Peking over Moscow in the ideological split and promising to go on fighting and not to negotiate—a pledge Hanoi is loath to give.

It is apparent that the North Vietnamese are becoming increasingly upset by the effects the Peking-Moscow clash is having on the prosecution of the war. "We are worried," General Vinh has bluntly admitted, and Le Duan, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party chairman, has declared that the large commitment of United States forces was encouraged by the American realization that "the foreseeable situation would not drive them into becoming involved in a major limited war which required that they cope with the strong reaction of the entire Socialist bloc." Recently, the North Vietnamese have criticized Chinese theoretical thinking about "revisionism," which is described as "too extreme," as well as Chinese strategy and tactics of prolonged "wars of liberation." Gen-



eral Vinh has said, undoubtedly without having first consulted the Russian, "The Soviet Union will support us under all conditions, whether we fight, or negotiate, or fight and negotiate," and has added: "China gives us wholehearted support, but she has weak points," including her "technical ability [which] is inferior to that of the Soviet Union." More and more, the North Vietnamese are stressing their old theme of tough "self-reliance." Reading between the lines, it would seem that Hanoi's careful balancing act between Moscow and Peking, which it has managed to carry on for years, may by necessity be undergoing some revamping; events may force the North Vietnamese to make some sort of choice, or at least a shift, and this is likely to determine what they do about any and all forms of negotiation.

In this context, there are three levels on which negotiations, or steps leading toward negotiations while some fighting in South Viet Nam continues, could take place, beginning either early next year, possibly during and after the annual Tet (New Year's) holiday, or perhaps not until after the November 1968 American Presidential election. (The election in the United States remains another important factor in Hanoi's overall calculation. If the communists decide to gamble on the mounting American debate and confusion, and to wait until after the election to negotiate, they will naturally have to reconsider the other factors enumerated above, especially any drastic change in their relations with China.)

The first of the three levels may be described as "local and political." In certain areas, a series of covert approaches might be made by South Vietnamese hamlet and village representatives to members of the Front or the People's Revolutionary Party, the southern political arm of the Lao Dong; these approaches might be followed by formal or, as is more likely initially, informal discussions and arrangements. Their ultimate objective would be the holding of new hamlet and village elections in South Viet Nam in which all local elements would participate; but such elections would follow a period of mutual reconciliation worked out autonomously within the village and hamlet areas concerned, with as little outside interference as possible from higher echelons of either side.

The second level of negotiations might involve discussions between Hanoi and the Front on one side and the Americans and the Saigon government on the other, and they might be engendered and facilitated in one of the many ways suggested over the last two years, either privately or publicly; such negotiations conceivably would deal with some of the basic questions such as an end to the bombing, withdrawals of troops on both sides, etc.

The third level would bring the United States and the Soviet Union into the picture together, and perhaps others, as guarantors of an agreement. The effect of such negotiations, whether they were conducted at another Geneva conference or somewhere else, would be to strengthen the hand of the Russians in North Viet Nam and leave the Americans with a role of some influence in South Viet Nam. For the moment anyway, in view of the havoc in China, the Chinese would be effectively squeezed out, which might produce some loud propaganda screams and intensify the heat of the Moscow-Peking dispute, but not much else. Since a primary objective of both the Americans and the Russians is to persuade Hanoi to disentangle itself from Peking, which despite the strong pro-Peking sentiments among some North Vietnamese leaders may not now be as difficult as it would have been a year or so ago, a joint Russian-American move, if properly timed and executed, would no doubt contain the Chinese and restrain them from taking any rash steps that could provoke a larger

war, such as a "spontaneous" eruption of Chinese troops across the North Vietnamese border. The purpose of the Russian-American détente would be the creation of an effective Vietnamese buffer zone. A further step might then be the neutralization of other parts of Southeast Asia, starting with Cambodia and Laos, both of which would be only too willing to accept this.

There is nothing to suggest that negotiations on these three levels must proceed separately, although it would seem logical that the first level must start first. At some point during the period of "fighting and negotiating" at the same time, while the first-level accommodations were being attempted, the second and even the third negotiatory level might be reached; it would seem practical, if not in fact unavoidable, that the first two levels should sooner or later be conducted simultaneously. However, for the purposes of discussion here, the three levels, and the possibilities they suggest of ending the war, will be taken up one at a time.

## II

Any possibility of local arrangements between pro-Saigon and pro-Viet Cong elements in the South Vietnamese countryside must presuppose two related conditions: the existence of a government in Saigon led by civilians who have the respect of all South Vietnamese, including at least potentially that of the five million living in Viet Cong-controlled areas, and a consequent willingness on the part of the local leaders of these five million to begin a series of selective dialogues. At this writing, it is impossible to predict what the effect of the September Presidential and Senatorial elections in South Viet Nam will be. Whether or not the military ticket headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu and Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky has been elected, the key man remains Tran Van Huong, who has been the leading civilian candidate for President. Those Vietnamese who are eager to settle the war through accommodation—and they include almost all civilian leaders and the majority of the population—believe that Huong, if not as President then as the chosen Prime Minister, has the best chance of prosecuting a peace plan. Although he is not physically strong and is not always forceful in action, Huong, a southerner, which is important in itself for purposes of negotiation, is firm in his convictions, and more importantly he is respected for his honesty and integrity and for his dedication to the cause of seeking peace without selling out to the communists. He is for accommodation and for free elections, which ultimately might produce a pro-communist or strongly neutralist President, but he is against any premature coalition government, which surely would have that effect. He is said to favor a gradual approach to peace, locally and then regionally.

If Huong, or anyone else, is to succeed in this pursuit, the military must be held in check. This will be difficult to do unless the United States is determined finally to use its influence and leverage to restrain the generals, individually and collectively, and to give the civilians a chance to try accommodation. What Huong or another civilian leader would require, in effect, is a guarantee from the United States that his position would be safeguarded from coups or demerits of the sort that early in 1965 forced Huong himself out of office after he had been Prime Minister for three months. Since the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in November 1963, which Washington promoted and helped execute, the United States has been signally unsuccessful in the use of its leverage to influence important political decisions and events in South Viet Nam. The next few months may offer the last chance. The only other option short of withdrawal is to go on prosecuting the war through further gradual or rapid escalation to force a military decision. The

search for peace, when it comes, might then include some of the same efforts at accommodation, but they would be much harder to pursue in an atmosphere of more despair, bitterness and recrimination.

If a decent and respected and unmolested civilian government can be established in Saigon, supported by an alert and active Senate (and a similar House of Representatives to be elected early in November), how could it proceed to deal with local Viet Cong elements? One must here begin with some other assumptions. The most important of these is that Viet Cong cadres in enough key areas could be persuaded that the alternatives offered by the Saigon representatives are worth their attention.

The Viet Cong would have to believe that the opportunities to maintain a voice for themselves in the countryside, through participation in local elections and otherwise, would be worth more than maintaining a series of shadow governments while the fighting-and-negotiating continued, with the possibility of resuming prolonged and painful guerrilla warfare of course always in the back of their minds. They would have to be further persuaded that, even though many if not most of them have been well-disciplined communists, the chance to be "legal" at the low levels, and to compete more openly than clandestinely with Saigon's representatives, warrants their cooperation. To turn this around, realistically, it should be said that the impact the Viet Cong have had in the rural areas will not easily be eliminated, no matter how and when the war ends. While it is true that the communists have lost some of their popularity in the areas they hold as a result of higher taxes, rougher treatment of the local population, including conscription, food controls and so on, it is also true that the government's image through the revolutionary development program and in other ways has not come through nearly strongly nor widely enough to compensate for the essentially low regard in which the great majority of government agents are still held; these include tax collectors, the police, district and province chiefs, and individual officers and soldiers, not to mention profiteers and landlords who still engage in widespread corruption and have resumed their own tax collections whenever they can return to cleared local areas behind the skirts of government troops.

The Viet Cong cadres who might be persuaded to participate in new local elections, starting in the hamlets, would, under any circumstances, be making a calculated gamble. They are still ahead of the government in the areas they control, and would conceivably be enticed by the prospect of gaining more initially in the indeterminate and government-controlled places. A contest and a race against time would develop, and the best thing that Saigon under pressure, would have going for itself is the establishment, finally of a viable constitutional government whose popularity would increase in direct ratio to its ability to continue gaining the support and respect of the peasantry. This might be enhanced in various ways, including the proper implementation of the new local election regulations already in effect which call for villages to retain 40 percent of what they collect in local taxes for their own use, instead of turning everything over to the districts and provinces. An immediate reevaluation of the policy on land rents would be another way of gaining popular support. It is a fact, as has recently been brought out, that the abolition or lowering of rent collections would be more meaningful to the peasants right now than the parceling out of former French or Vietnamese holdings; much of this land, along with church or communally held properties, is tied up in a vast confusion of ownership claims and general bureaucratic red tape, and it will take years to clear all this up.

The willingness of the local Viet Cong cadres (a good number of whom have been disillusioned and whose lives have been deeply disrupted by the ever-increasing violence of the war) to cooperate in a new program of hamlet self-rule would also depend on various intangible factors. The native cadres, residents of their areas since birth or for many years, would have to be convinced that by going along with Saigon's "opening to the left" they would not only preserve hamlet and village self-determination as they see it, but as it is part of the historic Vietnamese tradition of local autonomy.

The local cadres who have been most politically active on a day-by-day, week-by-week and month-by-month basis are the nuts and bolts of the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front machine, and the control exercised over them by the People's Revolutionary Party, while it has been severe, has been in the nature of a steel hood placed over an engine composed of many small parts. Conceivably, the parts could be stirred below the hood. There is another factor: the local cadres would have to be further persuaded to gamble for the chance to maintain their own southern image, in cooperation with a southern-led Saigon government, against the threat by the North to impose its rule. There seems little doubt that the southern cadres, no matter how thoroughly indoctrinated with communism they have been, and how well disciplined, still resent being ordered about in the execution of their revolutionary duties by northern political and military officers. The fact remains, while the southerners may think in terms of ultimate reunification with the North, there is a strong tradition of southern separatism and a desire to retain a southern identity, and to develop and complete the revolution in the South prior to discussing unity. This tradition and thrust of southern revolutionary independence dates back to the 1930s. Can local nationalist and regional expression now be reinvigorated as part of a movement toward peace? Can the true nationalists in South Viet Nam, including among others, a considerable number of Socialists ideologically independent of both Moscow and Peking and a number of peasant labor-union cadres, be projected into the political maelstrom and given a chance to play meaningful roles among the peasantry? These may prove to be the most significant questions as the coming crisis of peace and war unfolds, and they obviously offer challenges and opportunities to both sides.

### III

If the attempt to reach local accommodations looking chiefly toward new elections is at all successful, a number of by-products would soon create situations of a second-level negotiatory nature. These would include the opening of some hostile or contested areas to access by both sides; that is, district heretofore available only to the Viet Cong would become available to government representatives, and vice versa. The regional flow of local trade would increase, and communication in and out of areas generally would become more possible. Refugees could return to their homes. It would be illusory to suppose that some degree of clandestine activity of a proselytizing nature would not continue on both sides, but this would be acceptable if the incidence of terror and assassination could be limited. The possibility of establishing local ceasefire zones suggests itself as the best way to achieve a balance of power instead of a balance of terror.

The creation of cease-fire zones would almost certainly have to be negotiated between higher authorities, between regimental or division commanders on the government side, for example, and communist zone commanders. The cease-fires might have to have the approval of even higher authorities, including central government officials in Saigon and

representatives of the National Liberation Front, acting on its own behalf or as the "branch office" of Hanoi, though it would not admit to being that. Actually, there are numbers of areas in Viet Nam today where tacit cease-fires already exist between communist and government forces, each agreeing to leave the other alone, so a framework of such accommodation has been established.

Whether Hanoi would condone a formalization of such cease-fires without the Americans first calling off the bombing of the North is surely doubtful. And whether the Americans would call off the bombing without evidence that Hanoi had ceased infiltrating reinforcements south is problematical. At this point, the bombing issues might become a matter of negotiation between the United States and North Viet Nam, or, if not yet of full negotiation, of probings or even of tentative acts of faith. In the meantime, in any event, it would not be supposed that all military activity would have ceased in the South. In fact, American search-and-destroy operations against communist main-force elements would probably have continued all along, and would probably still go on even as small cease-fire zones or truce areas were established. But the way might now be cleared to enter into the major second-level area of discussion, including cessation of bombing in the South as well as the North, and the bombing question as a whole would thus become more of a tactical instrument in the large strategy of the search for peace and not simply an almost irresolvable issue in itself. The difficulty of calling off the bombing in return for some significant large act of de-escalation on the part of the North Vietnamese, such as an abrupt end to infiltration, would thus be eliminated, or reduced to a more workable perspective. Social psychologists have aptly pointed out that too broad and unspecified a "behavior" has been requested of the North Vietnamese in order to achieve too broad and unspecified a goal, and the longer such demands are made the more difficult it becomes to attain that goal. By breaking the goal down into lesser goals, attainable step by step, the ultimate goal might become more realizable.

This does not, for a moment, mean compromising with our primary goals, foremost of which is our insistence that the territorial and political integrity of South Viet Nam, and for that matter of North Viet Nam too, be preserved and guaranteed. However, the Americans and the South Vietnamese must take certain risks as well as the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, for under any circumstances, especially during a period of fighting and negotiating at the same time, politics, to reverse the classic formula, is simply a means of waging war by other means. Nor is there any reason to suppose that, whatever happens, the North Vietnamese Communists will give up their efforts to subvert South Viet Nam to their own purposes through a phased socioeconomic and "national democratic" revolution in the South aimed at ultimately building a single nation of some thirty million people. Our objective is to limit the scope and possibilities of subversion by imposing a workable legal framework, and then to convince as many local southern communists as possible that this framework offers them the best opportunity for the welfare and development of South Viet Nam.

The North Vietnamese themselves have declared that the existence of a communist state in the North "cannot replace the inherent social contradictions of South Viet Nam." An approach of gradualism in the rural areas is obviously best calculated to create conditions for challenging local Viet Cong cadres to a true revolutionary contest. If this groundwork can be laid, suggestions have been made that the establishment of an increasing number of cease-fires accom-

panied by political accommodation be then tied to a reduction of the bombing of the North on the basis of a phasing down of the attacks. For example, the United States would agree not to bomb certain parts of the North or to halt all bombing north of certain lines, unless violations of the cease-fires in the South occurred. This idea has already had some currency, most recently in the recommendation of a group of Republican Congressmen. It seems unwise to couch any such offer in terms of punishment for violations, although that is what it might amount to, or to place any formal deadlines on it. At some point, perhaps halfway through the process of establishing cease-fire areas in the South, as the selected zones have been extended to a number of important delta provinces and to some key provinces elsewhere, and perhaps the bombing within these provinces as well as in at least part of the North has been cut down, an effort might be made to create two larger cease-fire zones involving both major American search-and-destroy units and communist main-force elements. One logical zone would be within the D.M.Z. and in an area extending south of it for a stretch of at least ten miles; the projected electronic detection barrier to be built by the United States might fit into this plan. The second zone ostensibly could take in an area stretching east from the Cambodian border in the Third Corps region and eventually could extend across the highlands and plateau to the coastal provinces of Quang Nam, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen.

It is perfectly possible, if not likely, that the North Vietnamese would not go along with any gradual reduction of the bombing and would still insist, as they have all along, that the bombing be stopped completely before any discussions can start. However, if the United States dropped its insistence on a positive and specific reciprocal gesture—namely, a cessation of infiltration from the North—the above plan would stand a better chance. The dangers of permitting infiltration to continue while the plan is being launched are not nearly as great as the advantages that would accrue from a gradual extension of the cease-fire zones, since infiltration, by itself, is more the effect than the cause of the continuing war; for the real cause is the determination of Hanoi and the Viet Cong to go on fighting at the current level of activity or to revert to action somewhere between phase one and phase two. The time to bring up the question of infiltration and the total end of the bombing of the North, as well as the extension of the cease-fire throughout South Viet Nam, would come when the plan had succeeded up to the point of reducing the level of action sufficiently to warrant the hope that an overall agreement might be negotiated. It might even be argued that if there are enough hopeful signs as the process unfolds, the United States could end the bombing unconditionally even before the third level of the negotiatory process gets under way.

### IV

If the process of local accommodation accompanied by the establishment of cease-fire zones has even been partially successful, with Hanoi as well as the Viet Cong accepting the challenge, third-level discussions would serve to enlarge the scope and portent of the peace plan. It is at this juncture that the role of the Russians, as adjudicators and as persuaders of Hanoi, would be of paramount importance. The initial spirit and purpose of the 1962 Geneva Conference that sought to neutralize Laos could here perhaps be recaptured. There is no reason to doubt the desire of the Russians to bring an end to the war in Viet Nam, and no reason to suppose that they would not, at this point, join with the Americans in diplomatic manoeuvres to encourage and facilitate a broader agreement. As stated earlier, the mechanics and techniques of such an approach are best left to the parties concerned.



It would, however, seem advisable to project an agreement on Viet Nam as much as possible into a larger Southeast Asian context, and to bring Cambodia and Laos, and possibly some other nations of the region, into the ultimate discussions, wherever they are held. In so far as possible, the earlier stages of such discussions, of establishing and exploring contacts, should be secret. And certainly the talks, when they begin in earnest, should not aim at the exclusion of the Chinese; in fact, at the opportune time the Chinese should be assured that their participation in the economic development of Southeast Asia is welcomed, and that both the United States and the Soviet Union are eager to discuss such larger problems as nuclear disarmament in cooperation with China. The settlement of the Viet Nam issue, once Peking is forced to accept the idea of a Vietnamese buffer state, may yet prove the way for a larger accommodation with China, unless, of course, that country by then is convulsed in civil war.

A broad Geneva-type conference, if it develops out of initial private soundings and arrangements, would obviously have to deal with the difficult matter of policing any agreement reached. It is the writer's opinion that almost any policing plan that would include such straightjacketed mechanisms as the International Control Commission is doomed to failure. Not only would the present members of the I.C.C., if they are retained, end up in bickering and in vetoing of each other's purposes and prerogatives, but they conceivably would tend to exacerbate friction among the Vietnamese seeking to resolve their own problems.

What the Viet Nam situation desperately demands is a more free revolutionary expression of its own ethos, something which, during the long and tragic postwar period when the French refused to let go in the South, was denied it, and which, under Diem and since, has continued to be precluded. If the South is to rediscover its own revolutionary traditions, and to preserve or modify them in relation to the communist North, it must be as unmolested and even as unsupervised as possible. This naturally involves risks of communist domination or subversion, but the risks must be taken in a true revolutionary atmosphere and milieu, and not under the gaze of an ineffective international police element.

This does not mean that the Americans and the Russians and possibly other powers should not play a role, but in so far as possible the role should be of a "good offices" nature. A Geneva-type conference might properly define the purpose of such a mission, and the United Nations might underwrite it. It could project its own mechanism for action, either if called upon by the Vietnamese or perhaps on the basis of its own readings of the unfolding situation in Viet Nam, as a result of which it might interpose suggestions for resolving potential or actual issues and quarrels. There remain some substantive preliminary matters that should rightfully be considered and acted upon at a conference. These include the phased withdrawal of troops from South Viet Nam, both American and North Vietnamese, the surrender of as many weapons as can feasibly be uncovered in the villages during the prolonged cease-fires (obviously some weapons will always remain hidden), the dismantling of bases or the procedure for turning them over to the Vietnamese, the reestablishment of fuller trade and communication between North and South Viet Nam, and perhaps the selection of a date, no less than five years away, for the holding of a referendum on reunification. The implementation of a Mekong Valley development program, the benefits of which, as President Johnson has pledged, would extend to North Viet Nam, could also logically be brought within the purview of a broad agreement that genuine-

ly concerned itself with the future of all of Southeast Asia.

None of this is meant, furthermore, to deny or exclude considerations of power or influence. The often stated determination of the United States to remain involved in Southeast Asian affairs is one that this writer strongly shares, though the commitment today is confused and undefined. Such involvement unavoidably requires the existence of a military shield. There would appear to be ample reason to reapproach this matter with a fresh set of ideas and to replace the somewhat tarnished Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with something more acceptable to the Asians and perhaps more palatable to at least part of the neutral and unaligned if not the communist world. To expect that this might become part of a larger Russian-American accommodation is to much, and is illusory or naive for Moscow cannot afford to renounce its own concept of revolutionary development and will undoubtedly continue to project it in competition with Peking. We cannot realistically assume anything otherwise. However, we can operate in the hope that a peaceful contest for influence in Southeast Asia, on behalf of nationalist development in revolutionary terms, will prevail; though it would also be naive to presume that the Chinese will not continue their efforts to disrupt such peaceful involvement by fomenting violence in Thailand, the Philippines and again in Indonesia. The effort, on our part, should nevertheless be designed to encourage as much peaceful development as possible, and, if that proves ineffective or insufficient, to promote successful programs of counter-insurgency.

Whatever impetus to regional cooperation develops out of a Vietnamese settlement—such cooperation is already burgeoning in several fields, such as education, transportation, banking and finance—should not be inhibited by threats or interpositions of major military might from any outside source, including the United States. Once the Viet Nam situation is regulated, the security of the area will nevertheless depend in the immediate future on the existence of a protective shield supplied in large part by the United States, with the help of Australia and perhaps a lingering British contribution. In the final analysis, the degree of American determination to support nationalist development in Viet Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and to back up its support with its multifarious resources, will prove the key factor, politically and economically more than militarily. One of the generally unrealized benefits of the war in Viet Nam has been an awareness on the part of Asian leaders—as best expressed so far by Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew—that the United States has bought time in Viet Nam for the rest of Southeast Asia to get together and avoid another Viet Nam. The success of the American commitment in the future will depend on our inner resolve, on our understanding of the area's problems and potentialities, as well as on our patience and willingness to remain "involved" indefinitely.

If Viet Nam has been a tragic and often misconstrued chapter of this American commitment, and involvement, the trend toward withdrawal and neo-isolationism, which has become the confused domestic political by-product of the conflict, does not either represent a practical solution or augur well for acceptance of our unavoidable responsibilities in a world that remains highly combustible and revolutionary. The crisis of indecision that confronts us in Viet Nam has simply prolonged and aggravated the confusion, and has made it more difficult to deal with the long-term problems of creating a constructive peace in Southeast Asia. Whatever the risks involved, we now must face up to the "indecisiveness" of the war and attempt, as best we can with the best elements

among the Vietnamese we can find, to reach a political solution for a war that has always been essentially political.

#### TOUCH OF TRAGEDY IN ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, as the Chicago Sun-Times said in an editorial comment upon this Nation's decision to undertake an anti-ballistic-missile defense system, there is a touch of tragedy involved. It lies in the fact that such a system, designed to guard us against possible attack by the unstable Chinese nation, can be effective in neutralizing the danger of nuclear holocaust but not the danger of continued guerrilla warfare as practiced by Mao Tse-tung and his followers.

This is not to say that such sophisticated defenses are not needed. Indeed, as this editorial aptly points up, the need for nuclear weapons and deterrents against their use will remain with us so long as the battle for men's minds and world security is not won. It is that battle in which we are now engaged, of course, in Southeast Asia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Sun-Times editorial, entitled "Escalation for Safety," published on September 20, 1967, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ESCALATION FOR SAFETY

The U.S. decision to build an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense network to guard against a nuclear attack from Red China is significant in two areas. It recognizes the growing threat of Red China's nuclear weapon capacity. It acknowledges that the United States is confident that Russia, and its nuclear armory, poses no present threat to world peace.

Sec. of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in announcing the new ABM network, made the point that neither the United States nor Russia possesses "first-strike capability." That is, neither nation has the ability to attack the other with nuclear weapons without suffering lethal retaliation. Nor, in McNamara's assessment, is either nation likely ever to gain such an advantage.

McNamara says both Russia and the United States are at the point where an escalation of defenses or weaponry by either nation would result in matching escalation by the other. In McNamara's opinion such an effort, which would result in the same balance of deterrence that now exists, would be futile—although the United States is willing to spend any amount of money and effort to protect itself.

The unknown danger to the United States and the world is Red China. Isolated, suspicious, torn by internal dissensions, possibly irresponsible, Red China and its future actions cannot be charted. Its animosities cannot be assessed. Its potential for destruction has been computed. McNamara said a limited ABM defense against the Red Chinese nuclear weapons armory would have a "higher degree of reliability against a Chinese attack than the much more massive and complicated system some have recommended against a possible Soviet attack." The proposed ABM network is thus a necessary effort to safeguard the future.

The tragedy of such a necessity is that a major power can guard itself and others against nuclear attack with the most sophis-

ticated of weapons and defense measures. However, that same sophistication is no deterrent to the Communist guerrilla who, as Mao Tse-tung has said, operates as a "fish swimming in the sea of the enemy."

The battle to neutralize the danger of nuclear attack can be won. The battle for men's minds, and world security, is not won. Until it is, the need for nuclear weapons and deterrents will remain.

#### FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I am pleased to invite the Senate's attention to the action taken by a distinguished organization on the question of electoral reform. At its convention held recently in San Francisco, the Federal Bar Association adopted an eight-point resolution favoring an amendment to the Constitution which would provide for the election of the President and Vice President by a direct, nationwide, popular vote. It is gratifying to note that the stand taken by the Federal Bar Association conforms closely with the features of Senate Joint Resolution 2, the constitutional amendment which I introduced on January 11, for myself and 18 other sponsors.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Federal Bar Association resolution, adopted at the convention in San Francisco, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolved that the Federal Bar Association hereby places itself on record as favoring an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which will:

1. Provide for the election of the President and Vice President by direct nationwide popular vote;
2. Require a candidate to obtain at least 40 per cent of the popular vote in order to be elected President or Vice President;
3. Provide for a national run-off election between the two top candidates in the event no candidate receives at least 40 per cent of the popular vote;
4. Require the President and Vice President to be voted for jointly;
5. Empower Congress to determine the days upon which the original election and the run-off election are to be held, which days shall be uniform throughout the United States;
6. Provide that the places and manner of holding the Presidential election and the inclusion of the names of candidates on the ballot shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof, with the proviso that Congress may at anytime by law make or alter such regulations;
7. Require that the voters for President and Vice President in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for persons voting for members of Congress, with the proviso that each state may adopt a less restrictive residence requirement for voting for President and Vice President provided that Congress may adopt uniform age and residence requirements; and
8. Contain appropriate provisions in case of the death of a candidate.

#### NATIONAL 4-H WEEK

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, tomorrow marks the conclusion of this year's

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observance of National 4-H Week. Nearly 3 million members of 4-H in every State and territory, residing in both urban and rural environs, are now undertaking diverse new projects for the coming year.

As a former member of 4-H, I know firsthand the incalculable contributions being made by this program emphasizing head, heart, hands, and health. It would, I think, be very difficult to overstate the tremendous contribution 4-H Club activities have made over the last five decades to rural America.

I think it is also appropriate to note, particularly during National 4-H Week, the increasing contribution which these programs are making to urban youngsters. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report on the fiscal year 1968 agricultural appropriations bill, observed this fact and urged that additional funds and effort be expended for providing additional opportunities to underprivileged youngsters in our great cities to participate in 4-H type youth development projects. That report stated that—

The wholesome effect of 4-H club activities has been so beneficial to rural youth that additional efforts to bring 4-H programs to young people in the congested and deprived urban areas of the United States would make an invaluable contribution to the moral, spiritual, and economic strength of this Nation.

I most heartily concur in the committee's recommendation.

I have, in fact, introduced legislation in the Senate which is designed to bring these beneficial programs to the young people of one of our greatest cities—Washington, D.C. At the present time, the District of Columbia is the lone city statutorily denied the opportunity to participate in the activities of the Extension Service of the Agriculture Department, a principle source of support and leadership for 4-H. My proposal, S. 2105, would eliminate this barrier to the development of 4-H Clubs and related youth-development activities in the District of Columbia. I am pleased to report that the bill has received wide support, as well as favorable attention, by Senator JORDAN'S Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation. I am most hopeful that S. 2105 will be reported and approved by the Senate at an early date.

Mr. President, 4-H contributed greatly to me as an individual. Its contribution to the Nation as a whole is known by every Member of the Senate. I am honored to have this opportunity to express my personal appreciation to those millions of youngsters and adults whose cooperative efforts over the years have made, and continue to make, 4-H one of America's most worthwhile organizations.

#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 12474) making appropriations for NASA for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12474) making appropriations for NASA for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

#### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent—and this has been cleared all around—that there be a time limitation on all amendments of 30 minutes, the time to be equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment and the floor manager of the bill [Mr. MAGNUSON], and 1 hour on the bill, to be equally divided and controlled by the majority leader and minority leader or whoever is designated by them.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, reserving an objection, I wonder if there is going to be an opportunity for me, under that time limitation, to make a speech of about 5 or 6 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. There will be plenty of time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request? Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this time will not start until after the distinguished manager of the bill, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], makes his opening remarks.

I ask unanimous consent at this time that the distinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK] may have 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the understanding is agreed to.

#### CRASH-LOCATOR BEACONS

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, an article in the Washington Post of 3 days ago was undoubtedly noted by many of my distinguished colleagues with a great deal of remorse. I refer to the report of the diary written by 16-year-old Carla Corbus and her mother, whose remains were found almost 6 months after their plane went down in the mountains of California. I only hope the top echelon of the Federal Aviation Administration, who have consistently refused to require installation of crash-locator beacons in private aircraft, will take note of this tragic incident.

At this point, Mr. President, I would like to recapitulate on some of the points I have brought out in previous statements urging requirement of crash-locator



tor beacons. On August 7, in this Chamber, I pointed out the number of fatalities resulting from general aviation accidents, noting that 53 percent of these fatalities have resulted from crashes occurring more than 5 miles from an airport—only 20 percent of the total general aviation accidents.

The costs incurred in searching for lost aircraft have been tremendous—\$59,224,142 for search and rescue missions flown by the Air Force alone in fiscal 1966. I am sure no one will argue the justification of using taxpayers' funds for these missions, but I do question the refusal of the FAA to take such an urgently needed step to reduce the hazards and the expense of conducting searches for missing aircraft. And, as so tragically illustrated by the report of 3 days ago, crash-locator beacons would most assuredly save lives.

Just 2 months ago, a plane crash in the Colorado mountains was the object of a weeklong search by the Civil Air Patrol and private citizens. I reported in detail to the Senate on this incident in a statement August 18. In this case, there may not have been survivors of the crash—a question which will never be answered. Nevertheless, a full week was spent by ground and air units before the wreckage was finally found, and with no small hazard to pilots trying to fly low enough in mountainous terrain to spot the plane.

In the letters I have received subsequent to my statements calling for requirement of crash-locator beacons, wholehearted support for the proposal has been expressed by pilots in many areas of the country. The few objections raised have been on the grounds of undue expense to owners of private aircraft and the thought that the device would be helpful only for mountain flying.

On the first point, I sympathize with the reluctance of pilots to stand the \$200 expense; but for a device that could very well save their own lives, I certainly do not think it would be asking too much. Since it is for their own protection, it seems just a little unreasonable to leave the entire burden to the taxpayers and the Civil Air Patrol when an alternative is so readily available. One FAA representative commented not long ago that there is no law requiring the Air Force, the Civil Air Patrol, or private pilots to undertake searching missions for downed aircraft. No law, perhaps, other than a moral obligation to save human life, regardless of expense, if there is a remote chance of success. Just what does it take to convince the FAA that the possibilities of success could be greatly increased by this one regulation? Should not the burden of the expense rest with those whose lives might be saved through precautionary measures, rather than in expensive, hazardous assessments on those with the moral responsibility to find them, even if it may be too late?

The second objection—that crash-locator beacons would be necessary only in a few areas of the country—I think is a highly fallacious assumption. I doubt that there are many pilots in this country who have not at one time or another found themselves flying over a relatively

unpopulated area, or over rough, wooded terrain, or even over a mountainous region. I would stress again the letter I quoted in my statement before the Senate on August 7, from a Colorado woman whose husband was killed in a plane crash near Gunnison, Colo. After a week of searching, the plane was finally located only 33 miles from the airport on a heavily timbered mesa. The plane was not high on a mountain peak, inaccessible to ground searching crews. It was, in fact, finally located by ground crews, and even then could not be spotted from the air because of the way it had dived into the timber. There are many other regions in the United States where a plane could go down and not be spotted from the air for just such a reason. I received a very simple response to my proposal for crash-locator beacons recently, which certainly attests to this fact. It reads:

A few years ago, I crashed on take-off in the mountains of Maine. I wasn't found for 24 hours. With a locator beacon I believe I would have been found very quickly. I favor this recommendation.

Another letter from Ogdensburg, N.Y., reads as follows:

I have read the copy of your recent aviation speech. In my short aviation life (200 hours) I have already learned that the weather station forecasts must be confirmed by personal observation. On one occasion I found the weather report to be quite erroneous only 30 miles from the station. The men working the stations have always spared no effort to assist me, you understand, but I would agree with your thinking on this matter.

I too have spent long hours on a Search Mission in the Civil Air Patrol. I shouldn't have been there, really, as the weather was marginal and I am strictly VFR. However, the thought that people might be alive and lying out in the snow with broken legs kept me going. We never found the wreck. A farmer on a tractor did after we had searched for almost three days. A crash locator beacon would have shown us the way in 30 minutes. Such beacons would be a boon.

This letter is from a doctor in Ogdensburg, N.Y. His experience clearly indicates that there are circumstances other than those to be encountered in our Colorado mountains that make search-and-rescue missions both hazardous and expensive. Ogdensburg, to my knowledge, is not in a mountainous region. It is on the St. Lawrence River, and, I believe, in a relatively flat area; but in this instance the weather conditions hampered search operations, not the terrain.

In other correspondence from the State of New York, I find that there are problems at least comparable to our own Rocky Mountains in the West. In a letter from Col. John C. Campbell, Jr., commander of the New York Air National Guard at Schenectady County Airport, I received the following report as evidence of the need for crash-locator beacons:

I have read your speech to the United States Senate with regard to aircraft crashes. I am in complete agreement with your views. I, too, am strongly in favor of crash locator beacons.

This year at least three private aircraft crashed and were missing in our area. These aircraft crashed in mountainous, wooded terrain and could not be spotted from the air, since the woods had complete leaf cover.

All were reported missing for many, many days. Help could not reach them in time, even though the crashes occurred relatively close to high population centers with all the elaborate paraphernalia of our advanced society.

In each case, crash locator beacons would have summoned aid days earlier and would have saved thousands of wasted manhours in futile search.

Over the years, I can recall many missing aircraft crashes in the Catskill, Adirondack, and Green Mountain areas which surround our Capitol District. When a small aircraft crashes in late spring or summertime, the common saying here is to wait for some deer hunter to find the wreck in the fall of the year. A sad commentary, but so very true in too many cases.

In subsequent correspondence with Colonel Campbell, I received further details on five crashes which occurred this year in that region. I ask unanimous consent that Colonel Campbell's letter of September 15 and the attached report from Mr. Francis Mosher, Jr., air safety investigator for the New York office of the Department of Transportation, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter and report were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEW YORK AIR NATIONAL GUARD,  
Schenectady County Airport, N.Y.,  
September 15, 1967.

Senator PETER H. DOMINICK,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR DOMINICK: I refer to your letter of September 6th and my answering letter of September 15th. The inclosed Department of Transportation letter has the details of the aircraft crashes which have occurred this year in the Albany, New York area.

You will notice that all aircraft were lost for several days, at least. One has not been found yet and one was missing for almost two years. It seems obvious that had crash locator beacons been installed they would have, first, pinpointed these crashes and thus directed rescue efforts to the scene with some dispatch and, secondly, saved the expenditure of countless manhours in air and ground search.

I look forward to the success of your efforts to improve the safety of those who fly and the protection of those unfortunates who are exposed to accident. Crash locator beacons will save lives and will spare needless and fruitless searching.

Very truly yours,  
Col. JOHN C. CAMPBELL, Jr.,  
Commander.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,  
Jamaica, N.Y.

Col. JOHN C. CAMPBELL, Jr.,  
New York Air National Guard,  
Schenectady, N.Y.

DEAR COLONEL CAMPBELL: The following is a resume of aircraft accidents which have crashed into mountainous terrain in the immediate Albany, New York area within the last six months or have been located during this period:

Piper PA-23-250, N-5604Y, Owned and operated by New Haven Airways. Crew two commercial instrument rated pilots, High Peak Mountain (elevation 3,580 feet MSL), Tannerville, New York. Departed Albany County Airport 1414 EDT, June 13, 1967, destination Ulster County Airport, Kingston, New York, Albany weather—1500 broken, visibility 6 miles, haze, Poughkeepsie weather—estimated 900 overcast, visibility 2

miles, fog. Flight contacted Albany approach control, reporting over Hudson River and returning to Albany. The wreckage was located on June 19, 1967.

Beech 35, CF-FAS, Owned and operated by Guy Boisvert, Canadian Private Pilot, 3 passengers, Shokan Mountain (elevation 3,700 feet MSL), Margretville, New York, Departed Cartierville, Quebec, 1013 EDT, June 18, 1967, VFR flight plan to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Weather in general area reported as thunderstorms, low ceilings and rain. Poughkeepsie weather: (aircraft reports): 1000 broken, 1800 overcast, visibility 3 miles, light thunderstorm, haze. The wreckage was located on July 4, 1967.

Piper PA-28, N-540W, Owned by Flying West Flying Club, Crew—Private pilot and one passenger, Departed Baltimore, Maryland 1120 EDT, 6-25-67, Destination Montreal, Quebec, Albany weather: 2500 overcast, visibility 7 miles, light rain showers. Aircraft contacted Albany approach control at 1425 EDT and reported stabilizer and gyro difficulty in precipitation east-southeast of Albany Airport. Aircraft not located to date.

Piper PA-28-150, Operator Captain (USAF), Owner Donald R. Wilkinson, New Windsor, New York, Pilot-in-command commercial, airplane single, multi-engine land, instrument, 3 passengers. Departed Orange County Airport, Walden, New York, 0835 EDT, July 1, 1967, VFR flight plan to Syracuse, New York. Weather in general area: low ceiling and fog. Wreckage located July 4, 1967, Mt. Cragmoore (elevation 3400 feet MSL), Ellenville, New York.

Cessna 172, N-9809T, Owned by Skyhaven, Inc., Rochester, New Hampshire, Operated by Private Pilot, One passenger, Departed Rochester, New Hampshire, 1445 EDT, 9-13-65, Destination Windsor Locks, Connecticut. Briefed on weather (telephone) prior to departure, weather reported as VFR marginal. The flight contacted Gardner radio. Wreckage located on July 4, 1967, on Haystack Mt. (elevation 3200 feet MSL), North Bennington, Vermont.

If further information is needed, please feel free to contact this office. The telephone number is Area Code 212, 995-3716, which is on the FTS system. It is requested that the foregoing information not be released for public information.

The reports, when completed, can be obtained by writing to:

Accident Inquiry Section, SB-84C, National Transportation Safety Board, DOT, Bureau of Aviation Safety, 1825 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.

The date, location, aircraft registration number should be included with the request.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS MOSHER, JR.,

Air Safety Investigator,

New York Office.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, each of these accidents resulted in a great deal of time and expense to the local civil air patrol and the local pilots who joined in the searches. Most of the time an expense would have been unnecessary with the aid of a crash-locator beacons, which the FAA reports has been perfected. So despite this fact, the FAA has not recommended regulatory action to require their use.

These reports, along with the discovery of the plane wreckage in California, must surely provide the clearest and most tragic evidence of the urgent need for FAA action to require crash-locator beacons. In most cases of lost aircraft, no record is left of the agony and suffering of the victims, but the picture is made painfully clear by reading of the 7-week ordeal of Mr. and Mrs.

Olen and their daughter. Carla noted in one entry of her diary:

I hope you are happy, Search and Rescue. You haven't found us yet.

The fault lay not, however, with the searching mission, but quite simply with the fact that they did not have a crash-locator beacon. It is indeed a sad commentary on our system when three persons—and Heaven only knows how many more—suffer through such an ordeal, when our technology has provided us with an effective and available means of averting just such a disaster. How many more lives will have to be lost, Mr. President, before the FAA wakes up to its responsibility?

At this point, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the article entitled "Last Days of Three Crash Victims," published in the Washington Daily News of October 3, 1967, and the article entitled "Diary Records Losing Fight for Life by Girl, Mother in Crashed Plane," published in the Washington Post of October 3, 1967.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, Oct. 3, 1967]

#### DIARY OF 16-YEAR-OLD GIRL: LAST DAYS OF THREE CRASH VICTIMS

REDDING, CALIF., October 3.—A girl's diary found at the scene of a plane crash told yesterday of a two-month struggle to survive in the snowy Trinity mountains which ended in death.

The bones of a man and two women were discovered Sunday by a deer hunter near the summit of 3213-foot-high Buckhorn mountain 35 miles west of here in northern California.

At least one of them had survived seven weeks in the rugged snow country after a forced landing March 11 on a flight from Portland, Ore., to Red Bluff, Calif.

The pilot was Al F. Olen, owner of the Clifford Hotel in Portland. Others were his wife, Phyllis, and her daughter, Carla Corbus, 16.

"On leg of journey to Red Bluff," said the diary's first entry. "Plane on left side in snowbank, 1215 p.m. Fuselage broken. Door ajar. Windows on right side were broken as well as windshield."

In another entry, Carla said Olen suffered a broken right arm, crushed right ribs and had pain in his back. Mrs. Olen, she said, was delirious for one day and suffered a broken right hand and left ankle.

Carla said her own injuries were an injured back, a sore right ankle and a cut on the left knee.

On April 30, she noted her 16th birthday: "I want to be rescued today," she wrote. The final entry was dated May 4 and read, "we are completely soaked."

Most of the diary, written in a flight guide book, noted weather conditions. She said the three melted snow for water but made no mention of obtaining food.

The diary also told of planes flying overhead and at one point said "Al" went for help—but apparently he returned when he failed. No mention was made of the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Olen.

The plane was found by Floyd Bolling, a Shasta, Calif., mill worker, and his wife.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Oct. 3, 1967]

#### DIARY RECORDS LOSING FIGHT FOR LIFE BY GIRL, MOTHER IN CRASHED PLANE

REDDING, CALIF., October 2.—A 16-year-old girl and her mother fought for two months a losing battle for their lives in the freezing

carcass of their plane after it crashed on a snowy mountain peak in March, a makeshift diary disclosed tonight.

"Today is my 16th birthday. I wanted to be rescued today," the girl scribbled in the back of an airman's guide 50 days after the crash. "I hope you are happy, Search and Rescue. You haven't found us yet."

That was on April 30, and rescue never came for Carla Corbus or for her mother, Phyllis. Their scattered bones were found near the plane today. Many animal tracks were nearby.

Search parties found no trace of her stepfather, Alvin Olen, a 59-year-old hotel owner from Portland, Ore., who left the plane six days after it crashed on March 11 to seek help.

A deer hunter discovered the wreckage of the single-engine Cessna 191 about 4,000 feet up the summit of Bully Choot Mountain, about 35 miles west of Redding and a mile from a seldom-used road. Search parties had been concentrating their hunt for the missing plane miles north of the site where it actually crashed.

The three victims were on their way to San Francisco to visit Olen's oldest son, Alvin Jr., 32. The son, an airline pilot, spent 107 days in Northern California after the crash. But, he recalled here Monday, during most of that time the weather was so foul he could not fly to hunt for the lost plane.

(In Portland, the Civil Aeronautics Authority said Olen was the object of a search over Montana in 1956 on a flight from Minneapolis to Portland after he changed plans enroute. In 1954 he was fined for reckless flying after taking off from and landing in Vancouver, B.C., only by the light of automobile headlights.)

"On leg of journey to Red Bluff (Calif.)," said the diary's first entry. "Plane on left side in snowbank, 12:15 p.m. Fuselage broken. Door ajar. Windows on right side were broken as well as windshield."

The diary, with entries by both mother and daughter, then described the injuries suffered in the crash.

"Al" suffered a cut on the chin, three cuts on the forehead, a broken arm, crushed ribs on the right side, and "pain in his vertebrae."

Phyllis was "delirious one day," suffering a broken left arm, cuts on the right hand, a broken left ankle and many cuts and bruises, plus frostbitten feet.

Carla was less seriously hurt. The diary noted she "hurt in the back near her left kidney. Sore right ankle. Cut on her left knee."

Three days after the crash, Carla tried to walk through the snow but was turned back "because her feet were frozen and she had lost her shoes."

Six days after the crash, the diary said Olen left the crash scene at the 5000-foot level of the mountain.

"Al shouted ok. He crossed the gully. He was on his way for help."

A week later, an entry written by Mrs. Olen said: "Fear Al did not make it for help. Getting weak."

The diary said they melted snow for water but made only one reference to food—the day Olen left. It said simply: One glass of jelly left."

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, in addition to those whose planes have crashed, we have also done some investigation to find out how many of the people who have been looking for them have also lost their lives.

In 1965, the Civil Air Patrol had three accidents with one life lost. They had test missions, practicing the procedures for rescue, in which they had five accidents and two lives lost. In 1966, they had two accidents in the CAP, although, fortunately, they did not lose any lives.



In 1967, up to date, there have been two accidents, with three lives lost.

These statistics are from information given to us by Lt. Col. Charles McDonnell, U.S. Air Force liaison officer for the Civil Air Patrol.

Fortunately, Mr. President, there have been no U.S. Air Force aircraft lost this year, although there has been one accident with a helicopter. But this report just points out the cost in lives, money, and time which are expended in searching for downed craft.

In the report from Colonel Campbell—which I shall not read in its entirety—it is stated that just this year, in New York, a Piper crashed on June 13, which was not located until July 19. A Beech which crashed on June 18 was not located until July 4. Another Piper which crashed on June 25 has not been located to date.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Colorado may have 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMINICK. That aircraft has not been located to date, though it crashed on June 25.

Another Piper which went down on July 1, was found on the 4th. Also, Mr. President, there is a report of a Cessna 172 which went down on September 13, 1965, in New York, and was finally located on July 4, 1967—almost 2 years after it crashed.

Yet the FAA has stated, in reports to me, that the crash-locator beacon is not required because the pilots object to the added expense. The only way we will ever get these devices into the planes is to have a regulation that the manufacturers must incorporate them as original equipment when they build the airplane, with the cost included as part of the purchase price. For the small additional cost each pilot would have to assume in order to take care of the expense of this item, we could possibly save as much as \$59 million in tax funds expended for search-and-rescue mission. It seems ridiculous to me to have the FAA time after time, state that they are not going to do anything about crash beacons because they have heard some objections from some of the aviation people, who do not wish to pay that much money. I certainly must say this makes little sense from the taxpayer's point of view, from the point of view of human suffering, or from the point of view of the country at large, in our effort to try to use updated technology to provide aviation safety at its best.

#### THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, yesterday, I voted in favor of retaining the funds for the SST. In connection with some investigation on the matter I conducted early this year, I got in touch with a very fine, experienced man by the name of G. C. Clementson, who lives in my State. I ask unanimous consent that a letter which he wrote to me on April 10, 1967, analyzing problems and

positions with regard to the SST, together with a copy of his own résumé of his experience to show what his capability is in this field, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter and résumé were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DENVER, COLO.,  
April 10, 1967.

HON. PETER H. DOMINICK,  
Senate Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PETER: Sorry that I've been so long in responding to your request for comments on the supersonic transport program. I unfortunately underestimated the wealth of material in the literature on this program and my own time for reading, criticizing, and formulating an opinion. I hope this letter proves helpful, even if somewhat late.

At the risk of dwelling on the obvious, I would first like to point out several factors which make the supersonic transport program different from any other commercial aircraft development undertaken in the United States, and then discuss the present program.

The supersonic transport development is the first commercial aircraft development in the history of American aviation which was not preceded by extensive development, test, large-quantity production, and then service use by the U.S. military services in a particular flight regime. To illustrate this point, let me define four aircraft flight regimes as follows:

1. Low Subsonic—Piston Engine Regime:  
Examples: Military Aircraft: B-10 through B-18. Commercial Aircraft: DC2/DC3, Douglas; Lodestar, Lockheed.

2. Medium Subsonic—Piston Engine Regime:

Examples: Military Aircraft: B-25 through B-29. Commercial Aircraft: DC-4/DC-7, Douglas; Constellation Series, Lockheed; Stratocruiser, Boeing; 202/404, Convair; 440, Martin.

3. High Subsonic—Jet Engine Regime:  
Examples: Military Aircraft: B-45, No. Amer.; B-47, Boeing; B-52, Boeing; B-57, Martin.

Commercial Aircraft: 700 Series, Boeing; 880/990, Convair; DC-8/DC-9, Douglas.

4. Supersonic—Jet Engine Regime:  
Examples: Military Aircraft: B-58, Convair; B-70, No. Amer.; SR-71, Lockheed. Commercial Aircraft: SST, Boeing.

From this listing, it is apparent that with the exception of the last category several military aircraft in each category were produced and used in service in large quantities; and that more than one aircraft manufacturer was involved in both the military and commercial developments. From these facts it can be concluded that, although commercial development has been heavily subsidized in the past, the entire cost was not readily determined. Only the cost necessary to adapt existing knowledge to a particular commercial application was borne by the aircraft manufacturer. The U. S. Government paid the remainder under military defense expenditures.

In addition, technical knowledge associated with each flight regime was efficiently transferred between aircraft manufacturers through governmental agencies of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. (The visual and performance similarity between the Douglas DC-8 and the Boeing 707 is a striking example of the effectiveness of this transfer of knowledge.)

In the fourth flight regime, since changing military requirements have created a situation wherein the justification for supersonic manned bombers is questionable, the normal extensive military developmental programs have been severely restricted. As a consequence, the cost of development of

the supersonic transport must be almost completely borne by the commercial design; hence, the cost appears not only exceedingly large, but to some people of questionable justification.

In order to attempt to minimize these costs, the Supersonic Transport Program Office has done two things, i.e., (1) narrowed the competing manufacturers down to one airplane manufacturer (Boeing) and one engine manufacturer (G.E.); and (2) spread the development costs so that the manufacturers involved, as well as commercial airline carriers, are assuming a minor portion of the risk (10%). This procedure has created a drastic break with past experience, in that we are creating an almost complete monopoly in the manufacture of commercial aircraft (it will be virtually impossible for other competing manufacturers to catch up with the technical headstart the Government is giving to Boeing and General Electric).

I suspect this may also be the reason for your stated reservation with respect to the preferred position of the selected manufacturers. I, also, have reservations about the long-term effect of this approach, but before I state my position let me present a summary discussion of the presently proposed program under the following categories: (1) Technical, (2) Operational, (3) Managerial, (4) Financial. I will then give you my personal conclusions and recommendations.

#### TECHNICAL

Although a large number of articles, both pro and con, have been written about the nature and severity of the technical problems involved in the development of the supersonic transport, I do not consider these problems to constitute the crucial problem area of the program. I do not intend by this statement to imply that the technical problems are easy to solve. To the contrary, there are and will be some rather difficult problems to resolve in the successful development of the jet engines; in the performance and handling qualities of the aircraft; in the choice and use of structural materials; and in creating an acceptable radiation environment for the passengers and crew. However, in none of these problem areas do I believe the proposed design is beyond the present state-of-art in technology.

You specifically mentioned in your letter concern for problems in stability of the aircraft clear air turbulence, and aerodynamic heating. In response I should like to point out that in re-entering manned space vehicles, both of these problems have been successfully solved under conditions more severe than that which the supersonic transport will need to tolerate.

To summarize, it is my personal opinion that, provided sufficient funds are available on a timely basis, the technical problems will not restrict or defeat the supersonic transport program.

#### OPERATIONAL

The operational problem areas are: (1) Sonic boom tolerance, (2) traffic control, and (3) route economics.

Experience to date seems to indicate a very low tolerance on the part of the public for sonic booms. Although there are flight planning techniques to minimize the intensity and prevalence of sonic booms, it is generally conceded that (barring some presently unknown techniques for attenuating sonic booms) the supersonic transport will be restricted to overwater flights only. However, when you consider the perennial Navy observation that three-quarters of the earth's surface is water, the restriction certainly cannot be a major factor in defeating the success of the program.

There is no doubt that the inclusion of the supersonic transport into the present air traffic control network will create control problems. However, a more severe problem in

air traffic control is the sheer number of vehicles to control rather than their speeds. The volume of traffic problem must be solved, supersonic or not, since it is evident that the rate of growth of air traffic is far from leveling off. When the system for adequately handling the air traffic volumes of the future has been developed, the inclusion of (relatively) small numbers of supersonic transports into the same environment will be only a minor perturbation.

On the question of the validity of the route economics with respect to the supersonic transport, one can find all shades of opinion. United States studies conducted by personnel in the FAA and the Department of Commerce present a rather convincing case that the supersonic transport can and will be an economic success. However, one should pause to consider the arguments presented by BO K. O. Lundberg of Sweden.\* Essentially, he challenges the argument that the public will use the supersonic transport primarily because it goes faster. My statement certainly is an over-simplification of his position, but I do believe that he vastly underestimates the intense desire of people in our time to "get there quickly."

It was this sort of logic that led Lockheed Aircraft to develop in a major way the turbo-prop transport (Electra) instead of taking the next step to the turbo-jet transport such as Boeing, Douglas, North American, and Convair did. This short-sighted management decision caused Lockheed Aircraft to lose leadership in the commercial transportation field which so far they have not regained.

A similar argument can be presented with respect to the "Concorde" versus our Supersonic Transport. I am sure that the British-French combine will make major gain in overseas public travel preference; but I am equally sure they will lose that gain as soon as the SST is available. Like the Electra, the Concorde will rapidly decline in use because of greater public preference for the faster jet transports.

#### MANAGERIAL

The Supersonic Transport Program presents management problems, not only from the standpoint of sheer size, but also the conflict which arises when the responsibility for development of this supersonic transport is included within the FAA. I am referring here to the problem that the FAA is the governmental agency responsible for certifying the airworthiness of all commercial transports, and yet must simultaneously be responsible for their development. Mr. Alan S. Boyd has stated that he plans to eventually remove the SST Program Office from the FAA and transfer it to another section of the Transportation Department. This is in the right direction, but basically only removes the conflict from within the FAA to some undetermined group within the Transportation Department. In an obviously accelerated development program with elements of national prestige at stake, I question whether or not this will be an effective solution.

#### FINANCIAL

Major General J. C. Maxwell has presented a strong case as to why the financial risk for development of the supersonic transport is far too great for private industry as separate corporations to undertake, and hence the Federal Government must subsidize the program. I do not question these arguments. They appear to be well founded. However, I do question the implied assumption that the risk must be taken by only one aircraft manufacturer and one engine manufacturer plus minor help from the major airlines. It is this

assumption that forces the final conclusion that the major program risk must be borne by the U.S. Government. I don't believe it!

Representative Frank T. Bow (R-Ohio) has already proposed that a Supersonic Transport Development Authority be established by act of Congress to sell \$1.5 billion in bonds and notes to finance the project. The Development Authority would later establish the Supersonic Transport Production Corporation to produce and sell the aircraft. In the Bow plan, investments in the Authority would be guaranteed by the U.S. Government. It was this last provision that probably led Budget Director Charles L. Schultze to state that under these arrangements the Government is assuming the entire risk rather than the 90% as presently proposed. Consequently, the Administration as represented by Mr. Schultze prefers the present financing arrangements with the manufacturers and airlines sharing 10% of the risk in order to provide "incentives to succeed" for private industry.

Perhaps I am overly naive, but I cannot see in these arguments any basic reason why the financial and organizational arrangements established for the Communications Satellite Corporation do not apply equally well to the Supersonic Transport Program. I see many similarities between the two development areas, and no fundamental reason why the same pattern of action cannot be applied here.

At this point, I have a sad feeling, wonderfully expressed by Voltaire when he apologized in the last paragraph of a three-page letter for not having sufficient time to write a brief letter. I hope this rather lengthy letter has not been too rambling, and that I have managed to get a few thoughts across in a convincing manner.

To summarize my conclusions:

- (1) Technical: There are no technical problems which call for knowledge beyond the present state-of-the-art.
- (2) Operational: The SST will probably be restricted to trans-oceanic flights, but should not present any problems greater than presently being or to be encountered by the high subsonic jets.
- (3) Managerial: It is difficult to perceive how the fundamental management conflict in the development and activation of the SST can be resolved by moving the SST Program Office out of the FAA.
- (4) Financial: I do not believe that the U.S. Government should bear the major portion of financial risk (90%) in order to create a manufacturing monopoly for Boeing and General Electric. Schemes such as the equivalent of COMSAT for the SST have not been fully and objectively explored.
- (5) The SST program is already late in development, and hence should not be required to mark time while financial and managerial problems are resolved.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) The present budgetary request of the FAA for the Supersonic Transport Development should be essentially met, in order to avoid further delay in the development.
- (2) However, the Congress, when it authorizes the requested funds, should establish a select committee to explore in detail and recommend an agency similar to the Communications Satellite Corporation for the purpose of financing and managing the development of the Supersonic Transport. (It is my understanding that the U.S. Government did not underwrite the financial risks of COMSAT, and I fail to see why the Government should do otherwise in the case of the Supersonic Transport.) If you are interested in this approach, I can furnish additional ideas on the composition and organization of an SST corporation.

If you're still with me—congratulations! I'll get this typed and in the mail. Hope you find it helpful.

As ever,

G. C. CLEMENTSON.

A RÉSUMÉ OF GERHARDT C. CLEMENTSON,  
LITTLETON, COLO.

Business experience: Space & Information Systems Division, North American Aviation, Inc., Downey, Calif.

S&ID (formerly called the Missile Division) is the division of NAA specializing the Space Vehicle Systems and Information Processing Systems. The major programs of this division are 1. the command and service modules of the Apollo Spacecraft, and 2. the second stage (S-II) of the Saturn 5 Launch Vehicle.

From 1964 to present: *Director—Engineering Computing and Simulation.*

Department of approximately three hundred engineers responsible for 1. physical simulation of man-machine interfaces in space vehicles, 2. central digital programming support for scientific problem solving, and 3. central digital programming support for development and monitoring engineering data handling systems such as wire listing and measurement listing. Currently—Manager, technical operations of the Falcon Research & Development Co.

From 1962 to 1964: *Technical Director—Apollo Space Sciences.*

Reported to the Vice President and Program Manager, Apollo Program. Responsible for and authorized to: 1. conduct studies on the scientific experiments appropriate to the Apollo Mission, 2. review and approve the selection and utilization of scientific and engineering consultants, 3. develop and maintain an interface with the scientific community on associated space science research programs, and 4. conduct scientific staff studies on technical problems as requested by the Apollo Program Manager.

From 1961 to 1962: *Director—Aerospace Technology.*

Responsible for all advanced engineering and research in support of division programs and bidding activity in the functional disciplines of Aerodynamics, Thermodynamics, Applied Mechanics, Materials, Space Physics, Power and Propulsion Systems and Structural Dynamics. Work was supported through: 1. NAA funded research, 2. contracted research, 3. advanced engineering in support of division programs and 4. bidding funds.

Management experience in the Air Force, 1955 to 1961: Faculty, USAF Academy, Colorado.

*Professor and Head, Department of Aeronautics.* Responsible for: 1. all phases of cadet instruction in the fields of thermodynamics and aerodynamics, including four prescribed and ten elective courses, 2. administration of programs for two wind tunnels, intensive aircraft power plant demonstration and other laboratory facilities. Direct supervision of eighteen officers, and nine civilian personnel.

From 1954 to 1955: Faculty, USAF Institute of Technology.

*Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering.* Responsible for developing and teaching a program of study in automatic control theory.

From 1951 to 1954: Armament Laboratory, Wright Air Development Center, Ohio.

*Chief, Fighter Systems Branch.* Responsible for research and development in flight control and weapons control as applied to fighter type aircraft. . . . Supervised 40 project engineers.

From 1950 to 1951: *Technical Staff Officer, Armament Laboratory.*

Responsible for monitoring plans and programs in research and development of fighter flight and weapons control systems.

From 1945 to 1947: *Chief, Aerodynamics Section, Flight Test Division, Wright Field.*

Responsible for developing special flight test methods for measuring performance, stability and control factors. Functioned as test pilot as well as flight test engineer.

Flying experience: United States Air Force. From 1947 to 1961: Supplemental flying duties—Command Pilot Rating, jet qualified.

\* *Pros and Cons of Supersonic Aviation Relative to Gains or Losses in the Combined Time/Comfort Considerations.* BO K. O. Lundberg. Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, Sept. 1964.



From 1945 to 1947: Experimental Test Pilot . . . Flight Test Division, Wright-Patterson Air Field.

From 1942 to 1945: Operational pilot—4th Fighter Command (P-38's).

Education: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

From 1948 to 1950: *Degree of Doctor in Science in Instrumentation.*

Comprehensive program of studies in Instrumentation and Automatic Control. Doctoral dissertation . . . An investigation of the Power Spectral Density of Atmospheric Turbulence. Elected member of Sigma Xi.

From 1947 to 1948: *Degree of Master of Science in Aeronautical Engineering.*

Program of studies in aircraft dynamics and automatic control techniques. Master's thesis . . . The Pulse Technique for Determining Aircraft Performance Functions.

From 1944 to 1945: California Institute of Technology.

*Degree of Master of Science.* Program of studies of aerodynamics of compressible flow.

From 1938 to 1942: United States Military Academy.

*Degree of Bachelor of Science.* Program of studies in humanities, social sciences, basic sciences, and basic engineering.

#### NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12474) making appropriations for NASA for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to my colleague such time as he may desire, with the time not taken out of the limitation on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Washington? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The Chair recognizes the junior Senator from Washington.

#### CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IGNORED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, earlier this week, the day before yesterday to be exact, the Congress completed legislative action on the military construction authorization bill for fiscal year 1968, the largest such bill to come before this body in many years. In defense of this measure, the then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, the Honorable Paul Ignatius, appeared before the Armed Services Committee as late as July 11, 1967, and stated:

This year's program represents a substantial increase over the bill which we brought before your committee for fiscal year 1967. The major reasons for the greater size are twofold: First, a resumption of our long-range program to replace outmoded and inadequate facilities, and secondly, a return to our objective of providing regular increments of military family housing in annual military construction programs.

The committee will recall from the fiscal year 1967 hearings, the program requested at that time was purposely held to austere levels in deference to our growing commitment in Southeast Asia and because of an increasing concern over inflationary tendencies in the

construction industry. Only those projects which were clearly essential to meet operational schedules, to support new missions, or which were necessary for other compelling reasons were included. Many worthwhile replacements, particularly in the housing area, were postponed.

As we promised the committee last year, we have been following the economic situation very closely and we have now concluded, after a review of key indices, that the inflationary trends of a year ago have abated to a point where the construction economy can both absorb and benefit from an increase in construction placements. It is in this context that the Secretary of Defense, on January 20, 1967, released for construction the fiscal year 1968 and all prior year projects which were deferred in December 1965.

In this light, the fiscal year 1968 construction request reflects an upturn to the more realistic programming levels we consider must be established if we are to achieve long-range goals for modernizing our aging facilities inventory and improving the standards of living accommodations for military persons. The continued deferral of such improvements must inevitably lead to reduced efficiency in our operations and a weakening in the morale of our military forces. Moreover, because of the escalating costs for upkeep which must be borne if outmoded facilities are continued in use, the repeated postponement of such replacements is simply not good business.

Mr. Ignatius further stated:

As in previous years, the selection of projects included in this year's bill has been accomplished in accordance with 5-year Defense programming procedures, and has been subjected to final review by the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the fiscal year 1968 program/budget decision process. The construction proposals contained in the bill are necessary beginning in the fiscal year 1968 time frame to meet the broad objectives and missions of the Department of Defense which were outlined in the Secretary's comprehensive posture statement.

In light of this, Mr. President, it comes as a complete surprise that the Secretary of Defense announced late yesterday afternoon, without any consultation with the Congress so far as I know, that because of the uncertain state of Federal finances, he had taken steps to defer various military construction projects previously authorized and appropriated for by the Congress. Certainly, this casts grave doubt on the validity of the 1968 construction program which we have just approved after many days of hearings, study, and debate. I should like to read a memorandum Secretary McNamara prepared for the Secretaries of the military departments:

Because of the uncertain state of federal finances, the following actions in respect to military construction contract awards will be put into effect immediately:

1. For all projects on which bids have been opened on or before October 9, 1967, awards shall be consummated in accordance with normal procedures.

2. For projects on which bids have not been opened as of October 9, 1967, the opening date shall be postponed until at least November 9, 1967. However, each such project shall be reviewed by the Secretary of the Department concerned, and any which are clearly associated with new weapons systems, or in direct support of Southeast Asia, may be approved for earlier opening. Any others which a Secretary desires to open because of exceptional circumstances shall be referred to Mr. Nitze or me for approval on an individual basis.

3. Effective October 9, 1967, no new invitations for bids shall be issued except for those projects clearly associated with new weapons systems or in direct support of Southeast Asia, as approved by the Secretary of a Military Department. Any other exceptions recommended by a Secretary will be referred to Mr. Nitze or me for approval on an individual basis.

This, of course, is not the first time Secretary McNamara has taken this position in regard to military construction matters and if I may, I should like to review the situation during the recent past. When the military construction authorization bill for fiscal year 1965 was before the Senate Armed Services Committee for consideration, responsible witnesses of the Defense Establishment offered assurances, as they did this year, that the authorization requested and contained in that bill was for construction to support the latest approved programs which should be in place no later than fiscal year 1967. We were told that their requests represented their most urgent construction needs. That bill was signed into law on August 1, 1964, and on November 19, 1964, with little prior notice to the Congress, the Secretary of Defense announced 95 actions to consolidate, reduce, or discontinue altogether Department of Defense activities in the United States and overseas. Surprisingly enough, several construction projects had been included in the recently approved construction bill for installations that were announced for closing.

The following year, when the fiscal year 1966 construction bill was before the committee for consideration, we were again assured that the projects included in that bill represented the fiscal year 1966 segment of the approved 5-year plan and must be in place not later than 1968. The bill finally agreed upon by the Congress contained a provision designed to assure some advance notice to the Congress of any future base closures proposed by the Department of Defense. This bill was signed into law on September 16, 1965. On December 21, 1965, however, and again with little advance notice to the Congress, the Secretary of Defense announced the indefinite deferral of 50 percent of the recently approved construction bill for a total of \$620 million. This program included among other things many badly needed barracks and bachelor officer spaces so necessary to the welfare of the troops.

In considering the fiscal year 1967 program, the committee found itself in the strange if not almost untenable position of being asked to pass upon many construction projects that seemed to be of secondary importance to many of those that had been deferred. There had been no assurance forthcoming that the fiscal year 1966 funds would be released for the construction of those deferred projects. Therefore, the Congress found it necessary to include a provision in the fiscal year 1967 bill designed to prevent the execution of the construction authorized in that bill prior to that authorized in previous years that had been deferred.

Perhaps our efforts at that time did bear a little fruit because on January 20,

1967, Secretary McNamara did rescind the December 1965 order deferring the award of contracts for more than 550 military construction projects and 8,250 units of family housing totaling \$564,000,000. At that time he indicated the action taken would have a beneficial effect upon morale in the Armed Forces, satisfy valid construction and housing requirements, and have a salutary effect on the construction industry. But this is not all, Mr. President. The military construction bill for fiscal year 1968 was submitted to the Congress on March 9, of this year, and it is my understanding that within a matter of hours before the budget was submitted to the Congress, \$1 billion in additional projects was added to the budget, again to aid the lagging construction industry. This was evident to those of us who were called upon to review the program by the many projects contained therein that did not appear to be urgent, or in some instances even essential, with the result that the Congress denied over \$327 million of the authority requested for the fiscal year 1968. During consideration of this measure I—and I am reasonably sure other Members of the Senate—was approached on various occasions by high departmental officials urging support of various programs they thought might be in jeopardy.

Now, Mr. President, it seems to me that this body has been very valiant and forthright in its efforts year after year to obtain from the Department of Defense the basic salient facts upon which to base a sound judgment in regard to the annual military construction program. It is indeed discouraging if not frustrating to be called upon to spend hours and days in considering a program that in the final analysis seems to be of dubious importance to the Department of Defense. It might be assumed that if the fiscal year 1966 program, and now the fiscal year 1967 program, can be deferred at the will of the Secretary of Defense, they must not be of great urgency and the fiscal year 1968 program can be considered in the same light, and I trust that the Appropriations Committees that have not yet acted on the latter program, will give the funding requests the most careful attention they deserve under the circumstances.

Personally, I do not consider the military construction program to be an important one and I feel that the health and welfare of our fighting men are being subordinated for economic reasons, either real or imaginary. Certainly I do not oppose the deferral of those projects that turn out not to be of great urgency and there will always be some in this category even though we have tried to eliminate them from the program. But to make an arbitrary deferral of all projects within the United States, which would presumably include those recently approved in the fiscal year 1968 program, is in my opinion a dangerous procedure. For example, we took lengthy testimony on the need for a buffer zone around the Concord Naval Weapons Station, Port Chicago, Calif., and provided \$19,800,000 as a downpayment to relieve this grave safety hazard. Are programs such as this to be jeopardized?

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Washington yield at that point?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I have followed the statement of the Senator with great interest, and I am in full accord with what the Senator has said.

As the Senator knows, this is my first year as chairman of the Military Appropriations Subcommittee. We have worked together for, I believe, a period of some 2 weeks meeting both in the morning and in the afternoon, hearing the requests from the military, and actually being urged time and time again to accede to their requests.

My problem—I am looking to the Senator from Washington for guidance on this question—is, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Construction, what do I do now? We will soon be at the point of holding a hearing and then to the markup stage. As chairman of the subcommittee what do I do in this situation? Whom can I believe as to what the needs are for the military? Can the distinguished Senator give me some guidance with respect to this matter?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, first I wish to say, as I have said before, that the able senior Senator from Nevada, who is chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Committee on Appropriations, did a tremendous job in teaming up with the subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, not only in connection with the hearings but also in the actual markup of the authorization bill which has been sent to the White House.

I must say that his counsel, advice, and assistance—ably assisted by his very competent staff director, Mr. Mike Rexroad and Gordon Nease of my subcommittee—played an invaluable part in trying to reach the decision at which we arrived in making a substantial cut in the authorization requests.

The normal thing one would do under the circumstances would be to call in the Defense Department representatives and ask them, "What projects are you going to fund?" But I must confess that after the experience I have related on the floor today, going back not just to this week but over several years as well, I do not believe the Senator can rely on the representations that they will make to his subcommittee. My advice would be not to take any action, except as to the items that relate directly to the war in Vietnam.

Mr. BIBLE. That is exactly the problem I face. This is my first year as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Construction. The distinguished Senator from Mississippi preceded me in this position and has far more ability and knowledge in this field, because he also serves on the Committee on Armed Services.

It occurred to me, in reading the release from Secretary McNamara of October 5, that it might be well to limit our appropriations hearings to actually two classes—those items that are clearly associated with the new weapons system or in direct support of Southeast Asia; because it appears to me that what the Secretary said in his release is that

this is all he is going to put under contract, in any event.

Mr. JACKSON. I would amend my earlier comments to say that, of course, it should include those items related to our strategic defense posture, both offensive, and defensive. That, of course, includes the proposed ABM program and our Minuteman sites.

Mr. BIBLE. As the Senator knows, there are items—that are needed and justified items—as additional support for our three great military academies, and they are certainly in this picture, in view of the buildup in Southeast Asia. I am wondering whether one hears the witnesses in support of those items—in view of this directive.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator raises a proper question.

I might also call to the Senator's attention—because he took such a keen interest in it—that we had the problem before us of the Concord Naval Weapons Station at Port Chicago, Calif. This project relates directly to the safety of several hundred people. As I read this directive, this item in the amount of \$19.8 million is frozen. This is a situation in which the Navy is now violating its own safety standards.

They have requested, as the Senator knows, the money to take over surrounding lands, including the town of Port Chicago in order to provide a buffer zone. As I read this directive, what will be done about that? This is a matter affecting the safety of people living in that area, and no exceptions have been provided.

This is not a matter that comes under the heading of support for South Vietnam. This is one of the regularly established military installations. If, however, the point is stretched with respect to items directly related to the support of South Vietnam, most of military installations in the United States are involved.

Mr. BIBLE. We certainly need additional guidelines. As I move forward into the military construction appropriations bill, I shall have to lean very heavily on the advice of the Senator from Washington, who has the expertise in this field, because we do not know whom to believe now.

Mr. JACKSON. We cannot rely on the representations that have been made to us.

I believe the distinguished Senator from Nevada would agree with me that we do want to save money wherever we can. But we were told, right down to the last minute, right to the time of the conference, that they needed the money for all the projects requested. On the Senate side we had cut the budget, as the able Senator will recall, by a little over 14 percent, yet we were advised continuously by representatives of the Department of Defense that they needed all the money requested.

We tried to find out where we could reduce the bill. We tried over and over again to find what items we could postpone or defer, what items we could eliminate. We were just told, "This is the budget, and we want you to support it."

Mr. President, it seems to me that what has happened here is a breakdown of consultation between the Department of Defense and the appropriate committees



of Congress. This discussion on the floor of the Senate would not be taking place at this time if the Department of Defense, through its appropriate representatives, had come to us and said there has been a change since July 11, when Assistant Secretary Ignatius made a statement before our committee in which he said that all these items are essential and necessary. We would have made whatever adjustments should have been made under the circumstances.

Every member of the committee is trying to save money. This is our objective. We wanted to cut any fat that was in the body of the defense program, without interfering with the muscle; and we made a diligent search to find where those items might be.

Now we are confronted with a situation—as I read the third paragraph of the Secretary's directive, that virtually all the items we have approved are being deferred. Why could not this information have been made available to us prior to our markup on the bill? Certainly, nothing has happened in the last few days that would give reason to take the action that has been taken by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. President, I wish to say, for myself, that I strongly support the President of the United States in every move he makes in trying to save money. Yes, I support the President of the United States in his request for some kind of an appropriate tax increase.

I must say that to have this type of procedure develop on the part of the Department of Defense at this time is most disheartening to me, because it is exactly the wrong way to deal with the U.S. Senate.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I believe it would be well to add to this most forthright discussion of Department of Defense inconsistencies the priority list that the Department submitted to the House of Representatives.

I note that many of the high priority items will be deferred, according to the latest directive.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. INOUE. Where is the priority?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, my good friend from Hawaii, who has made so many valuable contributions to our deliberations as a member of the Subcommittee on Military Construction and has put his finger on the whole question of what we can and cannot rely upon as far as representations being made by the Department of Defense. I think the answer is, a priority list from the Department of Defense does not mean a thing any more, because not only are the priority lists that are submitted of little value, the overall representation as to the projects that are absolutely essential and necessary in connection with support of our Armed Forces leaves us in doubt.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question?

Mr. JACKSON. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUE. For purposes of clarification, who will decide whether a project is directly related to the conflict in Vietnam?

Mr. JACKSON. As I read the memorandum, the Secretary of Defense will make that decision. He will receive recommendations from the service secretaries involved or, if not, the Secretary of Defense will make the decision, or, his deputy, as I read the directive.

The pertinent part of the directive that applies, as I interpret it, to the authorization bill which we have just sent to the White House, is paragraph 3 of his memorandum of 5 October. That paragraph reads as follows:

Effective October 9, 1967, no new invitations for bids shall be issued except for those projects clearly associated with new weapons systems or in direct support of Southeast Asia, as approved by the Secretary of a Military Department. Any other exceptions recommended by a Secretary shall be referred to Mr. Nitze or me for approval on an individual basis.

Mr. President, I would hope and trust that this will be the last time—and I am afraid it will not be—that we will have to take a matter of this kind to the floor of the Senate to point out what happens when an important segment of the executive branch of Government fails to be forthright and fails to consult the Congress. All of this could have been avoided.

#### NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12474) making appropriations for NASA for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. In accordance with the order previously entered, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, before we begin to consider the NASA appropriation bill, I wish to make a statement for the Record which I am sure the present occupant of the chair [Mr. SPONG] will be interested in.

The Langley Research Center of NASA, located at Hampton, Va., is celebrating this week its 50th anniversary. This is a reminder to us that the marvelous achievements in aeronautics and astronautics that have been made are not forced by any crash program, but are the result of half a century of progress in research and development attained through the dedication and ingenuity of leading scientists and engineers over the years. As unlikely as it seems, the Saturn V rocket, soon to be tested and for which funds are included in this bill, had its genesis in the experiments of Dr. Samuel Pierpont Langley and of Wilbur and Orville Wright on heavier-than-air biplanes.

Langley was the first laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, in 1917, others were added after 1938, and all of them were included as the nucleus of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958.

Langley pioneered with X-1 to explore

transonic and supersonic speeds of rocket planes, and just this week the X-15 has achieved a record speed of 4,534 miles per hour.

Other and more detailed accomplishments are set out in the press release from NASA of October 1.

Mr. President, on this 50th anniversary of Langley Research Center of NASA, at Hampton, Va., I ask unanimous consent that this press release be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the press release was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[A National Aeronautics and Space Administration news release, Oct. 1, 1967]

#### LANGLEY 50TH ANNIVERSARY

On Oct. 7, 1903, Charles M. Manley, chief assistant to Samuel Pierpont Langley, was launched from a houseboat on the Potomac in a heavier-than-air machine that was designed to fly. It sank.

Sixty-eight days later a similar wood and canvas contraption, designed by a pair of bicycle mechanics, Wilbur and Orville Wright, shot down the sands at Kitty Hawk, N.C., stayed in the air for 3.5 seconds and covered a distance of 105 feet.

A few weeks from now a sleek rocket, the Saturn V, 365 feet tall and with a thrust comparable to 160 million horsepower, will take off from Cape Kennedy, Fla., on a test flight in preparation for this country's first trip to the Moon and back.

As unlikely as it seems, the Saturn V had its genesis in the Langley and Wright machines.

The journey from the first biplanes to supersonic aircraft and space vehicles was exciting, arduous and rewarding. Credit for the success of man's conquest of the air and space must go in large part to the work done at the research center, later named after Dr. Langley, located in Hampton, Va.

In recognition of Langley Research Center's contribution to the advancement of the United States in aeronautics and astronautics, the first week of October has been set aside by Presidential proclamation to commemorate 50 years of service to the Nation.

From 1917 to 1938, Langley, as the single laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, provided the facilities and scientific manpower necessary to keep the nation in the vanguard of aviation progress. As other research centers were established across the country after 1938, Langley staff members provided the leadership to make them work. When the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was established in 1958, it was built largely around NACA and the experience gained at Langley.

Langley has assisted in increasing the speed of the airplane from less than 100 miles-per-hour to more than 4,000 miles-per-hour. It has helped man conquer the air and move toward mastery of the infinite space above the atmosphere.

Its milestones include:

The development in the 1920's of a cowl for air-cooled engines, a streamlining effect credited with increasing the speeds of airplanes of that period from 12 to 15 per cent; an innovation that made possible the use of engines of much higher horsepower;

The accumulation of scientific data and technical competence that increased the performance and utility of aircraft used in World War II;

The conception in the 1940's of research planes leading to history-making advancements at supersonic and hypersonic speeds;

The design, development, and practical application in the '50's of the world's first transonic wind tunnels which bridged the

technological gap in research facilities between subsonic and supersonic speeds;

The discovery and verification of the Area Rule, a revolutionary idea concerning the configuration of aircraft;

The development of much of the technology for a practical supersonic commercial air transport plane.

Langley continues in its aeronautical researches, working on current and future concepts of hypersonic flight, advanced supersonic aircraft, helicopters, vertical takeoff and landing and short takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL/STOL), and support services for the exploration of space.

If Dr. Langley were alive today he would be gratified by the nation's space program. He would also have a part in it. He had from his earliest years been interested in astronomy. For many years he was interested in research as Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. He and his brother John built from scratch a telescope with a five-foot focal length and a seven-inch mirror. They polished and discarded 20 mirrors before they fabricated one that met their standards.

Later, at the Allegheny Observatory, he made drawings that served for years as classic sunspot representations. Having realized early the limitations placed on astrophysics by the blanketing layer of Earth's atmosphere, he attempted to overcome them first by trying to find a constant that would represent the filtering atmosphere of the Earth, and later by moving instruments to the tops of mountains where this effect would be minimized.

In order to explore the physics of outer space further he invented the boloscope, a device that could measure temperature differences of 1/100,000 of one degree Centigrade. With this instrument he extended the spectrum to a point until then undreamed of.

It was not until he was 50 years old that he launched a new career in aerodynamics.

The credit for flying the first heavier-than-air machine was hotly disputed by followers of the Wright brothers and Langley for many years, but time eventually dulled the dispute and all of the figures involved were given due credit.

Disputes were not unusual in the history of aviation progress.

Attempts to end NACA's existence as an independent agency were made with regularity. It was proposed at varying intervals that NACA's facilities and functions be transferred to the Navy, the Army, the Bureau of Standards, the War Department and the Department of Commerce.

The Langley laboratory also suffered its share of natural disasters. Wooden buildings, hangars and wind tunnels were beset by fires, and storms and floods took their toll. Langley, however, pushed aviation progress ahead in the face of adversity in politics, natural disasters, and a shortage of funds during the Great Depression of the 30's.

A five-foot wind tunnel was opened in 1920. In many ways, the development of the airplane has been the development of the wind tunnel, and Langley consistently has pioneered in these devices, extending with each new one the range of aerodynamic testing that can be done on the ground.

Langley's first wind tunnel was not unusual. It was modeled after one in use at the British National Physical Laboratory. Similar models were in use by the Army, Navy and various engineering schools. Its operation was quite simple: it directed a stream of air across a model airplane, where gages measured the stresses.

By the following year it was decided that a new kind of wind tunnel was needed, one using compressed air. It was known for some time that a model's behavior differed from that of a full-scale airplane. By raising the air pressure in the wind tunnel this difference in the effects of scale was overcome. As

a result of tests in this so-called "variable density" wind tunnel, NACA studied the feasibility of jet propulsion some 25 years before the first jet airplane flew.

In 1927, a tunnel known as the propeller research tunnel, large enough to test full-scale parts, was put into operation. It had a 20-foot test section through which air flowed at 110 miles-per-hour. This tunnel, the world's largest at that time, allowed aerodynamic tests on full-scale propellers, fuselages, landing gear and other aircraft parts.

The most dramatic breakthrough achieved by this equipment was what came to be known as the NACA cowl. A steamlined covering for radial air-cooled engines, the cowl reduced the drag created by exposed engine parts. Because it greatly improved cooling, it permitted much larger engines of greater power.

In its 1928 report, NACA stated, "by the application of the results of this study to a Curtiss AT-5A Army pursuit training plane, the maximum speed was increased from 118 to 137 mph. This is equivalent to providing approximately 83 additional horsepower without additional weight or cost of engine, fuel consumption, or weight of structure." For this achievement, NACA was awarded the Collier Trophy for 1928.

Another benefit from the propeller research tunnel was the location of engine nacelles on the leading edges of wings, rather than slung beneath them as had been the previous practice. This resulted in important speed gains. The amount of drag on fixed landing gear was also accurately determined.

Throughout the 1930's, aviation continued its advance. The shape of wings and airplane bodies all over the world were determined by the knowledge gained at Langley. And when World War II came, the information acquired over the years at this NACA facility contributed mightily to America's superior wartime air power.

Elaborately instrumented research rocket planes were carried above the atmosphere, where the density of the air was low, to explore transonic and supersonic speeds. Starting with the spectacular flight of the X-1 and progressing through the more and more advanced models, speed and altitude records were broken again and again. Langley shared the Collier Trophy with Bell Aircraft and the U.S. Air Force for this pioneering research in 1947. Today the X-15, latest in the series, has achieved speeds over 4,000 miles-per-hour and altitudes of more than 354,000 feet.

Langley was honored with the Collier Trophy again in 1951 for the development and practical application of the transonic wind tunnel, a facility that bridged the gap which once existed in wind tunnel research in the range from high subsonic speeds to those just above the speed of sound.

Langley's fourth Collier Trophy was won in 1954 for the discovery and experimental verification of the Area Rule.

Essentially, the Area Rule is a method to balance in a rational way the lengthwise distribution of volume of fuselage and wings in order to produce an airplane with minimum drag at transonic speeds.

Slight modifications of the shape of the airplane fuselage can result in highly-improved performance. For example, a fighter plane prototype was unable in tests to achieve supersonic speed. With slight modifications indicated by the Area Rule, a gain in speed as much as 25 per cent was attained.

Today, Langley continues to improve the speed and versatility of aircraft. Some of its objectives are improved helicopters for urban travel up to 100 miles, short takeoff and landing aircraft for interurban travel up to about 500 miles, and improvements in subsonic jet transports to allow short runway operation.

Work is going forward on the supersonic airplane, and in the more distant future for

an airplane designed to go more than five times the speed of sound—the hypersonic airplane.

Langley was the birthplace of Project Mercury, the first United States manned space flight project. It was instrumental in some of the key research in support of the successful Gemini project and the Apollo program, now just getting under way.

Langley research contributed to the Echo passive communication satellites. Once launched into orbit, a large aluminum-covered mylar plastic balloon automatically inflated and was used to bounce electronic signals from one point on Earth down to another. Line-of-sight electronic transmission is generally restricted to about 150 miles; by means of Echo satellites, this range was extended to span oceans and continents. In addition, regularly published reports of the transit of the Echo balloon allowed people all over the world to see their first man-made satellite move across the night sky.

Langley also took part in the development of the versatile Scout rocket, first all-solid-fueled launch vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, and the management of Lunar Orbiter, a spacecraft which circled and helped map the Moon. Lunar Orbiter was successful in five launches on five attempts.

Mercury models were tested in Langley's wind tunnels. Tests varied from static stability studies on full-scale models to drag and heat transfer investigations on models weighing less than a ping-pong ball.

The research center is supporting project Apollo through the use of unique simulators and specialized laboratories, designed to enable the country to gain on the ground experience of the rigors of outer space.

The experience and accomplishments gained at Langley, combined with the availability at one location of an array of specialized laboratory facilities and equipment at Hampton, is unique. Langley today constitutes a vital national resource for the future conduct of advanced research and technology programs in aeronautics and the manned and unmanned exploration of space.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, H.R. 12474 provides appropriations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for 1968. Such appropriations normally would have been included in H.R. 9960, making appropriations for independent offices and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which was passed by the Senate on September 21. But when the House reported that bill on May 12, 1967, funds for NASA were omitted because the required authorization had not been enacted. The authorization was approved on August 21, and is contained in Public Law 90-67. The House then passed this appropriation bill on August 22.

The amount of the bill as reported to the Senate is \$4,678,900,000, which is an increase of \$95,500,000 over the House, but is under the estimates by \$421,100,000, is under the 1967 appropriations by \$289,100,000 and is under the authorizations for 1968 by \$186,851,000.

There are three items of appropriations in the bill: Research and development, construction of facilities, and administrative operations.

For "Research and development," the bill provides \$3,995,500,000, which is an increase of \$96,000,000 over the House, but is under the estimates by \$356,500,000, is under the 1967 appropriations by \$249,500,000 and is under the authorization by \$152,065,000.

For "Construction of facilities," the bill provides \$55,400,000, which is an in-



crease of \$19,500,000 over the House, but is under the estimates by \$21,300,000, is under the 1967 appropriations by \$27,600,000 and is under the authorization by \$14,580,000.

Mr. President, these are line items that are referred to in the report.

For "Administrative operations," the bill provides \$628,000,000, which is a reduction below the House of \$20,000,000, and is under the estimates by \$43,300,000, is under the 1967 appropriations by \$12,000,000 and is under the authorization by \$20,206,000.

Mr. President, the increases recommended by the committee are in the following programs:

Apollo applications was increased by the committee by \$35 million; Voyager was increased by \$36 million; nuclear rockets was increased by \$10 million; Nuclear Rocket Development Station, which must be considered with nuclear rocket programs, was increased by \$19.5 million. This will allow forward progress on both Nerva I and Nerva II.

In addition, tracking and data acquisition, which is required to operate the system efficiently, and to assure maximum safety for the astronauts when they are in space, and permit the monitoring of other space vehicles, was increased by the Senate by \$15 million, making total increases of \$115.5 million.

The committee then recommended the decrease, which I mentioned, of \$20 million for administrative operations, thus resulting in a net increase of \$95.5 million over the House bill.

This, Mr. President, briefly states the amounts which the Senate committee considered essential.

I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments to H.R. 12474 be agreed to en bloc; that the bill, as so amended, be considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment; and that no points of order be waived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendments agreed to en bloc are as follows:

On page 2, line 11, after the word "Administration", strike out "\$3,899,500,000" and insert "\$3,995,500,000".

On page 2, line 18, after the word "law", strike out "\$35,900,000" and insert "\$55,000,000".

On page 3, line 6, after the word "property", strike out "\$648,000,000" and insert "\$628,000,000".

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I support the recommendations of the Senate Appropriations Committee for NASA's fiscal year 1968 appropriations. I extend my compliments to the chairman of the subcommittee, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], and the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], for the excellent work that they, and their colleagues, both on the subcommittee and the full committee, have performed in reporting out this bill.

The committee has reviewed at length NASA's fiscal year 1968 budget request and has recommended a very realistic budget, taking into consideration the great demands on our resources being made at the present time. This can be

attested to by the fact that the committee is recommending a total amount which is \$421,100,000 below the administration's request for fiscal year 1968 and \$186,851,000 below the total amount authorized by the Congress for NASA for fiscal year 1968 earlier this year. If this bill is approved, NASA will be faced with carrying out a very austere aeronautical and space program for fiscal year 1968. I feel, however, despite the austerity, that NASA can move forward to develop the technologies in space necessary for our Nation to maintain its leadership.

A nation of our stature cannot afford to lag in any major technology. Neither can we afford to surrender our leadership in space technology freely to others. We need only be mindful of the Nation's despair on October 4, 1957, only 10 years ago, to recognize the truth of this assertion. As a great nation we must acquire and retain a preeminent position in aeronautics and space, and this requires that we command the great technologies of our time.

Our space program has been directed to achieve specific goals. In striving to reach these goals we have learned to command space technology and have turned our efforts to constructive ends. These ends are the scientific exploration of space to acquire new knowledge necessary to the advancement of civilization. I cannot identify the new knowledge we will acquire but that new truths remain to be discovered and that we are on the threshold of a scientific and technological revolution no one can doubt. History recalls that the first inkling of nuclear energy was gained from man's observing his universe. He knew that the amounts of energy radiated from the stars and his sun could not be produced by any mechanism known here on earth. In his search to explain the production of the energy of the stars, he developed the first theories of atomic and then nuclear energy.

Only recently we have again discovered energy sources in our universe which are difficult to explain with our current knowledge, but it has started men thinking and you can be assured that the future will provide the theory to explain these tremendous sources of energy. All of us here today will agree that the United States of America should be the leader in these discoveries. Only through support of programs aimed at gaining this new knowledge for mankind can such discoveries be made. Basically, this is what the space program does.

The Senate Appropriations Committee in their deliberations of this bill have carefully considered the recommendations of the other House. We found that in some instances the House had cut too deeply; so we restored some funds.

For example, NASA requested \$297.7 million for their tracking and data acquisition program. The Congress authorized \$290 million but the House in cutting the research and development budget recommended only \$260 million. Our worldwide tracking and data acquisition system simply cannot be run efficiently at that level. Moreover, the Administrator of NASA, the Honorable James E. Webb, testified that to provide ade-

quately for the safety of the astronauts, he must have at least another \$15 million in that program. Therefore, the Senate committee has recommended that \$15 million be added to the research and development budget for the tracking and data acquisition program.

The committee believed, however, that at the level of appropriations being recommended, less money was necessary for administrative operations and, therefore, recommends a \$20 million cut in that appropriation.

Mr. President, earlier this year the Senate authorizing committee analyzed in great detail NASA's program and the Congress authorized a program for NASA of about \$4,866 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee now has carefully reviewed this program again in light of today's fiscal requirements as well as the reductions made by the House. The bill the committee has recommended to the Senate is sound. It provides our Nation with a strong program in aeronautics and space. It provides the means for our country to retain its leadership in these important areas of science and technology. Mr. President, I fully support the recommendations of the committee and strongly urge my colleagues to vote for this bill.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, we have a unanimous-consent agreement on a time limitation on these proposed amendments. I understand that the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] has an amendment at the desk.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Colorado first, and then will yield to the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] for the purpose of presenting his amendment.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's yielding to me. I was not informed that a unanimous-consent agreement had been made.

Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado will state it.

Mr. ALLOTT. What is the unanimous-consent agreement which has been entered into?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That after the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] yields the floor, there will be one-half hour on each amendment to be equally divided, after which there will be 1 hour on the bill.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time of the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] on the general aspects of the pending bill will not be included in the time limitation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, at this time I have no intention of making a long statement about the bill. It has caused us as much concern as any bill ever has, partially because of the very late authorization for it, it was not included in the independent offices appropriations bill.

For the sake of the record, let me repeat some of the figures that the Senator from Washington has given.

The amount of the bill passed by the House was \$4,583,000,000, and as reported by the Senate, \$4,678,900,000. It is \$289,100,000 under the appropriations for 1967, which were \$4,968,000,000.

The budget estimate was amended to \$5,100,000,000 so that the bill as reported by the committee—and I think this should be borne in mind—is \$421,100,000 under the estimate for 1968 as amended.

It is under the authorization by \$186,851,000—almost \$200 million.

These figures were not arrived at with any ease by the committee. I think for the moment the only thing that I really want to point out can be capsulized into two or three points.

First, we did receive the advice and consultation of the distinguished Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], who is chairman of the Space Committee, not only throughout the hearings but also throughout the markup of the bill itself.

Joining him in that was the ranking minority member, the very distinguished and charming lady from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], whose knowledge of this particular area is probably unsurpassed by anyone in the Senate. So that with these two advising and working with us all the way through, and with the many, many long hours which the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], and I and others spent on the space program, plus three separate hearings which extended over many months, I think that we have given the bill as careful, thorough, and thoughtful consideration as any bill which has ever come before the Senate.

The second point I should like to make is that there is one amendment before the Senate, in two parts, attempting to cut the bill. Senators should decide very carefully what they want to do with it. I would call their attention to the fact that when the space program was started—at the time everyone, in 1957, was in a state of alarm over Sputnik I, which was the beginning of the space program—and then with the election of President Kennedy—and I may refer later to some remarks he made—we engaged in a program to make a moon landing during the 1960's. In fact, this was a Presidential commitment to do this by President Kennedy. It was a commitment which the country as a whole gathered up, accepted, and was greatly enthusiastic over.

Undoubtedly, it will be argued that today is a new day and there is a different situation in the country. That is true. We did not face a \$29 billion deficit then. We did face a substantial deficit at that time, as we had during all those years.

Yet the country committed itself. There were those of us at that time, and I think the record will disclose in the hearings on the independent offices bill back in those early years, questions by the senior Senator from Colorado as to whether the decision to place a man on the moon at any time, not alone during the 1960's, was not something which should be considered and studied, and the advice of independent scientists obtained to the fullest extent, in order to determine whether this was a really legitimate goal for the United States, considering all of its aspects, considering the risks we

took in competition with Russia concerning the development of the Russian space program, and considering the cost of the program.

I must say, at that time, the scientists in this country who had the knowledge to speak out, did not speak out.

It is only in the last year or two that we have found a few willing to come out of the woodwork and say they did not think this was really a reasonable goal and aim of the United States. So we explored this question as much as we could during those times. I think it is perhaps unfortunate that at this stage and time we have responsible men criticizing the program who could have and should have at that time made their voices heard and given the Members of the Congress of the United States, who, by and large, are not scientists, the opportunity to hear them and take advantage of what knowledge they have.

So the United States did engage itself in this program. To do so, we have had to develop technologies in hundreds of fields—I should say thousands of fields. This technology has gone on. It has involved developing all kinds of booster vehicles and all kinds of capsules. It has involved one great tragedy which brought sorrow to all of us, and particularly those who had known these men.

We have developed the Titan booster series, which lifted all of the Gemini series successfully into the air and brought them back home. We have developed the Saturn I engine, which has a very great capability. We now have a Titan III-C and a Titan III-M, which is based upon the same strap-on principle as the Titan III-C, which has not yet been tested, but which has every indication of a very potential vehicle.

Beyond that, we have the Saturn V rocket, the huge booster which is the one which will finally lift, we hope, our men into space to a manned landing on the moon and bring them home safely.

So this is a sort of résumé of where we stand, looking at it objectively, and not looking at it emotionally in any sense of the word.

I can understand those who disagree with the figures in this particular bill, but I say to Members of the Senate and to others who hear my voice that this bill represents, in our opinion, the best bill we can bring out which simply does not throw out developed machinery, technology, knowledge, and hardware into the trash can, and provides a reasonable look into the future without committing ourselves to endless manned explorations in space.

It was a hard decision for the committee. It was a hard decision when the senior Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] and the senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] worked upon the authorization bill. But what we have here—and I want to emphasize it—is a bill which, in my opinion, provides a lucid, reasonable, sound application and use of all the science and technology and hardware we have developed and ordered, without committing ourselves to just untold billions of dollars in the area of manned exploration of space which some people seem to desire. This appropriation will enable us to go ahead without sac-

rificing what we have gained and what we have learned; and I think this is the decision which governed our committee in our deliberations.

I hope the amendment will be rejected. I shall probably speak on it later, but I emphasize again that this was the basis upon which the committee made its decision.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator from Colorado for the fine work he has done. I think he understands the facts involved. He has a very strong opinion on wanting to do the things which ought to be done. I thank him very much for his contributions. As far as I am concerned, he has performed exceptionally fine service for the people.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator very much. I yield the floor.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I now yield to the Senator from Wisconsin for the purpose of offering and discussing his amendment.

#### AMENDMENT NO. 383

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 383, and ask unanimous consent that the amendment not be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 383 is as follows:

On page 2, line 12, strike "\$3,995,500,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,914,500,000".

On page 2, line 18, strike "\$55,400,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$35,900,000".

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] be added as a cosponsor of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in essence, my proposal would cut funds added to the bill by the Senate Appropriations Committee over and above the amount approved by the House with one exception. The Proxmire amendment would not touch an additional \$15 million provided by the Senate Appropriations Committee for tracking and data acquisition. These funds are necessary, in the words of the committee, to "operate the system efficiently and to assure maximum safety for the astronauts."

That addition by the Senate Appropriations Committee would not be eliminated. It would be kept in the bill if my amendment were successful.

Frankly, I was strongly tempted to try to cut even more from the bill as reported to the floor of the Senate. I think an excellent case could be made for slicing \$200 to \$300 million from the bill. However, I wanted to give a number of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle who have expressed their concern over excessive Federal spending a chance to vote for a moderate, reasonable, unquestionably sound amendment that at the most would simply mean the postponement for a relatively short period of time of post-moon projects. I stress post-



moon projects, after what we do after we approach the moon.

Furthermore, I wanted to give my colleagues a chance to support the President's effort to cut spending in this area, because the President has gone on record in favor of the cuts made by the House of Representatives in the space budget—the very cuts that my amendment would preserve.

I say this position of the President should have special force—it certainly does with me—in causing us to divert some funds which would go to the space program. The President told me that, if he had his preference, the space program would go ahead at full tilt, as the administration originally requested, but he recognizes the great need for paring programs wherever they can be cut. Therefore, he very reluctantly acceded to the position taken by the House Appropriations Committee in August when it cut the space program.

On August 21, 1967, when President Johnson signed the space authorization bill he referred to the cuts made in the fiscal 1968 space program by the House Appropriations Committee as cuts that “under other circumstances I would have opposed.” But, the President went on to say:

The times demand responsibility from us all.

Every Federal dollar must be scrutinized by the Congress before it is appropriated and by the Executive branch before it is spent. And in the process some hard choices must be made. The test is to distinguish between the necessary and the desirable.

To reach our expenditure reduction target will not be easy, for the January budget was lean. By working together with the Congress we will pursue that goal . . . Our task is to pare the desirable.

The administration and the Congress must face up to these choices in the space program. I recognize—as also must the Congress—that the reduction in funds recommended by the House Appropriations Committee will require the deferral and reduction of some desirable space projects. Yet, in the face of present circumstances, I join with the Congress and accept this reduction.

So the budget request, in realistic and effective terms, has been modified and changed to take the position the House took. The Senate Space Subcommittee's position is over the position taken by the President.

It seems to me that we must either accept that Presidential advice today by going back to the House figures in this bill or, in effect, say, “the responsibility is yours, Mr. President, we wash our hands of any responsibility to hold down Federal spending.”

Let us take a look at what the proposed cut would mean. By reducing the Apollo applications program by \$35 million we would simply be postponing immediate procurement of materials for a flight not scheduled for 4 years. In any event the Apollo applications program amounts to an experiment to see how we should spend great sums of money in space on missions that are not yet off the drawing boards. These missions have not been justified or reviewed or, indeed, determined by Congress to be in the national interest.

The elimination of \$36 million for the

Voyager program would postpone design and development of a project to soft-land an automated laboratory on the surface of Mars. Funds for this project were not even permitted by your own authorizing committee—the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. The committee felt, with great justification, in my estimation, that, and I quote, “the program could be deferred, particularly in view of the concern by many for the budgetary situation this year.” These funds were restored in the authorization bill in conference when the House insisted on its language. Ironically enough, now the House Appropriations Committee has deleted the funds altogether and the Senate Appropriations Committee has restored them.

I submit that we can wait to land on Mars for a few months while we take care of the needs of our great cities which are literally under siege by the forgotten citizens in this country—the ghetto dwellers who have so little stake in society that they are prepared to destroy it.

My amendment would also cut almost \$30 million from our nuclear rocket development program. \$10 million of this amount would be for nuclear rockets per se while another \$19,500,000 would delete funds for a test complex for the Nerva 2 which is not, as yet, completely designed.

These giant atomic rockets are meant for a manned Mars mission. This is heady stuff. But we live on planet earth and this is where we will die. Let us place first things first and take care of the needs of our own citizens for jobs, education, adequate medical care, adequate housing, adequate law enforcement before looking for life on the planet Mars. We cannot and must not try to escape from the deeply serious problems we face in the United States by pointing to the stars—by squandering Federal funds that have become increasingly difficult to allocate on a Mars probe.

Mr. President, it seems to me that we have distorted the space program over the past few years. We set out to land on the moon as quickly as possible at the beginning of this decade. We knew that a great deal of waste was involved but we felt that prestige factors outweighed these considerations. We have most emphatically not, however, made a conscious decision to undertake a crash program to explore other planets. In this year 1967 we have not said, at least no one has said to me, “It will cost billions to reach Mars but every cent spent is worth it, even if substantial waste is involved, because we must get there ahead of the Soviet Union.”

It is almost as though we feel we must extend this massive program at any cost just because the hardware is there. It is as though Louis Pasteur spent money trying to create new diseases because he did not want his expertise in the area of immunology to go to waste. We are spending millions of dollars to keep the monster machinery cranked up by our space program in motion, even if we are not sure what direction it should go in. That is the meaning of the Apollo Applications program and of the Voyager and Nerva programs as well.

My amendment would simply slow down this rush toward the unknown at a time when the known problems we face on this planet are far from solved or, in many instances, solvable. The slowdown would be minimal. I am not asking for a major cutback in our space program. But a vote for my amendment today would simply be a recognition of the need for taking a second look at our post-Apollo program in view of the serious budgetary problems being faced by our Nation.

I suppose some may talk of “technological fallout”—that vague term that means if you spend enough on any scientific endeavor you will get some side benefits. I suppose if we decided to spend two billion dollars on a baldness cure, we would have plenty of fallout of one kind with less fallout of another. I shall not speculate on what the fall-out benefits would be but we could hardly expect to spend this amount of money on anything without making progress in basic research concepts as well as technological advances. Again, however, we have great uncertainty about what we are trying to do. The very term fallout suggests the unexpected by-product, the pleasant surprise. This is hardly a factor we can or should take into account in planning the expenditure of tax dollars.

In summation then, a vote for my amendment means a vote in support of the President's efforts to hold down Federal spending. It means a vote for a second look at where we are going after we land on the moon. It means a vote for a sensible system of spending priorities. It means a vote for people instead of machines. It means a vote for sound fiscal policies. It means a vote for the many Americans who have come to have serious doubts about our space program—not just the post-moon-shot program, but the effort to get a man on the moon. For in a recent Harris poll a clear majority of American people expressed opposition to any space program costing more than \$4 billion.

This modest amendment would still leave the space budget almost \$600 million over \$4 billion.

Certainly, Senators who have any concern for fiscal responsibility will support an amendment that reduces spending by \$100 million—or about 2 percent—in accordance with Presidential recommendations and which only slightly slows down the long and I mean long term future expenditures for space, expenditures that involve no competitive race—and no priority even within the space budget.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I do not wish to take too much time on this matter. I believe that the Senator from Colorado and other Senators do not entirely disagree with what the Senator from Wisconsin says.

This is a program which we had to evaluate and analyze, going through the programs with a fine-tooth comb. It is hard to know just where maximum value in a program such as this begins, and where it ends, or when you reach the

point where the benefits no longer justify the expenditures. That has been true in the consideration of all the Space appropriations.

It is true that the President of the United States made the general suggestion that the House figures be approved. When he said that, he meant the overall reductions by the House of Representatives. He did not single out individual items. The Senate committee had the responsibility of taking the items line by line. We might have wished to agree with the overall House figure; but we may have desired to reduce in one place and add in another place.

We conscientiously went about that job. As the Senator from Colorado has stated, this is the most reasonable and consistent bill the committee considered possible in reporting it to the Senate. There is a great amount of expertise in the membership of the Senate committee when it comes to space programs.

I repeat what I said yesterday: I do not think there are any Senators who are more inclined to be more economical than myself or the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield very briefly so that I may ask for the yeas and nays?

Mr. MAGNUSON. In a minute.

I think the Senator's definition of economy and mine may sometimes be different. I said yesterday on another matter, and I say it again on this matter; we have to keep some of these programs going to keep the economy moving, so we can collect some taxes to put in the Treasury to pay for the urban and social programs we are now talking about. We could cut out everything, and then go down and find the Treasury's cupboard was bare, like Mother Hubbard's cupboard. Approximately 92 percent of all this work is subcontracted to private industry and they are profitmaking taxpayers.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that we can ask for the yeas and nays while other Senators are still on the floor? I ask unanimous consent that I may ask for the yeas and nays without the time being taken out of either side.

Mr. MAGNUSON. In a minute.

We know there is a point where we must question how far we go, and we are attempting to express that judgment. Apollo explorations is a simple matter. We have spent billions in this effort to go to the moon. I say again, as I have said before, that if the moon was not there, if it disappeared, we would be doing much of this manned exploration in space, anyway.

Apollo explorations take advantage of many things. I do not need to take up the time of the Senate with what we have learned in this effort. It involves the whole problem of manned vehicles in space, and incidentally it involves great achievement in how we may apply the military or defense applications, or affirmative application of men in space with rockets, missiles, and other things.

That is why we thought the figure for the Apollo applications program was about as close as we could come without throwing out many of the things we al-

ready had. As the Senator from Colorado has said, to put them in the ash can and try to pick them up later.

The additional funds of \$35 million for the Apollo applications program will enable this country to investigate man's capability to function effectively in space for periods ranging up to a year or more. Developing this capability in earth orbital flights of increasing length and complexity in the near future is essential to the success of our civil and military manned space programs.

This funding will enable us to pursue a balanced manned orbital program involving early flights of 28 days duration and later of 56 days duration with existing equipment. We thus will make effective use of the Saturn I booster capability, which has been developed. These flights will be forerunners of others extending our manned orbital capability to a year or more.

Adequate funding of the Apollo applications program will allow for continuing production of Saturn I booster and its possible upgrading to a more powerful version, as required, in a timely manner. Through such a careful Saturn booster development program we will have a versatile capability for long life manned earth orbiting missions, extended lunar exploration and both manned and unmanned planetary exploration—later in combination with nuclear rockets.

Adequate funding is also necessary to pursue effectively the very promising earth resource sensing technology using the versatility of man in space.

Restoration of \$15 million to tracking and data acquisition brings the funding for these operations just to the absolute minimum required to support fiscal year 1968 spaceflights. Our tracking systems have successfully covered every manned U.S. flight and enabled the safe recovery of our astronauts. The deep space network has acquired scientific data from spacecraft at the far side of the solar system. These facilities are the heart of successful manned and unmanned mission operations.

The economies already effected by congressional action, in stretching out programs and eliminating new starts, do not reduce the tracking requirements for payloads now in orbit or to be launched this year. If less than the minimum operating budget for these facilities were provided, support of applications technology satellites, Pioneer, Mariner IV, and Mariner V, or other missions, would have to be reduced. The reduced return of data from any of these projects, already ongoing and paid for, would be false economy at best.

Our tracking facilities are also a key factor in our international space cooperation with friendly countries. We have tracking agreements with 24 countries which give us a worldwide capability to track U.S. and other cooperating country satellites on request.

On two other items, nuclear rocket and nuclear rocket development station for our space program itself.

Initiating the development of the Nerva II nuclear rocket engine is an efficient and logical step in the nuclear rocket program at this time. A long series of highly successful ground reactor tests

proves that we have mastered basic nuclear rocket technology. We can now take advantage of this technology advance to build a new generation of versatile and reliable nuclear rocket engines of great power.

This engine will afford the Nation a new range of advanced space propulsion capability. It can be used for a wide range of potential space missions from earth orbital to solar system exploration. The basic engine can be used singly or in clusters. It can also be used in combination with the Saturn chemical booster. In earth orbit this engine will have the potential for missions requiring significant maneuverability well beyond that of present chemical rockets—like shifting from near earth orbit to earth synchronous and return. It will give us significant payload increases and timing and landing versatility for lunar flights. It will also afford the country a long-range capability to conduct a large manned expedition to the planets. Development of the Nerva II will thus help to insure this country's preeminence in space in the last third of the 20th century.

The proposed initiation of construction of a complex at the Nevada nuclear test site to test the large Nerva II nuclear rocket engine is essential to the success of this engine program. The test stand complex, with about a 4-year construction period, is a pacing item in the progress of the Nerva II engine. Consequently the start of site development and the procurement of long-leadtime items this year is essential to the timely progress of the nuclear rocket development. It will be the only facility in the country capable of flight testing the large nuclear rocket on the ground with safety and with full simulation of space conditions.

The committee thought, after listening to days of testimony, that if there is anything that we ought to continue to develop in this whole field, it is the use of nuclear power in the boosters.

If we do that, the testimony from all scientists is that we will save hundreds of millions of dollars in the cost of the boosters, that we possibly could use the boosters over and over again, and that they would be involved in nearly all of the space effort. We are just beginning with nuclear propulsion, and we thought we should not delay.

We were in the position that the House and the Senate committee, without a protest, allowed the Atomic Energy Commission, which is a partner in this effort, \$94 million to go ahead with this joint program. The Space Agency, as partner, can meet its share of participation under this proposal.

We approved this amount of money in this joint space effort—and I voted to allow the Atomic Energy Commission to go ahead with this matter. I think it is well worth while.

I think it would be penny wise and pound foolish for us to stop this modest effort and attempt to find out whether we could use nuclear power in rockets. Once we do, I think we will have gained further superiority in this field over the whole world.

The other project, Voyager, gave both bodies some trouble. Voyager is a pro-



gram that is to go on beyond the Apollo program.

I have had some personal concerns as to what our space program might be after Apollo. I have had some doubts as to whether the expenditure of a great deal of money to find out certain things about the other planets might be worth while at a time when money is scarce. There is no question about money being scarce.

I have suggested on many occasions—and I am sure that many Senators agree with me—that after Apollo we perhaps ought to make our best effort to see if we cannot have a cooperative exploration of space with other countries. At the meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, most of the aeronautical and space scientists around the world have put their stamp of approval on this joint undertaking.

It would save us a great deal of money. We could explore space for the good of mankind as we do with oceanography, and in the use of weather satellites. I think it would do more to relieve world tension than any other one thing we could do.

After we leave Apollo, the work we will do will have little or no military application. It will be purely scientific knowledge. The Apollo applications program, in which we will have manned platforms in space, is a different story.

The committee thought we should continue with a modest amount for Voyager so that we would not lose what we have achieved now in the interwoven application of all these things, and so that later on if we can join with other nations of the world we will then have a contribution of scientific knowledge to make.

This was the most precise figure we could arrive at. We are \$421,100,000 under the budget. I say to my friend, the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE], that we worked hard on the pending bill. It gave us much difficulty because we have to rely so heavily on information received from these great men who are involved in this program. We are laymen in this field.

I think that the pending bill is a sound, responsible bill, considering the times. I think that the spinoffs, even now, and particularly in the future, are and will be much greater than we now imagine.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I am going to pursue this matter of cooperation in exploring outer space in the best way I know how. I hope that we will be able to have a great joint effort of all countries in the world with respect to the future programs in space that have some know-how in this field. It will benefit all mankind.

We should be very careful in the future, as to whether we will support any space program to spend hundreds of millions and perhaps billions of dollars until my suggestion is pursued to its ultimate and until every possibility of cooperation is completely explored.

I think it would be a great thing for the world and everybody in it.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 5 minutes remaining.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, as a cosponsor I certainly support the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.

There is no question that there is considerable merit in the space program. There is a question in the minds of many of us as to how much we can afford to put in it, particularly at a time when we are confronted with a staggering deficit.

We need not be so concerned about who gets to the moon first. I do not think that is so important. In fact, it was said the other day that regardless of who gets to the moon first, we can rest assured that we will be the first nation there with foreign aid.

I am also reminded of the fact that the pending bill would provide \$4,678,900,000 for this year's program for space. With respect to the project of going to the moon, it is interesting to note that if this amount of money were reduced to \$1 billion and sewn together, the strip would reach from Washington, D.C., to the moon and back to the Texas ranch. We do not have enough dollars to keep pouring them in all of these projects.

The \$36 million which we cut out of the money to launch this Voyager is not just a \$36 million saving. This is the initial cost of a commitment on a program to go to Mars, which will cost at least \$1 billion and perhaps much more.

Is this the time to start a program to reach Mars, or should we hold it back until such time as we have better control of our financial structure?

The very least we can do is to adopt this amendment, which reduces the amount to the House figure. It represents a cut of \$110 million.

As pointed out by the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, the President has endorsed these cuts made by the House as not jeopardizing the programs or the security of this country. I repeat, the President has endorsed the cuts which the House made; this amendment would restore the House figure. Such a reduction is certainly in the best interest of the country at a time when we are operating with a sizable deficit.

Earlier today we heard considerable criticism of the President because he had frozen certain funds which had been previously approved by Congress.

The argument was made that it is a responsibility of Congress to make these cuts and endorse or reject these programs.

I agree fully. It is our responsibility, but if we do not accept that responsibility I do not think Congress should criticize the President if he later wishes to exercise the authority to override our action.

The place to make cuts in expenditures is on the floor of the Senate. We should do it by a rollcall vote, and those

of us who feel that our expenditures are getting out of hand should back up our speeches with votes.

Our votes on all of these programs, not only on this program but on all other programs, should reflect our true positions. Certainly some of these programs may be the pet projects in our own immediate area, but we must curtail all new projects until our budget is nearer balanced.

At very least, this amendment, which would cut the appropriation by \$110.5 million, should be agreed to by the Senate.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, 10 years ago, on October 4, 1957, the Russians surprised the world with the launching of Sputnik I. Rarely in history has a technological achievement had such an impact on human affairs. Many of us were worried about the military implications because they had used military hardware to launch that satellite.

President Johnson was the majority leader of this body at that time. He was also chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, a position which I now have the honor to hold. Many weeks of hearings were held by that subcommittee in the latter part of 1957 and early 1958, the purpose of which was to ascertain the facts about our missile and space developments. The subcommittee unanimously determined that we were dangerously behind in this area and made numerous recommendations as to what we had to do, as a nation, to catch up.

In the past 10 years, many of those recommendations have been carried out. Our accomplishments in space have been little short of miraculous. Our plans have been ambitious and our resolve has been steadfast. We have chosen as our goal nothing less than landing men on the moon itself. The real purpose of this goal is, of course, not just to pull some cosmic stunt, but to have the capability to operate in this new environment—this "new ocean" as the late President Kennedy called it—the capability to operate in a way that would put us second to no nation on this earth.

But today, 10 years after sputnik, at the same time that we are actually building this great capability, we find ourselves curiously at another crossroad—not as to what we are going to do next year or even the year after that, because the programs that will come to fruition in 1968 and 1969 are already too far down the road to change very much—we are at the crossroads of decision as to what our space program is going to be in 1970 and beyond, and there are two programs in this appropriations bill that I would specifically like to discuss in this regard.

The first is the Apollo applications program. This is, in my opinion, the most important of NASA's followon programs. It will, in fact, build specifically on the technology and hardware developed during the Apollo program. For very little in the way of additional expenditures, it will allow us to utilize and take advantage of the capability it has cost us so much to attain. If we do not continue with this program, then the great expenditures and effort will have been

wasted, our technological advantage scrapped, and our vast facilities mothballed.

The other program is the Voyager. This is a program to explore Mars and the other planets in 1973 and beyond. I will not dwell upon this except to say that as things stand at the present time, we have no plans whatsoever for interplanetary exploration in the 1970's. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same thing about the Russians. They have a vigorous interplanetary program now and give every indication that they will continue with these efforts. By whatever project name we call it, I think it is imperative that we have a well-planned interplanetary program. If we do not, we will simply forfeit the solar system to the Russians. I, for one, do not want to do that.

Ten years ago we did not have the knowledge or the equipment to meet the Russian challenge. We had to build it, the hard way. Today we are on a par with them—ahead in some areas, still behind in others. Today, in contrast to 10 years ago, we have the capability to meet the challenge. What we need is the will. And to show that will, we must make the decisions now, not 3 or 4 or 10 years from now. I do not want the chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee, whether that is still my honor or someone else's, to have to call for hearings again in a few years in order to try to find out what we have to do to catch up.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, it is difficult for me to go against decisions of the Committee on Appropriations, of which I am a member; but I did reserve my right on this bill in the committee, largely because of one item that was added—\$35 million on the Apollo application, which Mr. Webb, the Administrator, said he did not need—and because of the action in the last few days by the House of Representatives and the Secretary of Defense in cutting back many important programs which I believe are more important than the one referred to in the pending amendment, important as it is. Therefore, I shall vote to cut the appropriation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired on the amendment.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD (when his named was called). On this vote, I have a pair with the distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea"; if I were permitted to vote, I would vote "nay." I therefore withhold my vote.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote, I have a pair with the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay"; if I were permitted to vote,

I would vote "yea." Therefore, I withdraw my vote.

The legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN], the Senator from Utah [Mr. MOSS], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] are necessarily absent.

On this vote, the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS] is paired with the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT]. If present and voting, the Senator from South Carolina would vote "yea," and the Senator from Alaska would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] is paired with the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH]. If present and voting the Senator from Arkansas would vote "yea," and the Senator from Texas would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] is paired with the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA]. If present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina would vote "yea," and the Senator from New Mexico would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senators from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN and Mr. PROUTY], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. PERCY], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BOGGS] is absent because of death in his family.

The Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is absent for religious observance.

If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] would each vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD] is paired with the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea," and the

Senator from South Carolina would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is paired with the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY]. If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "yea," and the Senator from California would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 30, nays 36, as follows:

[No. 286 Leg.]

YEAS—30

Baker	Cotton	Nelson
Bayh	Dirksen	Pell
Bennett	Griffin	Proxmire
Brewster	Gruning	Ribicoff
Brooke	Hansen	Spong
Burdick	Kennedy, N.Y.	Talmadge
Byrd, Va.	Lausche	Tydings
Case	Miller	Williams, N.J.
Church	Morse	Williams, Del.
Cooper	Mundt	Young, N. Dak.

NAYS—36

Allott	Hill	McIntyre
Anderson	Holland	Metcalf
Bible	Inouye	Mondale
Cannon	Jackson	Monroney
Curtis	Jordan, N.C.	Muskie
Dominick	Jordan, Idaho	Pearson
Ellender	Kuchel	Scott
Fong	Long, Mo.	Smathers
Hart	Long, La.	Smith
Hartke	Magnuson	Sparkman
Hayden	McClellan	Stennis
Hickenlooper	McGee	Symington

NOT VOTING—34

Aiken	Harris	Murphy
Bartlett	Hatfield	Pastore
Boggs	Hollings	Percy
Byrd, W. Va.	Hruska	Prout
Carlson	Javits	Randolph
Clark	Kennedy, Mass.	Russell
Dodd	Mansfield	Thurmond
Eastland	McCarthy	Tower
Ervin	McGovern	Yarborough
Fannin	Montoya	Young, Ohio
Fulbright	Morton	
Gore	Moss	

So Mr. PROXMIRE's amendment (No. 383) was rejected.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. ALLOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I had informed most Senators, who have asked me, that we were going to have a vote on final passage immediately after the vote on the previous amendment. However, I understand now that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] has an amendment he wishes to offer, and the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] has a very brief statement she wishes to make on the bill.

I understand that the Senator from Delaware will not require much time.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, we can agree on 5 minutes limitation on this amendment.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me briefly?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is the time fixed now?

Mr. MAGNUSON. The time has been fixed since we began.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I have need for a few minutes.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I shall be pleased to



yield some of my time to the Senator later.

Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS], on behalf of himself and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIER], proposes an amendment:

On page 2, line 12, strike out "\$3,995,500,000" and insert "\$3,969,500,000."

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, this is merely a part of the previous amendment. The purpose of this amendment is to reduce by \$26 million the appropriation in the bill. The committee allowed \$36 million for the Voyager, which is the project to go to Mars; this amendment will reduce that item by \$26 million.

Some claim that there would be need for \$10 million to keep the scientists and the research team in operation, but it was agreed that we could postpone the other \$26 million without jeopardizing the program. It would, however, stop the long-range commitments, which ultimately could cost over \$1 billion.

If we commit ourselves to this project we would be committing ourselves to a minimum of a billion dollars on a project to go to Mars. There are many stars in the universe, and whether we can pay a billion dollars to go to each of them is a question to be answered, particularly when it is being done on borrowed money.

If we agree to this amendment it would not destroy the organization, but it would hold in abeyance further commitments on this project until after Congress has again acted.

Mr. President, this amendment would affect that one project.

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. PROXMIER. Is it not true that the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences recommended that the entire amount for Voyager be deleted? The Senator from Delaware is being very generous in allowing \$10 million, when the committee recommended no money.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The Senator is correct.

Mr. PROXMIER. In addition, the Appropriations Committee in the House of Representatives recommended no money for Voyager. Is that not correct?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The Senator is correct. Both of those committees recommended no money.

Our earlier amendment, which would have met those recommendations, having failed, and recognizing that we do not have a sufficient number of votes, this amendment would leave \$10 million in the bill to hold the organization together and to continue the research for this

project. Approval of the amendment would stop further long-range commitments on this project, which lead to a cost of over \$1 billion.

I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I have only this brief comment.

The reinstatement of \$36 million for Voyager is necessary to maintain U.S. options with respect to planetary missions. The Voyager program is the next step beyond Mariner to explore our nearby neighbors, Venus and Mars, with spacecraft capable of orbiting the planets and landing on their surface to conduct useful experiments. At present, there are no plans for U.S. flights to the planets after the 1969 Mariner/Mars flyby.

There are many reasons why the United States should pursue a planetary flight program. First, if the United States does not continue in this field, we will virtually dissipate the competent industry-Government teams which carried out the highly successful lunar Ranger, Surveyor, Orbiter missions, the Mariner/Venus 1962 and 1965 missions, and the Mariner/Mars 1964 missions. We will literally abandon our planetary exploration lead to the Soviets who have doggedly attempted Venus and Mars missions at almost every opportunity. A Soviet spacecraft is now en route to Venus and scheduled to arrive there on October 18.

Second, there is exciting new scientific knowledge to be gained. The key to understanding the origin of the solar system and of the earth itself will likely be found when we explore the other planets. Further insights into the origin of life and its possible uniqueness on earth will be established. These questions alone, with their far-reaching implications, should be sufficient justification for the program.

Finally, the process of building new spacecraft has brought new developments in medical and other technology which benefit all Americans. Research to develop instruments to search for life on Mars has already increased our understanding of disease and life processes here on Earth.

Thus, investment in this seemingly far-out project will bring us immediate returns in prestige, knowledge, technology, and markets.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Mississippi.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MCINTYRE in the chair). The Senator from Mississippi is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this amendment affects only Voyager. It would still leave \$10 million in the bill.

I was one of those who voted for retention of the Voyager program all the way through because, as I said, and as the Senator from Washington has said, otherwise we will abruptly abandon and bring to a halt the tremendous momentum we have built up in the moon shot program. Beyond Apollo, we have no interplanetary plans. That is the moon shot.

To bring this tremendous machine to a complete halt, to me, is just unthinkable. We should lay the groundwork for the necessary planning and the small beginnings, and that is all the \$36 million would provide.

Frankly, I think that if we are going to take out \$26 million, it would be better to knock the whole \$36 million out. The testimony was that \$10 million would not be enough.

To me, it would be unthinkable to do this at this early stage before we know the facts, and bring the program to a grinding and complete stop when the moon shot is over. That is why I vigorously support the Voyager program all the way through. The \$36 million figure is a minimum figure.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. ALLOTT. The distinguished Senator from Mississippi has well stated the case. There is no point in trying to be emotional about the matter. It is a very objective matter of judgment which should be exercised here.

The situation is that with the Voyager program there are two windows which may be utilized for an unmanned landing or a look at Mars. One is 1973 and one is 1975. It will be several years after that, if we do not utilize them at this time. We will have space boosters, Saturn V's, hopefully, on hand at that time, depending on how fortunate we are with our first flight with Saturn V's in order to do this.

Now, do we chuck these in the trash can—as I said a while ago—and forget about it, or do we pursue a logical plan for the utilization of what we have already developed? If we keep in the \$36 million, we can, hopefully, do this in 1975. All hope of doing it in 1973 has now gone by the board by reason of the action of the other committees which have acted.

So that if we are going to retain and use the material, the supplies, the missiles, and the vehicles we have on hand and, hopefully, will have on hand at that time, which are already ordered, which are already in the pipeline, this is the only logical way to do it.

The distinguished Senator from Mississippi hit it right on the head. We can go on and do research and research and research for 10 years for \$10 million. But if we keep in the \$36 million, we cannot only do the research but also start the initial phases of the planned attack on the problem of getting into the window of Mars in 1975.

The problem is that simple. I hope that the Senate will reject the amendment.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I support without reservation the position taken by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi and the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

This amendment would end the interplanetary program. I would point out that we have spent billions and billions and billions of dollars on the space pro-

gram and now, suddenly, under the circumstances we are all interested in saving money, and we would take an action with respect to a relatively small amount of money that would eliminate the entire future program which these tremendous investments represent.

Actually, this is about one-half of a day's cost of the Vietnamese war. I would hope that everyone would realize what they would be doing today if we abolished the Voyager program and, as a result, end our entire space program from an interplanetary standpoint.

To me, it is unthinkable that we would do that. I would hope that the Senate would reject the amendment.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from South Dakota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I support the amendment of the Senator from Delaware, not in terms of emotion, but in terms of hard consideration of the economic condition of this country.

Let us get clear in mind what we are doing. If we put in the \$36 million—although the House put nothing in and the legislative committee did not recommend it—we are committed then to make a landing on Mars, which is going to cost \$1 billion—perhaps it will be more than a \$1 billion program. The \$10 million will meet the objections raised by the Senator from Mississippi. It will keep the team intact. It will permit continued planning, and so forth. But it seems to me that before we even discover what we are going to learn by landing a man on the moon, if we now go off on another great adventure of simply landing a machine on Mars for \$1 billion, we will be pretty reckless with the taxpayers' money in these times when \$26 million is not just alfalfa hay, or peanuts. It is important money.

When in the world are we going to start economizing, if we cannot start economizing on a project as visionary as this one is? We have got the money in for the rest of the planetary program. We have got it in for Voyager, and for the moon. We are going to land a man up there very shortly to see what we can learn, eventually, we hope. What is the purpose of going out to Mars and landing a machine out there? Is there any great urgency about it?

Of course there is the curiosity of some scientists to consider. They may pick up a few ideas and some information. But it would seem to me that they will be a very long time digesting what they learn on the moon.

I agree with the Senator from Delaware that the constellations are pretty big out there. There are an awful lot of stars up in the sky. If we are going to start penetrating them \$1 billion at a time, when are we ever going to balance the budget?

The place to start economizing is now. Here is \$26 million we can save, not emotionally but economically, for the taxpayers of America.

I support the amendment of the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Delaware yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. In casting my votes on measures which come before the Senate, I try to follow a plan of determining the issues which should be given priority in spending the taxpayers' money.

We have our eyes set on the moon and on the planets. We are looking up at the sky unconscious of the pitfalls that lie beneath our feet as we walk upon the earth and contemplate the management of the fiscal affairs of our country.

All eyes are on the moon. All eyes are on the planets. No eyes seem to be upon the fiscal problems confronting us in the management of our simple earthly business.

Somewhere it has been said, pithily, as you gaze into the skies be sure that you do not stumble upon the pitfalls of the earth. How can I vote for cutting the economic opportunity program by \$2.5 billion and then tell the people I am voting to put a man on the moon, and, possibly later, upon Saturn or other places in space? I cannot see it. We have too many problems on earth to handle.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING].

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, when our vital domestic programs are being cut, when appropriations for such pressing and long neglected needs in the fields of education, health, housing, slum clearance, pollution abatement, resource development, the war on poverty, the war on crime, are being drastically reduced, I can see no justification for the extravagant space programs. To spend billions of dollars to land a man on the moon when the needs of man on earth are being tragically slighted is unjustifiable.

One reason for the costliness of the space program is the desire to get to the moon before the Russians. I think it unimportant whether we get to the moon in 1969, 1970, 1980, or at all until our earthly needs are met. To spend more billions to explore the planet Mars when we fail to explore the needs and wants of people on our own planet is folly. I know of no place in our budget where economies can be more justified than on space. To spend \$5 billion annually on this one program seems to me to exhibit a mistaken sense of priorities.

When I was a young man many believed that Mars was inhabited. A famous astronomer, Percival Lowell, who operated an observatory at Flagstaff, Ariz., thought not only that there were men on Mars but that they were very superior beings. Lowell had seen, or thought he had seen, canals on Mars running from that planet's two polar ice caps. He deduced from that that these highly intelligent Martians were utilizing high engineering ingenuity to irrigate this largely desert planet and thus to preserve life on it. So Lowell wrote a famous book called "Mars as the Abode of Life."

Unfortunately, no other astronomers saw those canals, and later observations with more powerful telescopes make clear that they do not exist. Other observations indicate that Mars is uninhabited and is not the abode of any kind of life.

It is, of course, disappointing that we may not be visited by little green men with a tassel coming out of their heads and perhaps coming on a saucer. But, in any event, why spend billions on the planet Mars when the planet Earth has so many unmet needs?

I shall vote for every cut in the space program, and wish they were more drastic. I know of no place where drastic cuts are more desirable than in a program to spend more than \$5 billion annually, which is nothing less than folly, particularly when the needs of our folks at home are so great.

I am more interested in landing an unemployed man on his feet on Earth than landing a man on the Moon.

For these reasons, while I appreciate some of the useful byproducts in scientific knowledge incidental to the space program, I feel obliged to vote against it.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I have been trying to follow the debate carefully. I understood from the Senator from Delaware's statement that there was no intention to continue the Voyager project. As a matter of fact, \$10 million is being left intact for the purpose of leaving the personnel there to continue the Voyager project. Now from some Senators who are opposed to the amendment we are told that this would do away with the Voyager project. Both sides cannot be right. It seems to me if the personnel are continued, that does not mean the Voyager project is not going to be continued.

I wish, in the summation of the arguments, it would be made clear, because it is not clear to me how we can do away with the Voyager project when we are going to spend \$10 million on personnel for it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I merely want to add again, for the Record, so it is perfectly clear, that the authorization for this Voyager project is \$42 million, passed by the House and the Senate, and now authorized in Public Law 90-67.

We think this is a reasonable and responsible bill, with a reduction of \$421,000,000 below the budget estimate.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] has asked a question, and I think he has a right to have that question answered. The Mariner project has been canceled. Therefore, the only utilization in sight now on which Saturn V and perhaps others which will be available is the Voyager program, outside of the Apollo applications.

If the Senate supports the motion that



is made here, what it will be doing is just keeping the personnel on board to study and restudy, when the real problem is to move ahead with a plan for the Voyager to take advantage of the window on Mars which opens in 1973 and again in 1975. After that, there will be several years, at least—I forget exactly, but I think it is 9 years—1973 and 1975 are the “window” years when we can get to it.

It is true that this is a large program, but it is the only method by which we can make use of the technology and the vehicles which we hope to have, which are ordered, and which are part of our upcoming arsenal in the space race.

No one can talk about specific things in this program, yet our own explorations in space so far have brought valuable information to this country—and I say this to my friend from South Dakota—which has been of almost inestimable value in our work of trying to predict the weather, which is of such great importance to the farmers, stockmen, and cattlemen in his State. This is one definite application we will get out of the work with Voyager. Knowing more about our universe, we will be able to predict weather, and we will get a hundred thousand other “fallouts” besides.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. I am not questioning the efficacy of the project, but I am questioning what will happen if the \$10 million is continued for the personnel.

Here we are in October. It will probably not be until next July or August when the follow-on money which is being knocked out will be raised. What will this do? Will this be actually a setback for the project? Are they going to be able to get the hardware started with the money knocked out? How much will this set back the project?

Mr. ALLOTT. The answer to that question is that research and design, particularly design, are very long lead items. If we do not put the \$36 million into this bill, we will not see the 1975 “window” in the Mars program or the Voyager program. The \$10 million will only keep the people “on board”—bodies working. It will not, however, enable us to go ahead with design, which has a long lead time, and which will help us accomplish, 8 years ahead, what we have been trying to accomplish so far.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, how much time do we have left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington has 4 minutes remaining and the Senator from Delaware has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT] has talked about the “window.” I did not understand it myself for a while, but the “window” is the proper time when Mars will be in the best position for space exploration in its relation to the earth. That will happen in 1975. As I understand it, a period of 9 years is involved before the proper “window” will occur again. I wanted to explain for the Record what is meant by the term “window.” I hope I have let in some light on this matter.

I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield myself just 1 minute.

Based on the recommendations of the Space Committee and based upon the recommendations of the President, this program should have been stricken out in its entirety, but since we were not able to get approval of the earlier amendment, this is compromise; we are leaving in the \$10 million to take care of the staff and continued research.

As for the “window,” which is of concern to the Senator from Colorado, if we keep piling deficits on top of deficits, we shall not need a window; we shall be able to stand on top of the national debt and look over the roof.

There is literally enough money in this one bill to run a strip of dollar bills to the moon and back again, and it is all borrowed money. The very least we can do is hold in abeyance some of these projects, at least until such time as we have the money.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. May I suggest to the Senator that there might be another definition for this “window” we are hearing so much about—that the “window” is the aperture through which it is proposed to throw another \$26 million of the taxpayers’ money, which we do not have to spend now, and at a time when we have been asked by the President to search for ways to save. Here is a pretty good place for a substantial start.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I conclude, Mr. President, by quoting what President Johnson said on August 21 in connection with the House bill which had eliminated this project in its entirety:

The reduction in funds recommended by the House Appropriations Committee will require the deferment and reduction of some desirable space projects. Yet, in the face of present circumstances, I join with the Congress and accept this reduction.

Why should the Senate override the President’s recommendations and give him \$26 million he does not need?

If Congress wants to maintain control of the pursestrings we should at least stop sending the White House more money than it is asking for and then later save our consciences by passing a resolution saying to the President, “You cut expenditures, we did not have the nerve to do it.”

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back—

Mr. MAGNUSON. I have just a half minute.

The White House asked for \$71 million for Voyager.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That was in January 1967. On August 21 the President said to reduce the appropriations for this project.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Delaware. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia (after having voted in the affirmative). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with my colleague, the senior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]. If he were present and voting, he would vote “yea.” If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote “nay.” Therefore, I withhold my vote.

The rollcall was concluded.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN], the Senator from Utah [Mr. MOSS], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH], are necessarily absent.

On this vote, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] is paired with the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT]. If present and voting, the Senator from Arkansas would vote “yea,” and the Senator from Alaska would vote “nay.”

On this vote, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] is paired with the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA]. If present and voting, the Senator from North Carolina would vote “yea,” and the Senator from New Mexico would vote “nay.”

On this vote, the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS] is paired with the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS]. If present and voting, the Senator from South Carolina would vote “yea,” and the Senator from Florida would vote “nay.”

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] would each vote “nay.”

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senators from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN and Mr. PROUTY], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. PERCY], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BOGGS] is absent because of death in his family.

The Senator from New York [Mr. JAV-

ITS] is absent for religious observance.

If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. Tower] would each vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD] is paired with the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oregon would vote "yea," and the Senator from South Carolina would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is paired with the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY]. If present and voting, the Senator from New York would vote "yea," and the Senator from California would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 31, nays 34, as follows:

[No. 287 Leg.]

YEAS—31

Baker	Griffin	Pell
Bayh	Gruening	Proxmire
Bennett	Hansen	Ribicoff
Brewster	Harris	Spong
Brooke	Kennedy, N.Y.	Talmadge
Burdick	Lausche	Tydings
Byrd, Va.	Miller	Williams, N.J.
Case	Mondale	Williams, Del.
Church	Morse	Young, N. Dak.
Cotton	Mundt	
Dirksen	Nelson	

NAYS—34

Allott	Hill	McGee
Anderson	Holland	McIntyre
Bible	Inouye	Monroney
Cannon	Jackson	Muskie
Cooper	Jordan, N.C.	Pearson
Curtis	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Dominick	Kuchel	Smith
Ellender	Long, Mo.	Sparkman
Fong	Long, La.	Stennis
Hart	Magnuson	Symington
Hayden	Mansfield	
Hickenlooper	McClellan	

NOT VOTING—35

Aiken	Hartke	Murphy
Bartlett	Hatfield	Pastore
Boggs	Hollings	Percy
Byrd, W. Va.	Hruska	Prouty
Carlson	Javits	Randolph
Clark	Kennedy, Mass.	Russell
Dodd	McCarthy	Smathers
Eastland	McGovern	Thurmond
Ervin	Metcalf	Tower
Fannin	Montoya	Yarborough
Fulbright	Morton	Young, Ohio
Gore	Moss	

So the amendment of Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware was rejected.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the Senate Appropriations Committee has reported out an fiscal year 1968 appropriations bill for NASA of \$4,678,900,000. This is \$421,100,000 below the administration's request and \$186,851,000 below the amount authorized by the Congress.

The Senate Appropriations Committee in their deliberations of this bill carefully considered the recommendations of the other House. We found that in some instances the House had cut too deeply. For example, NASA requested \$297.7 million for their tracking and data acquisition program. The Congress authorized \$290 million but the House in cutting the research and development budget recom-

mended only \$260 million. Our world-wide tracking and data acquisition system simply cannot be run efficiently at that level. Moreover, the Administrator of NASA, the Honorable James E. Webb, testified that to provide for the safety of the astronauts, he must have at least another \$15 million in that program. The Senate committee has recommended that \$15 million for tracking and data acquisition be added to the research and development request.

In the case of the nuclear rocket engine, the Administrator, Mr. Webb, testified that, if cut to the \$45.6 million level as recommended by the House, he could not undertake the development of the 200,000-pound-thrust engine which everyone agrees would be the most efficient engine to develop. He would instead have to fall back to the development of the Nerva I engine with a thrust of between 60,000 and 75,000 pounds. With the additional \$10 million in the research and development budget and \$19.5 million in the construction of facilities, which has been recommended by the Senate committee, we can proceed with the development of the 200,000-pound-thrust engine which everyone agrees will be needed in the future for our space exploration programs. This is an excellent investment for the future and I strongly support this recommendation.

In the case of our planetary programs, Mr. Webb testified that if he had to absorb the cut voted by the House he could not initiate the Voyager program for the exploration of the planets. This would mean that the planetary exploration program of the United States would end with the 1969 Mariner-Mars mission. Yet all of the scientific testimony before the Congress, and particularly the testimony of people from the National Academy of Sciences, has been that the United States should increase the amount of its resources that is devoted to planetary exploration. Planetary exploration bears on some of the fundamental questions of our time; the origin of the earth, and in fact the origin of the universe itself, and whether or not there is extraterrestrial life. The committee, therefore, added \$36 million to the House bill with its recommendation that a Voyager program proceed at that level during fiscal year 1968. I fully support this recommendation and hope that NASA will go ahead with a Voyager program. In view of the tremendous success of the Lunar Orbiter, NASA should give careful consideration to first doing orbiting missions of Mars and Venus.

In the area of manned flight exploration, the Apollo program is reaching its final stages. There is still the possibility that man will reach the moon and return safely to earth within this decade. But because of the technical problems, the probability is getting lower. Nevertheless, we must plan for what comes after the Apollo program in manned space flight. NASA has proposed a realistic program called the Apollo Applications program under which they propose to make use of the technology and equipment developed under the Apollo program for long-duration, earth-orbital

flight and further lunar exploration. However, under the cut passed by the House, the Apollo Applications program simply could not proceed with more than four flights using the uprated Saturn I vehicle and after these flights there would be a gap in our manned space flight program. Mr. Webb testified that if he must run the space program at the level recommended by the House then:

There will, in my opinion, be from two to five years' gap in our large operations in space.

Mr. Webb said that at the level recommended by the House, he would be forced to stop the production of the uprated Saturn I booster which to date has been the most successful booster program this country has ever known—the program has never had a failure. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] questioned the witnesses on this point and his conclusion was that to stop the production of this booster after spending a billion dollars in developing it and then in 4 or 5 years having to go forward with the use of a different booster or the development of a new booster would be sheer waste. He said:

In my opinion, that will be waste of the rankest kind.

I think we should go forward with the Apollo Applications program; the Congress authorized \$347.7 million, the House recommended \$300 million. This committee added \$35 million to NASA's research and development budget with the recommendation that this be used for the Apollo Applications program. I strongly support that recommendation.

As a result of its analysis, the Senate Appropriations Committee also reduced the administrative operations request \$20 million below the amount approved by the House.

Mr. President, this bill represents a detailed analysis in the best judgment of many of our most respected colleagues. It provides the Nation with an austere but strong program in aeronautics and space and with it our Nation can continue its leadership in these important areas of science and technology. I fully support the recommendations of the Appropriations Committee and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the U.S. space program has been directed toward balanced and orderly objectives in three fields: earth orbit, lunar, and planetary. Each is an essential element for balance. To maintain the balance requires the continuity, during 1968, of unmanned planetary program support. The fiscal 1968 decisions do, in fact, play a critical role in determining our planetary exploration capability in the 1970's which the National Academy of Sciences calls "the most rewarding goal on which to focus national attention for the 10 to 15 years following lunar landing."

Russia's planetary activity is a major part of her space program. Her launchings, while not as successful as ours, number 17, as opposed to our five. Further, they are now flying spacecraft that weigh up to 2,500 pounds, about four times the weight of our Mariner spacecraft. Our best estimates on the current Russian flight to Venus indicate that the



vehicle is carrying one or more probes to be launched when near the planet. The Russians must be convinced of the scientific, economic, political, and social rewards of an aggressive planetary exploration program. Their effort cannot be described as a race with us, but rather an orderly program to acquire knowledge of the planets.

NASA and the space industry have been investigating and refining concepts of Voyager since 1961. The program has been thoroughly defined and the required technologies will be available. If sufficient funds are not authorized for fiscal year 1968, the launch of Voyager will be delayed from 1973 to 1975 because Mars is "available" only once every 25 months.

Translated into resources, both Government and industry scientist-engineer teams have been building up and working for 6 years on Voyager at a substantial cost. A decision now to defer action in 1968 means these teams and their facilities and technologies cannot be held; rather, they would have to be dismembered and reassigned. Two years from now, the effort and starting costs to recreate this resource would be substantial.

The scientific community, NASA, the President and his advisers, all certify the scientific value of data from interplanetary space. Added to this are the Voyager-unique requirements that will result in the advancement of technologies. The space program is demonstrating how it can "spin off" elements of its technology to society. The Voyager program will assure the continued flow of these benefits, particularly in the areas of data management, automated science instruments, resources management, and long-life reliability for complex systems, as illustrated by work in the field of medical and health support, solution of problems of urban and regional areas, and education.

The amount of money approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee for the Voyager program is the minimum amount of money which can make this program viable.

Accordingly, I hope that the Senate will reject this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment of the amendments and third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] has worked very long and diligently on the pending bill. She has a short statement to make, and I yield to her such time as she may desire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, as a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, as well as the ranking minority member of the Senate Space Committee, I would like to add my observations on the NASA appropriations bill for fiscal year 1968 which is now before the Senate. First, I would like to take this opportunity

to congratulate the chairman and the ranking minority member for the excellent manner in which they handled the hearings on this bill.

I think it is important to note that the appropriations bill which your committee has reported is substantially less than the authorization bill passed by the Senate.

In most instances, your committee carefully reviewed the funding for each of the program items and took the position that, wherever practicable, new, high cost programs should be deferred and that only those on-going programs which have proved successful and for which substantial investments had already been incurred during previous years be continued.

In my view, the appropriations bill before you provides for a well-balanced program at a funding level commensurate with the financial situation existing today. I therefore commend the passage of this bill to my colleagues.

In conclusion, I feel constrained to express my surprise at the action of the President with respect to the space program in announcing his acceptance of the NASA appropriations reductions made by the House Appropriations Committee at the time he signed the 1968 authorization bill.

He has certainly had quite a change of heart about the space program from those days when he headed the Senate Space Committee and so vigorously pushed for a full space program instead of a limited space program. His action clearly signaled a new policy of relegating the space program to a secondary position and one of considerably lower priority than that which he had insisted upon when he was chairman of the Senate Space Committee.

To be quite frank, he literally pulled the rug from under those who direct the space program. I am not surprised at the recent announcement of the resignation of Dr. Seamans effective at the end of this year. I am more surprised that his action has not, as yet, caused the resignation of Mr. Webb.

For surely Mr. Webb would be fully justified in resigning since the President has made his position almost untenable.

Nor would I be surprised at any other top level resignations at NASA now that the space program has been relegated to a secondary status.

Not only am I surprised at the President's statement but I am shocked at the timing of it—at the signing of an authorization bill before congressional action had been completed on the appropriations bill.

I fully agree with the observations made by the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on NASA, and by the ranking minority member of that subcommittee, when Mr. Webb was testifying before that subcommittee.

The chairman of the subcommittee stated:

But when we talk about reduction of different amounts—the Senate also has a responsibility. Assume they would want to arrive at the total House figure. We still have the responsibility. We may want to cut one program instead of the one they cut, or vice versa. And we have that responsibility. We

cannot just accept where the House made the cuts, even assuming that we were going to agree to the House total figure.

The ranking minority member of the subcommittee observed:

I am fully aware of the prerogatives of the President, this one or any other to withhold funds that Congress has appropriated. But as a member of this committee and as a Member of the Senate, it seems to me that if we accept Mr. Webb's statement, he cannot ask for more than the House asked for in any item. But if we accept this in the context that the House's word is final, we might as well adjourn this meeting and take the House bill and go back. And this is not acceptable to me. And I think we have got to get such information as we can, because even though the President approved the report of the House, that would just simply forestall the constitutional function of this committee.

To this observation, the chairman of the subcommittee stated: "That is right."

And I join in saying that it is right.

The President pulled the rug from under Mr. Webb, but the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on NASA and the full Senate Appropriations Committee refused to let the President pull the rug from under them and impose the will of the House on them in conflict with the constitutional function of the Senate committee and the conference procedure.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I yield such time, on the bill, to the Senator from Alabama as he may desire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I am grateful to the chairman for yielding to me.

I support the bill. I commend the committee for doing what I consider to be a very good job under extremely difficult circumstances.

I do have a few comments to make about one phase of the bill, referring to the administrative operations item.

The amount appropriated in the pending bill, H.R. 12474, is \$628,000,000. This is \$43.3 million less than the agency request, and \$20 million less than the maximum permitted in the NASA authorization bill.

Despite the fact that the House reduced the NASA budget by \$516 million, it appropriated virtually the full amount authorized for "Administrative operations." In other words, H.R. 12474 as passed by the House provides \$648 million for "Administrative operations," the full amount authorized. The Senate bill provides only \$628 million.

NASA officials have made it clear to me and others that even the House figure raises crucial problems. Cutting the appropriation by another \$20 million raises even more complex and critical problems. Even under the higher House figure NASA might have to take advantage of its statutory reprogramming authority to meet its minimum needs in this activity. NASA's administrators will have to display maximum ingenuity and flexibility to operate their programs under the amount appropriated for "Administrative operations."

It is a mistaken belief that huge reductions in space flight programs naturally permit corresponding reductions in appropriations for administration. Actually, reductions of the magnitude con-

tained in this bill create innumerable new problems for NASA's administrators, and they will have to make considerable readjustment to maintain a viable program under the funds we have allowed them.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, this was a difficult bill to handle.

We reduced the administrative operations item by 6.5 percent. The research and development item, the big item, has been reduced 8 percent. I cannot see how a 6.5-percent cut is going to hurt the administration when the research and development item is 8 percent less.

We thought we did well. I want the record to show that the Senator from Maine did a great deal of work to get these figures for the committee. If we had been consistent, this cut across the board would have reduced the administrative operations item by 8 percent instead of 6.5 percent. I want the record to show that.

Mr. HOLLAND. Will the Senator yield me 3 minutes?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Florida, on the bill.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I want it clearly understood by all Senators that this bill has been drastically reduced from the budget amount submitted by the administration. It has been reduced by the amount of \$421,100,000, or 8.3 percent.

I also wish to make it very clear that the amount in this bill is approximately \$95 million over the amount appropriated by the House. The reason for the increase is as clear as a bell, if one had listened to the testimony. There is not agreement now as to how this program can be balanced in view of its great overall reduction. Because of the increases we have made in the House bill and the provision mentioned by the distinguished Senator from Alabama, which allows a 5-percent reprogramming latitude, there will be room, under this bill, to bring out a well-balanced bill, in my opinion, in conference, after we receive further information.

I cannot begin to state how distressed the Appropriations Subcommittee was to note how confused was the thinking of the Administrator when he appeared before us, after the action of the House; it indicated that he, himself, had little opinion at that time as to how a balanced program could be worked out.

This bill is of sufficient size to bring about a balanced program; yet, even the conference bill cannot be larger than 8.3 percent below the administration budget, which is a very material saving. I bring out this point because I believe we can get a well-balanced continuation of the important space program by the passage of this bill.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I wish to add to my earlier remarks, with particular reference to Nerva. It is appropriate and a bit ironic that the NASA appropriation comes to the Senate for a critical decision during the week of the 10th anniversary of the entry of the United States into the space race.

It would be unfortunate if this date passed without recognition of the tremendous human accomplishments which

have transpired over the past 10 years since the beginning of the space age on October 4, 1957, when the first manmade, artificial earth satellite was launched into orbit. Thus started what many have thought to be man's noblest adventure.

History has a way of repeating itself. We stand today at virtually the same crossroads and have the same choice that faced the country a decade ago. I know that Members of the Senate share my recollection of a period of great national embarrassment, horrendous criticism, heated congressional debate, and investigations, even recriminations, which marked our reaction to the realization 10 years ago that our great American technology had failed at the starting gate of the space age.

History books will record many explanations of why we were not prepared. True, we had other problems on which to concentrate, just as we have today. They were problems which faded before our shocked realization in 1957 that the Russians had stolen the technological march on the United States.

Mr. Webb, the Director of NASA, told the Appropriations Committee just the other day, as he has said on other recent occasions, that Russia is expected to momentarily launch a new and bigger space spectacular, or a series of spectaculars that may even involve the orbiting of many men around the earth. This is to be done, our experts say, through the greater propulsion capability which the Russians have at this time.

The concern I have today is over threatening signs on the horizon for the future of American space technology. There are danger signals which indicate the possibility of a weakened resolve of our commitments in the face of technological and military challenges in 1967.

Mr. President, there were grave challenges and distractions 10 years ago, but these were brushed aside in our resolve to wipe out what for us was the shame of sputnik.

I was heartened a few days ago when the Senate Appropriations Committee put aside a weak-hearted 1968 appropriations bill sent to us by the House of Representatives which would have the effect of turning our back on firm national commitments made in the recent past. My esteemed colleague, the senior Senator from Washington [Mr. Magnuson], led the committee in reporting a bill which in effect said that we would not strip this mighty space age giant that we have created of its ability to survive the next decade.

Perhaps he was mindful of another great Senator of 10 years ago, Lyndon B. Johnson, who said in 1957 in a speech to CBS affiliates:

There is now abundant evidence that a pattern of history is repeating. We are awakening to the reality that advances of Soviet technology and science have made our wall of security a relic of another age. . . . Our peril becomes a disaster when we fall so far behind that there is no hope of recovery. . . . We must not wait for calamity before undertaking a cure.

In 1958 and 1959 we began the slow road into space and later undertook the development of great rocket systems, the

most advanced entry of which is soon to be launched at Cape Kennedy. I refer to the great Saturn V. With this vehicle, I have heard some say, we have kept our commitments and have been able to catch up with the Russians. But the one accomplishment that has remained beyond our grasp is the final closing of the "propulsion gap" which was discovered in 1957 and 1958.

Since 1955 tremendous accomplishments have been presented to the country by a small but uniquely qualified and trained Government/Industrial team which has the responsibility of developing the Nerva rocket engine. That period of technology is coming to an end, but it is not a period when we can cut back and say that the job is ended. The basis of this logic was quickly recognized by the members of the Senate Appropriations Committee when they restored funds to the program which had been cut by the House of Representatives. The committee recognized that the Nerva II nuclear rocket engine may be our only hope of overtaking the Russians, whom we know are working on systems with capabilities greater than our mighty Saturn V.

It is imperative that we recognize what must be done to protect our technological options, and we must decide, as President Johnson so properly suggested, "between the necessary and the desirable." The President went on to say—and this point is conveniently missed by those who would strip us of our ability to keep our head above water in this propulsion race—that "we need not and dare not eliminate the necessary."

The action of the Senate Appropriations Committee and its subcommittee is entirely consistent with the unanimous and overwhelming support that the Space Committee always has given to the development of an atomic rocket engine for space travel. We have recognized the very great success that has been achieved in the laboratory and at the test site by continuing to fund the program.

Some who are stamped by the concerns of today would have us mothball this program. They do not recognize that to do so would mean the abandonment of a successful \$1 billion investment, together with the loss of a technological and scientific team that it may not be possible to reassemble again. Others have said, in effect, let us develop a smaller engine of 60,000 to 75,000 pounds of thrust which would take us to the moon and permit us to orbit the earth and indulge in experiments of that type.

What the Senate Space Committee and the Appropriations Committee have done is to put their overwhelming support behind the development of the next logical step—Nerva II, which would permit the development of rocket capabilities of 100,000 pounds of thrust. This would enable us to travel to the planets and to accomplish the boldest and most imaginative missions which are now foreseen, and to do it on the most economic and practical basis.

At the same time, the Senate Appropriations Committee has stripped from this program every ounce of fat. The committee has, in fact, given great weight to the financial realities of 1967



and has gone along with 80 percent of the cut which the House voted in the overall space program.

Mr. President, I believe that we have the obligation to pursue our opportunities in space and to fulfill the national commitment which has been pledged. I urge that the recommendation of the Appropriations Committee, which deserves to be praised, be supported to the fullest extent possible by the Members of the Senate.

It does not require a peer into the future to know that the Russians soon will launch a very dramatic and meaningful new achievement in space. All of our experts—while they may not agree in their predictions on what form the Russian spectacular will take—agree that this is definitely in the offing in the next weeks or months. When it happens, we will be able to look back on what we do today with a sense of accomplishment or a sense of failure.

Mr. President, without this atomic engine we will be consigning the United States to a secondary position in space. I am confident that the Senate is not going to permit this to happen.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, it is important that our Nation's nuclear rocket development program is given the proper perspective. There may be some who do not fully realize that this program called Project Rover is the next logical—and essential—step forward into space. It is not a question of "if" or "whether." It is a question of when.

The answer to that last question is now. Every scientist and technologist involved in our space effort will back that up. They will tell you that we cannot afford to wait, both in terms of time and money.

Our space effort is now at a critical juncture. It has moved ahead dramatically in what has essentially been a come-from-behind contest with Soviet space power. We have established a great capability of our own now, and I think we can begin to view the rocketry prowess of both nations as generally even.

But we know the Soviet Union is now developing a space booster far superior to our own best Saturn V. We may see that powerful booster in action this next year. There is also every reason to believe the Russians are also deeply involved in developing nuclear rocket engines.

The penalties of any delay now in Rover are enormous. We would immediately lose 2 years of advance—if not more—for 1 year's delay. More important, we would lose the initiative which I think we now hold.

And to save what? To save what is a relatively small budget expense we would automatically commit ourselves to a far greater expense involved in regrouping and reorganizing the fine group of people and the sophisticated equipment we now have gathered effectively—the group that has developed the brilliantly successful Nerva I engine prototype.

Now that we can move forward with assurance in developing the flying nuclear engine—Nerva II—how can we possibly hesitate? If we waited to develop a jet aircraft engine until we could afford it, we would still be droning along behind

propellers. It would be just as pointless to limit ourselves deliberately to a restricted, chemically fueled engine as the power base for our space rocketry.

For those who prefer to restrict their consideration to strict dollars and cents, I have an equally compelling argument in support of Rover. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration appropriation, as submitted by your committee, has been chopped \$421 million and more below the administration's budget request. Funds for nuclear rocket development, while bolstered by the Senate Appropriations Committee, are nonetheless \$20.5 million under the budget recommendation.

So we have a meaningful spending cut in the overall appropriation and a significant reduction—as large as possible short of disablement—in the nuclear rocket program itself. The Project Rover total approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee—\$76 million in all—is the "bare bones" compromise between the destructive House cut and the full administration recommendation of \$96.5 million. If we can afford no more, we most certainly cannot afford less.

We are told the Rover appropriation now before us can be made sufficient to keep Nerva engine development moving ahead with the fine equipment and manpower now assembled. If it is not quite full speed ahead it is at least adequate to escape the tremendously costly setback a further reduction would cause.

One final word to those who have objected to the long-range commitment this program carries with it. I must point out that the commitment was made a long time ago when this Nation picked up the gauntlet dropped from Sputnik I. It is already a tremendous overall commitment, and the commitment to date in Project Rover alone has exceeded \$1 billion.

Thus I must discount objections to a commitment. Our only commitment now is to the future. It cannot be avoided; only delayed. I submit that we would be foolish to delay the inevitable—penny-wise and dollar foolish.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote, I have a pair with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay"; if I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." Therefore, I withdraw my vote.

The assistant legislative clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTROYA],

the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN], the Senator from Utah [Mr. MOSS], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTROYA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG] would each vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senators from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN and Mr. PROUTY], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. PERCY], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BOGES] is absent because of death in his family.

The Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is absent for religious observance.

If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. BOGES], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. FANNIN], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. HATFIELD], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], the Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 60, nays 5, as follows:

[No. 288 Leg.]  
YEAS—60

Allott	Cotton	Hill
Anderson	Curtis	Holland
Baker	Dirksen	Inouye
Bayh	Dominick	Jackson
Bennett	Ellender	Jordan, N.C.
Bible	Fong	Jordan, Idaho
Brewster	Griffin	Kennedy, N.Y.
Brooke	Hansen	Kuchel
Burdick	Harris	Long, Mo.
Byrd, Va.	Hart	Long, La.
Cannon	Hartke	Magnuson
Case	Hayden	Mansfield
Cooper	Hickenlooper	McClellan

McGee	Nelson	Spong
McIntyre	Pearson	Stennis
Miller	Proxmire	Symington
Mondale	Ribicoff	Tydings
Monroney	Scott	Williams, N.J.
Mundt	Smith	Williams, Del.
Muskie	Sparkman	Young, N. Dak.

## NAYS—5

Church	Metcalf	Pell
Gruening	Morse	

## NOT VOTING—35

Aiken	Hatfield	Pastore
Bartlett	Hollings	Percy
Boggs	Hruska	Prouty
Byrd, W. Va.	Javits	Randolph
Carlson	Kennedy, Mass.	Russell
Clark	Lausche	Smathers
Dodd	McCarthy	Talmadge
Eastland	McGovern	Thurmond
Ervin	Montoya	Tower
Fannin	Morton	Yarborough
Fulbright	Moss	Young, Ohio
Gore	Murphy	

So the bill (H.R. 12474) was passed.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist on its amendments and request a conference with the House of Representatives thereon, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer (Mr. MCINTYRE in the chair) appointed Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. RUSSELL, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. ALLOTT, Mrs. SMITH, and Mr. HRUSKA conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this measure funds the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; it will enable the continuation of this Nation's on-going space program.

The fact that the committee recommendations were so widely accepted by the Senate speaks best for the outstanding manner in which the measure was handled by the distinguished senior Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON]. Not many days have passed since Senator MAGNUSON last managed a bill of such major importance—the appropriations bill for HUD and independent offices. He nonetheless applied the same great diligence and careful scrutiny to the preparation of this measure; qualities that have characterized his handling of the many significant legislative achievements that bear his mark. The Senate is grateful to Senator MAGNUSON; it is grateful for the strong efforts he has again applied; it is grateful for another outstanding success—a success, in this instance, that enables our Nation to continue her vastly important space program. It is another great achievement for the senior Senator from Washington, but only one of many. The Senate and the Nation owe him a deep debt of gratitude—it is richly deserved.

Along with Senator MAGNUSON in leading the successful adoption of this measure was the senior Senator from Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the ranking minority member of the subcommittee. His broad understanding of this Nation's space effort, his endeavor to assure that only funds required to maintain an ef-

fective program would be provided, served immensely to obtain the Senate's overwhelming endorsement. His efforts are greatly appreciated.

The senior Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] lent his valuable and highly effective support to this funding measure. His wide expertise and deep appreciation of both the needs and problems of our space program contributed so much to the discussion. As the chairman of the legislative committee charged with overseeing our space program, his clear and persuasive arguments supporting this measure were highly beneficial to the entire Senate.

Notable also was the support of the senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH]. She urged the adoption of this measure with the same skillful advocacy that has been so consistently effective on every proposal that gains her endorsement. The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] and the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WILLIAMS] are to be singled out for their splendid cooperative efforts to expedite the disposition of this proposal. As always, they urged their own strong and sincere positions skillfully and ably but in no way impeded final action today.

Many other Senators joined the discussion; the debate was lively and most thoughtful. And yet the Senate acted with the utmost dispatch and efficiency—which certainly is a tribute to us all.

#### APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I strongly support the action of the Senate in restoring the budget of the National Transportation Safety Board in the amount requested.

The statistics of death, injury, and economic loss caused each year by transportation and transportation-related accidents are staggering. On our highways last year, 53,000 Americans were killed, 1,900,000 were injured, and \$10 billion was wasted. In the air last year, 1,300 Americans were killed in approximately 5,500 aircraft accidents. In railroad accidents, including those at grade crossings, over 2,400 deaths occurred.

We must not, we cannot fail to take all necessary steps to end this national tragedy. In proposing a Department of Transportation, President Johnson wisely called for the establishment within the Department of a National Transportation Safety Board whose sole function was to be transportation safety. The President stated that the Safety Board's duties should include reviewing investigations of accidents to seek their causes, determining compliance with safety standards, examining the adequacy of the safety standards themselves, and assuming safety functions transferred from the ICC and the CAB.

The Congress followed the President's recommendations and created a National Transportation Safety Board. In the Department of Transportation Act, the Board was granted broad powers not only to recommend, but also to investigate and conduct special studies pertaining to safety in transportation and the

prevention of accidents. The Board was given the statutory responsibility to act as an independent force in the Department for energizing safety activities.

The House cuts, if not restored, would have limited the Safety Board solely to accident investigations and appeal of certificate or license actions. The action taken by the Senate in restoring the amount requested represents a vote of approval for the Board to carry out the full duties which the President recommended, and the Congress authorized. I urge the Safety Board to proceed without delay to exercise its authority to the full extent necessary to carry out its sole function of saving the lives of its fellow Americans.

#### SEATTLE SUCCESS STORY

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, Lawrence Electronics Co., of Seattle, Wash., is a small business, which manufactures highly sophisticated electronic instrumentation. In the spring of this year, the company employed five people, and the profit prospects for the immediate future were not too bright. In late May and early June, the company displayed its products at the Paris Air Show, with assistance from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Under directives from President Johnson, the Commerce Department has been very active in export expansion, and helping American businesses display their products in foreign countries has proven to be a very fruitful way to expand exports. In the case of Lawrence Electronics Co., the effort was a tremendous success. Mr. Samuel I. Lawrence, Jr., president of the firm, reported \$120,000 in direct sales at the Paris Air Show, and he estimated that an additional \$300,000 in sales would come about in the next 12 months as a result of his participation in the show. Although these figures may not seem significant when compared to the balance sheets of large corporations, I can assure you that the numbers marked a milestone in the history of this small business in Seattle. Mr. Lawrence reports that he can now look forward happily to paying taxes on his profits. In addition to this factor, of course, increased exports also create additional jobs in our economy, and help cut down the size of our international balance-of-payments deficit. To my mind, the export expansion program is an excellent illustration of a government-business partnership that is truly in the public interest.

#### PUBLIC WORKS AND ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 559, H.R. 11641.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 11641) making appropriations for certain civil functions administered by the Department of Defense, the Panama Canal, certain agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Atomic Energy



Commission, the Atlantic-Pacific Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission, the Delaware River Basin Commission, Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Water Resources Council, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations, with amendments.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there will be no more votes today. The introductory statements on the present bill will be made on Monday sometime after the transaction of routine morning business.

Mr. President, we have an agreement to adjourn until 10:30 a.m. on Monday next. The junior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT] will be recognized for up to 45 minutes, and the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] will follow and be recognized for up to 1 hour.

#### COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION ON MONDAY

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will committees be permitted to meet on Monday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be permitted to meet until at least 12 noon on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, there has been a good deal of conversation lately—in the Congress, in the press, and throughout the Nation—about sympathy for the President.

Sympathy is a curious and questionable emotion. It implies, for me, an element of generous disdain. I frankly question whether any man, including the President, welcomes it.

It is true that our Nation faces, at this time, some of the most difficult, frustrating, and bitterly contested decisions of its story history. As the Nation's Chief Executive and as the focus of its policies, the President does bear a unique share of these burdens.

But a President also bears a unique responsibility for them—a responsibility which he openly seeks and the precise nature of which perhaps no candidate to seek that high office was ever so well aware as the incumbent one. There is every indication that he will ask the American people next year to renew his mandate for the exercise of that responsibility. This Presidency was openly sought. It has been exercised in full knowledge of its vast import.

With responsibility goes accountability, inseparably and without dispute. For those problems which he inherits, and for those crises not of his own making, no man can be held accountable. But where positive leadership can be reason-

ably asked, and when it is not provided, accountability begins to run.

Yesterday, Mr. President, the President of the United States lashed out at the Congress for its failure to avert an imminent fiscal crisis. It is the responsibility of Congress, we are told, to make cuts in the President's budget. And it is the further responsibility of the Congress, we are told, to promptly enact the President's proposed surtax. Otherwise, we are told, we in the Congress must be fully accountable for the "consequences"—runaway inflation and prohibitive interest rates.

Mr. President, I think it is time that it be made perfectly clear to the President and to the people precisely where the responsibility and its concomitant accountability properly rest. Speaking for myself, there is no question that they rest with the President.

Many of us, in both Houses and on both sides of the aisle, have frequently stated that in the absence of good-faith efforts by the President to make substantial cuts in Federal spending we will not support an increase in taxes. I, for one, will not vote for the tax until such efforts are made. But let us recognize this position for what it is. It is not necessarily an assertion that some additional tax might not be needed. It is a conditional demand for reduced spending. It is an effort on our part to convince the President that the people want a cut in spending. It may be that higher taxes are called for. But the taxing power is only one of the fiscal tools available to a government—and perhaps the most cumbersome. How can we, in good faith, ask the people we represent here to give up more when they clearly want and seek a reduction in spending?

The President told the Congress in August that he had directed his department and agency heads to "look into" the possibility of a reduction in expenditures. Mr. President, on Tuesday of this week, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Charles J. Zwick, told an audience in New York that cuts of \$5 billion would be "unreasonable, impractical, and of a size and nature that would undermine our domestic programs." It is highly improbable that Mr. Zwick would have made such a statement without the approval of the President. I suppose it might be reasonable to infer from such strong language that perhaps half that amount is about the best we can expect—\$2.5 billion.

The tax proposal of the President, if enacted exactly as offered, would have provided, in his estimation, \$6.3 billion in additional revenues during this fiscal year. Assuming that the President might be willing to reduce expenditures by, say, \$2.7 billion, we would still be confronted by a budget deficit of \$20 billion at a minimum, which does not include the sale of participation certificates, which have the same effect on the money market as the financing of the regular debt. And there is as yet no indication that the President might be willing to cut even \$2.7 billion.

Mr. President, the most critical aspect of this loggerhead is the question of who is best qualified to identify those areas in which substantial cuts might be made.

With all of the real respect and credit due the tremendously able members of the respective appropriations committees and their staffs, I submit with deep conviction that the man who makes the budget should cut the budget. The President, assisted by the department heads and the very able director of the Bureau of the Budget, and with a staff of literally thousands, is far better qualified than individual members of Congress to recommend these cuts.

Let there be no confusion of terms. We are speaking of recommendations. We are speaking of areas in which cuts might be made. The President is quite right that the Congress holds the purse strings. The actual and final cuts will be ours. What we ask for is the comprehensive sort of advice that the Executive is uniquely qualified to give.

For those who invoke the superficially attractive but specious argument that only when the Congress has completed the appropriation process will the Executive know what it has to work with, I answer that such an argument ignores entirely the nature of the process itself. The process begins with the budget. This is why we have a budget in the first place. This is why we have regular and routine budget revisions. If the Congress knew precisely what should be spent and how these funds should be apportioned among the various agencies and programs, there would be no need for an Executive budget submission. The Congress authorizes appropriations to indicate its evaluation of the value of individual programs. The President, in the context of these figures, makes his own evaluation and submits the budget request. Differences are ironed out and compromised in the Congress. This traditional and effective form of dialog between the two branches is now being disregarded by the President. For a President who berates the Congress for its delay in acting on his tax proposal, it is curious indeed that he waits indefinitely to make essential revisions and recommendations.

Mr. President, I think that it should be made clear, if it is not already, that the Congress is by no means unwilling to make cuts—deep, substantial ones. On the contrary, I feel that the Congress is fiercely eager to make such cuts.

Profoundly mindful of the urgency of many well-conceived and vital programs which affect people here at home and abroad, we remain convinced that priorities must be defined. The Congress might well disagree with the recommendations made by the President for reducing expenditures. In that event the responsibility and accountability would genuinely be ours. But until given that option, they are not. If persistently denied that option, the Congress will, I think, make cuts on its own—"meat-ax" cuts, a weak, incohesive, and dangerous approach. Whether they take the form of across-the-board percentage cuts or an unprecedented ceiling of expenditures, it is my belief that they will be made in any event. But why must it be done without the expertise of the executive branch?

Mr. President, if this administration believes that a 10-percent surtax alone

can avert inflation, then I remain to be convinced of the gravity of the pending fiscal crisis. If this administration believes that cuts of \$5 billion are unthinkable, then I remain to be convinced of the gravity of the crisis we face. The President seems to believe that he bears no responsibility for the size of his budget. He is wrong. I hope that he does not also mistakenly believe that he will not be held accountable by the people of this country for the size of that budget and the unprecedented deficit that it will almost certainly produce, together with consequent inflation and a tightening of the credit market.

The President is qualified to advise the Congress, today, as to how it might best reduce or defer nonessential expenditures. He must be aware of that option. He should be very much aware that the people of this country want him to exercise that option. If he will not, and if he now and later seeks to pass the buck to the Congress, then he must be prepared to be accountable to the people.

Yesterday, it seems clear, the President did seek to pass this buck to the Congress. He might bear in mind the well-known assertion of a former President, who said of his desk in the Oval Office: "The buck stops here."

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. BAKER. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. HANSEN. I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Tennessee for the pertinent and timely remarks he has just made.

These are, indeed, difficult days which face the people of this country. With the war in Vietnam costing, by some estimates, as much as \$30 billion a year, with unprecedented domestic problems facing them on all sides, with nondefense spending rising more rapidly than the increase in the military budget, with crime up dramatically compared to the increase in the population, with civil strife rampant in most of America's major cities, and rioting becoming the No. 1 cause of concern among our people, I can understand why the distinguished Senator from Tennessee has chosen to speak out on some of the issues which we must face squarely at this time.

Against this backdrop of the confused and complicated economic picture which characterizes the country today, we must recognize that there are facets of the economy which are prosperous, which are doing well. At the same time, there are other significant elements of the economy which are hurting badly; so that we have, at one and the same time, those who believe we can do more of all things, and those who feel that the national interest demands we cut back, retrench, fix, and assign priorities.

I think that the President's attempt to pass the buck, as the distinguished Senator from Tennessee has said, does not reflect the Executive responsibility that we would hope he would continue to manifest but, rather, reflects political expediency.

I am certain that, just as the Senator from Tennessee has stated, if the President refuses longer to fulfill the duties which are clearly his, then the legisla-

tive arm of the Government will have to step in.

If it does so, it will step in not with all the understanding before it which the President himself must have, and surely does have, but rather will have to assume not only its responsibilities but those as well that clearly should be in the hands of the Chief Executive.

I hope that we may have the providential guidance and recommendations which come from a clear insight into all the problems, and a clear insight into what the various departments of Government believe they can operate with, insofar as their budgets are concerned. If we have this sort of direction from the President, then we can do a better job. We can be more responsive to the people of this country.

If we do not get that guidance and direction, then we will have to go ahead as the President seems to wish us to do.

I compliment the distinguished Senator from Tennessee for his very excellent statement.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

#### SUSPENSION OF CIVIL WORKS AND CERTAIN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, one would have thought from President Johnson's news conference yesterday that his administration was helpless to reduce or suspend Federal spending until Congress had enacted all appropriation bills.

I am sure, therefore, that all Members of Congress were astonished by the action of the Pentagon in suspending certain military construction, and including all civil works. The only conclusion I draw from that action is that if the Pentagon can suspend progress on civil works, it can suspend further work on all other Defense Department activities, depending solely upon its discretion in the matter and not upon any action by Congress.

It is my understanding that the order of the Department directs all division engineers to suspend advertising and awards on all new civil works construction until further notice, effective immediately. Bids which have already been submitted on construction will be opened October 23; but new commitments in civil works research and development and new civil works hiring will be suspended indefinitely, except for maintenance and operations.

The press describes this action as a deferral only of authorized public works, for which appropriations were made for fiscal year 1967.

I can make my own interpretation of it, however. My interpretation, based on 22 years in public office, is that the administration has made an impoundment of money in the one area where it believes Members of Congress are most sensitive and will respond by acting on the President's request for a tax increase.

But I predict that the result will be quite different. Certainly it will be quite different at the grassroots of America, and at the ballot boxes of America, as the word goes out to one community after another that if it wants work to proceed on a development proved to be

needed and economically sound that its people will first have to ante up 10 percent more in taxes to pay for the unjustifiable war in Vietnam.

I do not address these remarks to Members of Congress. They will have their own interpretations to make, and will respond to this pressure in their own ways.

But to the people of the United States, and the voters of America, I say: "Your Government is holding hostage for a tax boost the future resource development of every State and every community. It is telling you that if you want development of American rivers and harbors for our own commercial growth and expansion you must pay first for the war in Vietnam."

The administration thinks the American people will never catch up with the fact that the war in Vietnam is costing them over \$29 billion a year, and that if the war were ended or even scaled down, there would not be any necessity for a tax increase and there would not be any need to postpone or cancel the development of the United States in favor of the development of millions of dollars worth of harbors, docks, roads, and development projects in South Vietnam and nearby countries.

Oh, we have millions for harbors and docks around the world, but we are going to freeze the millions in the United States. The answer of the voters should be to freeze the politicians out of office who stand by and permit this kind of political shakedown on the part of this administration.

The President mentioned that lack of congressional action on his tax request is costing the Government \$20 million a day in lost revenue.

I have some suggestions where the President can save \$20 million a day, and more, and not need more revenue.

First, he can bring home four divisions from Europe that are serving no useful purpose other than to eat up American taxpayers' money. If the development of American resources can be sacrificed to the war, the maintenance of the American Army in Europe can be sacrificed to the war. At the rate our defense spending is going, we are going to have to do something to enhance the economic base of our own country, for no Military Establishment the size of ours can exist for long without a vast and growing economic base to support it.

As I have said so many times, I say for the record again, we cannot justify maintaining six American divisions in Europe. We are the only nation in NATO that has ever kept its manpower commitments under NATO. Not even the Germans have kept their obligations under NATO from the standpoint of manpower commitments. Never has Canada kept its manpower commitments. Never has Great Britain kept its manpower commitments. Never has France kept its manpower commitments. Never has a single member of NATO. It is only the American taxpayers who have been played for suckers under NATO.

I want to say to the voters of this country: "Take them to an accounting at the voting booths when they continue to fleece you out of these millions of dollars



and then freeze money to develop the economic strength of our country."

Second, may I say to my President that he can terminate the disgraceful, shameful support of the Greek military junta that is costing the American taxpayers a great amount of their largess, for that junta is even now clamoring for more American money. This administration is on the way to giving it to them. Read the New York Times for this morning.

The New York Times today tells of the displeasure of the American Ambassador in Greece over the blatant fascism of the Greek military clique. It seems its lack of discretion may have slowed up the American Ambassador's plans for getting \$100 million worth of U.S. military aid resumed to this military junta. The Times story relates that since August, there has been on the President's desk a memorandum in support of resumption of U.S. aid to this Greek military dictatorship. The American Ambassador, according to the Times, "urged the military leaders to avoid such eye-catching action," referring to the jailing of leading Greek critics of the junta.

This country's financial and military backing of the current rulers of Greece is one of the most disgraceful chapters in our diplomatic history. It is a total sell-out of American principles. It is the ultimate in the cynical, heavy-handed use of foreign countries that has come to characterize so much of American foreign policy.

The United States stands for nothing in Greece other than total militarism of the Greek military junta. Our policy is removing the last doubts about what America stands for. In Greece, we stand only for the furnishing of several hundreds of thousands of Greek bodies for the NATO army. That is the total interest of the United States in Greece, for to obtain those soldiers we have sold out constitutionalism, we have sold out personal liberty, and we have bought any Greek Army officer who can deliver soldiers to NATO.

It is shameful that this democracy of ours is supporting a shocking military dictatorship in Greece. The cost is \$100 million of American arms. I say to the President, "You can save it, and the American taxpayers are entitled to have you save it."

Unless he does, Americans will sacrifice their own resource development, because there is not the slightest doubt that as soon as a velvet glove can be drawn over the iron fist of the Greek junta, our military aid will continue to flow to a land which could not possibly fight a war against anyone.

Let me say that to give the impression that the Greek Army could sustain any military action is wrong. Get into the records and find out what our military experts say about the lack of military efficiency of the Greek Army. It has no economic foundation whatsoever, other than the U.S. Treasury and U.S. weapons and supplies. Yet we pour millions and millions into that army.

Third, the President could save the American people about 2 days worth of tax increase by terminating our aid

obligations to Argentina and Peru. I speak as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Latin America; and I yield to no one in the efforts I have been putting forth to help build up the economic productive power of Latin America. But the military aid that goes into Latin America detracts from its economic productive power. These two countries, Argentina and Peru, have been receiving economic and military aid from us on the ground that they were in dire economic need.

But obviously, what we hear about poverty and need, especially in Peru, cannot be true if that country can buy supersonic aircraft from France.

Here we are, dealing with a country whose per capita income is less than \$200 a year. Yet they buy supersonic aircraft from France; and we pour military aid into their pockets.

Now we see Peru proposing to buy supersonic aircraft from France—only because they could not blackmail us into selling them supersonic aircraft. So they hold up the threat, "You either make it available to us, or we will go elsewhere."

Well, let them go elsewhere, but let them go elsewhere also to get their economic aid. Let them go elsewhere for all their foreign assistance. I say to the American taxpayers: "Make clear to the Members of Congress that you have had enough; you have had enough of the foreign aid program based upon the demands of small-time generals and admirals who command more support in the Pentagon than among their own people."

Another area where the President can save hundreds of millions of dollars is for the antiballistic missile, which has yet to be shown to be effective in increasing the protection of the American people, and which also, may I say, when you deal with nuclear bombs, involves a problem that we do not hear the administration telling the American people very much about.

Mr. President, it will not be the bomb that will kill millions of American people, to any degree whatsoever, in comparison with the fallout that will kill them.

Mr. President, even if we could assume—and we cannot assume it, because we know it is recognized we cannot be sure—than an anti-missile-missile program would knock out the missiles, we know it would not knock out the fallout.

That is why, Mr. President, we are confronted with the great problem of seeing to it that there is a nuclear disarmament program. That is why we have got to recognize, before it is too late, that unless we stop the development, the maintenance, and the possession of nuclear bombs, mankind's survival through this next century is very much in doubt.

Politicians ought to be thinking about the next century rather than the next election. Mr. President, if we do not proceed to take steps to bring to an end production of the bombs by which a nuclear war can be fought, then all the anti-missile-missile programs in the world will be for naught, for they cannot end the fallout.

While I am on that subject, Mr. President, we do not hear very much, either—although the physicists and the scientists

can tell us, we do not hear much said—about giving an answer to the hydrogen bomb boys, when we hear them say, almost every day, "When is this administration going to let the military start dropping the hydrogen bomb?"

Sounds good, does it not? Mr. President, that is an adrenalin reaction, not a cortical reaction, on the part of the hydrogen bomb boys. They are thinking with their emotions, not with their heads.

Suppose, Mr. President, to use a hypothetical situation, we were to undertake a hydrogen bomb attack on China tomorrow. We cannot be sure but that thousands and thousands of others would die from it—perhaps even in the United States. Familiarize yourself with the direction and force of the prevailing winds. You do not drop hydrogen bombs in China and have the fallout stay in China. It will settle on Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, eventually Hawaii, Seattle, on Portland, and on San Francisco. It will move inland all the way to Chicago, as the scientists point out.

Have we lost our senses? Have we in the United States with blind nationalism so completely wrapped the flag around us that we have become, among all the nations, the world's No. 1 warmonger? Well, we had better remove the blinders and take another look, with only 6 percent of the population of the world, and with an overwhelming majority of the world's people already against us, Mr. President; because we are developing here such blind nationalism that our only response to the troubled areas of the world is the advocacy of armed force.

That is why I have argued so consistently and persistently for so long that we had better face up to the fact that we cannot become the military policeman of the world and survive, for the world will destroy us. It may take the better part of a century to do it, but the United States, no more than any other power that has ever attempted it in the history of mankind, can set itself up as the military dominator of the world and expect to survive. And when we keep in mind the fact that by the year 2000 we will have less than 6 percent of the population of the world—assuming, of course, that the statistics I now give will not be changed by a nuclear war; and if they are changed by a nuclear war, it is all over for all of us, anyway—as the population experts point out, we will have a little less than 6 percent, which will be proportionately less than now; because while our population will have increased, it will not have increased at the same ratio as that of other areas.

The United States and the Western Powers together will have a little less than 20 percent of the population, but they will be divided, for the people in the other Western nations have more sense than to follow the blind nationalism of the United States. They are not following us now. France has thrown us out. She fears us. She fears what we are up to. She does not intend to cooperate with the military policies of the United States.

We will see, Mr. President, great changes taking place in the attitudes of the other Western peoples. The Prime Minister of Great Britain is getting a

taste of it now. He recognizes that he will not for long be able to hold the people of his country behind him if he continues giving even lip service to America's policies in Vietnam. There is too much growing opposition in British public opinion for that. He has already lost the support, on the military issue, of his own party. Analysts in Great Britain, in their writings these days, are pointing out that if the Prime Minister of Great Britain does not change his course vis-à-vis Vietnam, he is through. He should be, too.

Some of us had a conference with six members of the Labor Party sitting in the House of Commons who visited these Chambers not so many days ago. They came over here, they said, to try to make it clear in this country, particularly among the parliamentarians, before it is too late, that within the Members of the Parliament of the British Labor Party, there is a great rising opposition to the British Prime Minister in respect to his military policy.

I think we need to face up, and the President should face up, before it is too late, to the fact that here is a place where millions of dollars can be saved, rather than in an effort to seek to freeze and impound any money necessary to keep vital and volatile the domestic economy of the country.

#### Vietnam War Causing Domestic Crisis

Most important, I would point out to the President that an end to the war in Vietnam would save \$29 billion. When are the American taxpayers going to have an end to that costly and fruitless burden? The administration has not said. It has no plans for an end to the war, no program, nothing but the empty hope that if we just keep spending enough long enough, somehow it will come to an end. But if we can force a surrender, then eventually we may get negotiations, but no peace, only a truce.

Next, I suggest to the President that before he asks Congress to pass appropriations bills as a precondition to budget cuts, he show Congress a new tax plan that will bring oil and gas companies into the taxpaying fraternity.

If there is a war emergency that requires wartime taxes, I do not understand why the most wealthy companies and stockholders in the United States should be exempt from paying them.

Before Congress acts on the 10-percent surtax—and I shall vote against it on the basis of the administration's present fiscal policy—the administration should be asked to send an additional tax bill to the Hill, repealing the depletion allowance for oil and gas companies, plugging up the loopholes for charitable trusts that escape business taxes.

Mr. President, as a staunch defender of our system of economic freedom based upon a private enterprise system, I have for many years opposed the tax escape of so-called charitable trusts that are formed to operate private business, or what should be private business. One cannot really say that a business operated by a charitable trust is in fact a private business. It is in competition with private business.

I can take anyone interested across the country from coast to coast and show him a whole variety of businesses operated by charitable trusts that do not pay a cent of taxes and that operate in competition with businesses across the country that are run by private entrepreneurs that pay taxes. It is not fair. It is not equitable.

Let me say that some people think it is not good politics to say it, but whenever I start saying something because it is good politics, you will know that I am slipping. My job is not to speak for politics. My job is to speak for my people and country.

Any church that is operating a private business under a charitable trust and is not paying taxes on that business is not carrying out its responsibilities of good citizenship. The churches have the responsibility of being good citizens, too.

Any charitable trust that is operating a business in competition with private business ought to have that loophole taken away from it. Of course, I am for tax exemption for truly charitable operations, hospitals and churches as far as a church worship property is concerned. However, when a church builds up an economic dynasty, an economic empire in competition with the rest of the economy and avoids taxes, we ought to have the guts in the Congress of the United States to plug the loophole. We owe it to the taxpayers of the whole country.

Mr. President, we just got through on the floor of the Senate a few moments ago approving an appropriations bill for \$5 billion in round numbers to put a man or men on the moon at a time of great national crisis, at a time when our total domestic budget is \$20 billion compared, for example, to a military budget of over \$70 billion—the largest in the history of the Republic.

To talk about restricting it is to talk about a sacred bull in American politics that many politicians seem to bow down to.

I have not forgotten one bit of sound observation that I heard from a former President of the United States, President Eisenhower. That was the comment he made as he retired from office about the danger of the industrial-military complex. It is upon us; it controls the economy today. It dominates the economic life of the American people, but they just do not know it.

We have a \$70 billion budget there. Try to cut it. I know. I tried, but we could not cut it. However, we are supposed to cut right into the heart of the \$20 billion domestic program on which the whole welfare of our people happens to be dependent.

We can pass today a \$5 billion budget to put men on the moon. However, when we talked about putting men in the ghettos on jobs, then look at the problem we had with the poverty appropriations bill. The drive on vote after vote in the Senate was a drive to cut the guts out of the poverty program.

We are going to pay dearly for that course of action. Mr. President, those cuts in the poverty budget are going to cost the American taxpayers many times the so-called savings of the cuts. For, let

us face it, these tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of fellow Americans that are poverty stricken and that are forced by the rest of us to live in conditions of human degradation and to see their children malnourished know what it is to suffer in a society most of which is affluent. They are not going to take it. And all the anti-riot laws and all the law enforcement measures will not stop the insistence of these tens of thousands of Americans that they are entitled as a matter of right to humane treatment from the rest of an affluent country. And they are not getting it.

It is easy for politicians to pontificate about how some of them get into the condition they are in. But, Mr. President, I was not brought up on a religious faith that believes in visiting on the offspring the sins of the ancestors. I was brought up on a religious faith that we are our brother's keeper.

The Congress of the United States, in my judgment, has not lived up to that spiritual teaching in regard to the poverty bill.

Why do we talk about making a cut of some \$7.5 billion in a \$20-billion domestic program but say that we must not touch the \$70 billion-plus military budget, only \$22 billion of which in that program is Vietnam connected?

How can you possibly justify the military program, the expenditure of American taxpayers' dollars in Europe, in Africa, in Latin America, in the subcontinent, in an hour of crisis? That is where the cut should be made. Let me hear my President talk about why he does not propose a cut in a \$70 billion military budget.

Let me hear my President tell the American people why he is not willing to cut deeply into a foreign aid program, including military aid, that is wracked with waste, inefficiency, and corruption.

Let me hear my President tell the American people why he is not insisting upon plugging the loopholes in the tax structure.

Let me hear my President tell the American people why he does not go only for a reasonable research program on NASA, and postpone—until we get out of the horrible mess we are in in Southeast Asia—the large expenditure that is involved in the \$5 billion sanctioned by the Senate just a few moments ago.

I should like to hear my President and I should like to see my President adopt those reforms before my President hears from the voters; because he is going to hear from them if he follows the course of action that is now being followed. And I do not want that voter action. For let me say that when I compare this man with any of the offerings of the party of the opposition, I will still take my chances with my President, despite my disappointments with the course of action he is following in regard to his budget and in regard to some aspects of foreign policy.

But I will never give up, and I will continue to hope that he will see the light of reason that is involved in the position of those of us who have stood up against bitter castigation and attack now for approximately 4 years. We were



alone for a long time, but no longer. We even have great support within Congress, and millions of Americans are behind us. They have recognized that this military course of action is a course of action of folly.

But it is not too late for my President, in my judgment, to change the course of action that his administration is following in foreign policy, in budgetary policies, and in tax policy.

It is not too late for the President to make the savings where they should be made, rather than from a \$20 billion domestic program which is already inadequate to meet the crying economic needs of the people of our country.

I close my remarks on this subject by asking unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain writings that I believe bear out with crystal clarity the point of view I have been expressing here today.

It is true that, in 95 percent of the programs of the President, he has found me supporting him; but I owe it to him, as I see my responsibility as a Senator, to disagree when I believe he is wrong, and to express my disagreement, in the hope that some way, somehow, he will see that it is important that he change his policy to meet the crying demands that the American people are rightfully making in respect to both his foreign policy and his economic domestic policy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the article from the New York Times entitled "Moves by Greece Delay U.S. Arms"; an editorial entitled "Tragedy in the Making," from the Washington Daily News of October 6; a letter from Dr. M. T. Merrill, of John Day, Oreg., which appeared in the Oregonian on October 3, describing his experience and conclusions from his medical service in South Vietnam; the editorial from the September 2 issue of Labor, entitled "Way To Equal Sacrifice: Plug Up Tax Loopholes," and the series of articles from Commonweal of September 22, the entire issue of which was devoted to the war in Vietnam. The first of these is "From Saigon to Detroit," by William Pfaff; the second is "Treadmill to Disaster," by James O'Gara; the third is "The Human Cost," by James Finn; the fourth is "Policies of Delusion," by John Moriarty; the fifth is "All, All Honorable Men," by Michael Novak; the sixth is "Exercise in Deception," by Tran Van Dinh; the seventh is "The Case for Withdrawal," by Peter Steinfels.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From The New York Times, Oct. 6, 1967]

**MOVES BY GREECE DELAY U.S. ARMS—PLAN TO RESUME SHIPMENTS UNDERCUT BY ARRESTS**

(By Peter Grose)

WASHINGTON, October 5.—New arrests of opposition figures by the Greek military regime are having the effect of undercutting efforts by the Johnson Administration to resume shipments of large-scale military aid to Greece.

The Administration wants to resume aid shipments because President Johnson's top advisers judge that Greece's role in the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization requires continued support.

Nevertheless, the State Department expressed annoyance today that the outspoken Athens newspaper publisher, Mrs. Helen Vlachos, was placed under house arrest yesterday. Since the military coup of April 21, the United States has publicly chided the ruling junta about 20 times.

Yet United States officials believe that except for notorious individual blunders, the new regime shows promise of moving toward what they describe as "reasonably constitutional procedures."

#### RENEWAL RECOMMENDED

A comprehensive recommendation for resumption of the military aid, which was suspended after the coup, has been on President Johnson's desk since August. It was prepared by a senior interagency policymaking group headed by Under Secretary of State Nicholas de B. Katzenbach.

The United States had been supplying the Greek armed forces with about \$100-million worth of military equipment a year, including tanks and jet aircraft, to help Greece meet its missions in NATO. Lesser supplies, such as small arms and ammunition, were quietly supplied throughout the summer, but the large shipments were blocked.

Momentum toward resuming the shipments late in the summer was abruptly halted by a series of what officials here called boners, such as the ban the regime imposed on miniskirts and its revocation of the Greek citizenship of Melina Mercouri, the actress, who had spoken out against the coup from the start.

United States officials, including the Ambassador in Athens, Phillips Talbot, urged the military leaders to avoid such eye-catching actions, which only added impetus to the more fundamental criticisms of military dictatorship voiced by the American liberal and intellectual community.

On Tuesday it became known that the civilian who had headed the Greek Government just before the coup, Panayotis Canelopoulos, had been placed under house arrest. He had publicly denounced the military junta. A State Department spokesman, Carl Barch, added another to the series of complaints the next day and said the United States "continues to hope for an early return to constitutional procedures with traditional liberties restored."

Then yesterday, the junta put Mrs. Vlachos under the house arrest. She had called the military men who ruled Greece "mediocrities."

Criticism in Congress was aroused by a three-day visit to Washington by two senior financial officers of the military regime, the governor of the Bank of Greece, Dimitrios N. Galanis, and Costas Thanos, secretary general of the Ministry of Co-ordination. The two officials left Washington yesterday, after meetings at the State Department and the Export-Import Bank.

A bipartisan group of 52 members of the House of Representatives signed a letter to the Administration yesterday urging against any consideration of economic aid for Greece.

A spokesman for the Export-Import Bank said there had been no discussion of economic aid during the talks there, which he described as a courtesy call. The State Department spokesman said the Greek officials made no formal request for aid during their meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Anthony M. Solomon, and that there had been no change in the Administration's embargo on large military shipments.

[From the Washington Daily News, Oct. 6, 1967]

#### TRAGEDY IN THE MAKING?

Peru, which needs \$20 million worth of the latest supersonic jet fighter-bombers like

Uncle Sam needs more red ink, nevertheless has signed up to buy such planes from France, informed sources in Washington report.

Altho it has been U.S. policy to discourage a Latin American arms race, the U.S. has not unwillingly peddled less sophisticated arms south of the border as Latin governments conformed more or less to our democratic ideal for their development.

So U.S. gripes about Peru's nonsensical agreement to buy a dozen 1430-mile-an-hour Mirage V's from France would seem to carry little weight—except that the U.S. has been a generous contributor to Peru's economic development and the overall progress of Latin America.

Since 1961 the U.S. has contributed more than \$300 million in economic aid to help Peru tackle such grave domestic problems as grinding poverty and mass illiteracy and to encourage tax and land reform. (Some 30 families are said to control most of the arable land while the majority of Peru's Indian population is landless, voteless and lives completely outside the fiscal sector.)

Peru is, of course, a sovereign nation. It can, of course, buy whatever arms it can pay for where it can get them. And France, of course, can sell to Latin America where de Gaulle has been grandly busy trying to undercut U.S. influence.

But if the Peruvian plane purchase—plus the French sale to Argentina of 50 late-model tanks—does add up to the feared Latin American arms race, nobody but the cynical salesman will win.

Latin Americans will be deprived even longer of the economic and social progress they desperately need. Armed conflict among them will be encouraged. And most of the billions of dollars of Alliance for Progress funds the U.S. has pledged will be wasted.

[From the Oregonian, Oct. 3, 1967]

#### MUST GO NOW

To the Editor: Some of the disturbing questions about the Vietnam war are: Why do the South Vietnamese government troops fight so little and so poorly? Why is their desertion rate so high? Why is the "pacification" program not working, after all the numerous revisions and reorganizations and intensified efforts? Why are the guerrillas able to move about so freely through the countryside, and to take over so much of the country at night? Once Americans have "secured" an area from the V.C., why can't the job of defending it be turned over to the South Vietnamese without losing all that has been gained?

Peter Arnett (The Sunday Oregonian, Sept. 17) cites, as one of many examples, the 470th Regional Force Company in Thu Thua district, Long An Province, which has not killed a single Viet Cong in its two years of existence. Last year, as a civilian physician, I visited a hamlet in Thu Thua on one of the medical visits routinely held in villages throughout Vietnam. I was escorted by two U.S. Army medics and a few of the Vietnamese soldiers of the Regional Forces Company. We set up shop in a private house, whose elderly owners seemed very friendly and served us tea. People brought their children to be treated, we gave cholera shots, and a Vietnamese health movie was shown in the house across the street.

As we were packing up in the afternoon, the Regional Forces soldiers hustled us along, saying, "Must go now. V.C. soon come," and they wouldn't let me go down to the river's edge to take a picture because "too many V.C." (pointing to the banana groves across the river). And I was told by the American adviser that most of the young people in that hamlet were away, living and fighting with the Viet Cong.

We all—including the soldiers—left the hamlet, as well as the main highway through the province capital, to the uncontested con-

trol of the V.C. from dusk until sun-up. During the day, however, this was "government-controlled territory" and one of the most successfully pacified areas in the country.

How could I define the political views of the old man who served me tea? Is he friend or enemy? Does he see the Viet Cong as barbarian invaders, or as the home-town boys coming in from a day's work? And what is to be expected from the 479th Regional Force Company? As long as they avoid any embarrassing confrontation with the V.C. (who include some of their own cousins or brothers) life is relatively uncomplicated and nobody is likely to get hurt.

We talk of the war as if it were a matter of all the good guys fighting against all of the bad guys, with maybe a few opportunists not choosing sides. But the vast majority of the Vietnamese—including the soldiers—are interested primarily in avoiding trouble with either side and trying to survive. If their crops, homes, or children are destroyed, it makes little difference to them which side did it. They will smile, pay what is required, do what they are forced to do, and hope it ends soon.

When Gen. Thieu, shortly after his election, proposed that the Americans do more of the "heavy fighting" and leave "pacification" to the Vietnamese, he was merely acknowledging that the Vietnamese people have little stomach for killing other Vietnamese.

Failure to understand this fact is a source of much of our confusion and frustration in Vietnam.

M. T. MERRILL, M.D.

[From Labor, Sept. 2, 1967]

#### WAY TO EQUAL SACRIFICE: PLUG UP TAX LOOPHOLES

Who shall bear the main burden of the rising costs of the Vietnam war and the pressures of inflation? That question is agitating Capitol Hill at this moment.

President Johnson has proposed, as one answer, a uniform 10 per cent tax surcharge applied to all above a specified level of income. However, many other voices are strongly urging an alternative approach—that is, the plugging of those tax loopholes which now enrich the wealthy.

We think this latter approach is right and just. Certainly, if the time has come to sacrifice because of America's deepening involvement in Vietnam, then special tax favors for the affluent, whether they be individuals, or corporations, should be eliminated or modified.

This was among the points underscored by AFL-CIO President George Meany, in his testimony on tax legislation given the other day before the House Ways and Means Committee, and by many liberal members of Congress.

"Tax loopholes of special privilege for wealthy families and corporations are numerous and notorious," Meany said. As an example, he cited government figures showing that 482 persons in 1964 reported incomes of \$1 million or more, and of these 19 "paid no tax at all—not one cent." (Later figures, as reported in last week's Labor, show the number with million-dollar incomes or more jumped to 646 in 1965, of which 22 paid no income taxes.)

Meany went on to itemize some of the loopholes. One of these is the capital gains, rolled up from the sale of stock, real estate and other property. Such gains have been running between \$20 billion and \$24 billion a year, but "only half of these profits" need be listed as income, and top tax rate on capital gains is only 25 percent, compared to 70 percent for other forms of income.

Meany also cited "double depreciation writeoffs" on new buildings, which are "wonderful" for real estate investors, but an "outrage" from the standpoint of the aver-

age citizen. "These tax-free cash returns add up to great fortunes," he declared.

This may not be the right time to engage in detailed structural tax reform, the AFL-CIO leader continued, but he insisted it "is the right time—when you are considering a war tax—to include some degree of federal taxation on the great amounts of cash returns that are now excluded from income reported for tax purposes."

"Major categories of such excluded income," Meany said, "are these: half of capital gains, income from tax-exempt state and local bonds, and (oil-mineral) depletion allowances. These excluded categories of income add up to something like \$13 to \$14 billion for individuals and families, and about \$9 to \$10 billion for corporations."

"To permit such huge categories of income to go untaxed while the government is imposing a special war tax, would be utterly unfair and inequitable," he said.

As an immediate step, he urged, that whatever surtax Congress votes should be extended to the major classes of excluded income, as well.

Meantime, among congressmen who spoke up on the subject, one of the most explicit calls for action to plug the loopholes came from Rep. Henry Reuss (D., Wis.), who is a leading member of the House Banking Committee and the Joint Economic Committee.

Reuss declared that "raising additional revenue by tax reform, rather than by a 10 per cent surtax, would avoid as much as possible the slowing down of economic growth and the increase in unemployment which would ensue from the proposed surtax."

Reuss then offered a package of loophole-closing proposals, covering untaxed capitals, unlimited charitable deductions, stock options, dividend exclusion, multiple corporations, tax-free municipal industrial bonds, oil-mineral depletion allowance, gift and estate tax abuses, and several others. Reuss estimated that his limited plan would yield at least \$4 billion in taxes.

Another liberal congressman—Herbert Tenzer (D., N.Y.)—proposed a 10 per cent tax on all "loophole and tax-sheltered income." He cited estimates that his plan would produce another \$7 billion a year in income.

Similar suggestions to close or narrow the various loopholes came from other members of Congress. We think they and the labor movement are on the right track. It seems to us that those now enjoying a bonanza of untaxed income should be the first to sacrifice a little, if sacrifices are needed.

[From Commonweal, Sept. 22, 1967]

FROM SAIGON TO DETROIT

(By William Pfaff)

*A Bad Summer's Notes:* The election in Vietnam has accomplished its purpose—which was to legitimize American policy. The legitimization of a Thieu-Ky government was the means to this end. The military leadership now can claim a popular mandate. We, in turn, can argue to ourselves that with an elected government in Saigon this Vietnamese ordeal of ours may yet have a good outcome.

But this exercise in democracy, so anxiously promoted by the American Embassy, may in fact have been the penultimate blow to Saigon governmental authority. We see the election as a necessarily flawed but genuine attempt to consult the will of the Vietnamese people. How did the Vietnamese see it? No American is very likely to know; few Americans can claim an intellectual, to say nothing of an emotional, grasp of Vietnamese political assumptions and perceptions. What I am about to suggest is nothing more than an opinion insecurely based on arguments about the character of politics and society elsewhere in that part of Asia which has roots in Chinese civilization. But it may be that

in Vietnam political legitimacy, the acknowledged right of rulers to rule, is understood as intimately connected with the rulers' demonstration that they are able to rule—able to impose order and suppress challenges.

If this is true, the military junta's anxiety not merely to win the election but to humiliate its opponents becomes intelligible. By the very holding of an election, a formal competition on the issue of who is to be allowed to rule in the future, they placed themselves on a level with their opponents. To Vietnamese this may have seemed an admission of government incompetence, and even of powerlessness—the rulers implicitly conceded that they were no better than a crowd of quarrelsome critics and rivals. Thus the military men saw it as indispensable to demonstrate that the election was *not* serious—that it was a charade performed to satisfy foreign opinion. The American government at the same time used every pressure at its command to demonstrate that the election *was* serious. Both were convinced that theirs was the only way to strengthen the political structure of the country. In the end the United States won. The election seemed serious. The Thieu-Ky ticket won—by a humilatingly low percentage. Such a victory may have been the worst of outcomes.

The election resulted from an American effort to come to terms with the moral issues of the war. Washington wants to believe that it defends the Vietnamese popular will. Critics of the war argue often enough that the American intervention is immoral because it balks the will of the Vietnamese majority.

Yet surely this war is between two Vietnamese minorities—or between one competent minority and several incompetent ones. The revolutionary minority has given ample evidence of a ruthlessness which concedes nothing to the practices of the national army or the national administration. The thing that must be said about the NLF is that it has demonstrated that it is the only sizable, coherent, serious national political force visible in the country. Vietnamese society, despite the opportunity, has persistently failed to supply a political or military alternative to this minority's victory. Only we Americans stand between South Vietnam and its zealot fate.

The moral issue then seems to me simply one of a proportionate means to a realizable end. Can we Americans save Vietnam from itself? Can the American intervention produce a result significantly better than the result of settlement and withdrawal? Can it do so at a morally intelligible cost—one that does not discredit the outcome? The answers, in my opinion, are that we cannot. I do not thereby think that Vietnam will not suffer—only that it may suffer less than by our persistence in our present course.

It is now conventional to say that the war is at a military stalemate. The Administration officially denies that this is so. Yet its escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam virtually concedes stalemate on the ground. Some hawks want more bombing to achieve the victory thus far denied us. Some believe that stalemate will eventually force the Viet Cong to compromise, if not to disintegrate. Some want a barrier at the 17th parallel to permit defeat of an isolated Viet Cong. Some want a million American troops and predict a ten-year war. But few hawks—or doves, for that matter—can conceive of an American military defeat.

Yet in an important respect, perhaps the most important, the defeat has already occurred. An American army of a half-million men, with enormous tactical air support and the assistance of the Strategic Air Command and the Pacific Fleet, is waging this war against a revolutionary minority in an allied country—and against North Vietnam. And as Shirley Temple Black has described it, "the



largest, strongest military power in the world" has failed to defeat "one of the smallest and weakest countries in the world."

The principal argument made that we are winning is by body-count—attrition, a notoriously unreliable standard, and in a war alleged to be against Asian Communism a standard whose implications stagger the imagination. By other military standards—who controls the ground, who maintains the initiative in giving battle and breaking it off—the enemy has as reasonable a claim to victory as we. Tactically we may not be defeated in Vietnam; but strategically, by virtue of the forces we have had to commit and their dramatic inability to force a decision, we have suffered a serious defeat—one which may prove profoundly destabilizing for the future of international relations.

Exporting counterrevolution, we have imported revolution. That Black Power enthusiasts this summer should have identified their cause with that of the Viet Cong is comprehensible. That liberal political officials should have been willing to accept and promulgate this definition of the American racial crisis provides the unexpected shock. The descriptions of the Newark and Detroit riots as "rebellions" and "insurrections" came from within the state and national governments. This involuntary choice of language tells more about the condition of America today than any riot. National Guardsmen now are told that riot control is "counterinsurgency warfare," and some commanders describe how heavy weapons can be brought to bear in our cities. Stokely Carmichael is quoted as saying that in Newark "we applied the war tactics of the guerrillas." American Negroes and whites alike are being told by the most responsible and the least responsible elements in American life to look at the domestic crisis in categories relevant to Vietnam. Writers in the *New York Review* advise that moderation is dead, the responsibility of the intellectual to act, not analyze; the duty of revolutionaries to make revolution.

What revolution? The word means to seize power—as the Viet Cong understands. In this country racial revolution would be repressed. That is the fact of the matter.

Black Power advocates are not revolutionaries, they are anarchists. This is very different, intelligible, implying an achievable program. The program is one of despair; revolution is an act of hope. When Rap Brown says that "If American don't come around, we're going to burn America down," this is a reasonable threat—if Brown means it, or if Negroes will act on his words—but it ends with America burned down.

This is a program for death, not life. Asian revolution, on the other hand, whatever its inner impulses, is not consciously directed to its own destruction. The devastating difference between America and Asia is as evident in "revolution" as in counterrevolution.

Exporting war to a society we do not understand, we import its categories of struggle with equal incomprehension, blinded by that violence which is, as Brown devastatingly and accurately puts it, "as American as cherry pie."

As for civilian casualties in Vietnam, it seems impossible to get a completely accurate picture, as James Finn suggests elsewhere in this issue. We know they are high on both sides, and last Christmas twelve Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish clergymen told the President that "the heartless war in the South continues, with the United States and South Vietnam forces matching the terror and assassinations of the Viet Cong by killing somewhere from two to five civilians for every Viet Cong guerrilla or North Vietnam regular." Viet Cong terror is a horrible fact, but does anyone suggest that terror can be matched with terror, assassination on their side with widespread bombing and the use of napalm on ours? The principle of double

effect may cover a multitude of things, but can it be used to justify killing the innocent on this scale? Is Hanoi to be turned into another Dresden? And if we escalate again, what will be our next target—the irrigation dikes, destruction of which would be tantamount to genocide?

The assumption behind escalation, of course, is that the other side will sit quietly while we act, thus giving us the margin of superiority. In fact, this improbable result has not happened, and as a consequence we have step by step increased our involvement and our commitment to the war. Each step was supposed to produce the magical result; each step in turn failed and was used to justify the next. What has happened, of course, is that the enemy kept pace with us every step of the way.

In January of 1965, for example, there were 100,000 Viet Cong forces. After active American entry that number rose to 135,000 by April and to 170,000 by August—most of them from South Vietnam, not North. This has been the pattern ever since. What will we think of escalation, though, if the U.S.S.R. supplies missiles to be used against Saigon every time we hit Hanoi? Or against our air bases in Thailand, for that matter? How will we react if Chinese planes start to attack our bombers in defense of North Vietnam? Escalation works both ways, and the next big jump may be a Communist move, perhaps a decision by North Vietnam to fully commit its 500,000 regular army or by China to send "volunteers" from its 800 million population.

Vietnam represents what Arthur Schlesinger called a "triumph of the politics of inadvertence." We have got to where we are by a series of small steps, each of which looked reasonable at the time. Yet each step led only to the next and in the end we have been trapped in that nightmare of American strategists, a land war in Asia.

#### TREADMILL TO DISASTER

(By James O'Gara, editor of *Commonweal*)

The war in Vietnam is a tragic and bloody mistake, in the course of which we are risking an even larger and bloodier war. We have become reckless in our use of power and indiscriminate in the goals we seek, so much so that the war cannot be justified morally or politically. If the traditional Christian norms of just means and right proportion mean anything, we should vigorously seek negotiations and get out of Vietnam as quickly as possible.

The United States, people say, is in South Vietnam to prevent one nation from being gobbled up by another; if we don't fight Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, we will have to resign ourselves to fighting it in Los Angeles; now is as good a time as any to show the Chinese that we won't let ourselves be pushed around. The only trouble with all of these popular "reasons," however, is that they have little or no relevance to the present situation in Vietnam.

Despite what the Administration tries to suggest, most of those fighting against us in South Vietnam are in fact people from South, not North, Vietnam. Indeed, until our bombing of North Vietnam caused Ho Chi Minh to commit more of his troops across the border, it is probable that we had more South Koreans (not South Vietnamese) fighting on our side than there were North Vietnamese on the other. China is undoubtedly sympathetic to North Vietnam, and we may yet provoke her into a more active role. At this point, however, there is nothing to indicate that China has ever sent any men to fight in Vietnam, and if our purpose is to show the Chinese that we will not be bluffed, killing Vietnamese is an odd way to go about it.

Vietnam is essentially a revolutionary civil war, reflecting a domestic situation that is beyond our power to resolve. Is it a matter of

no concern to us that only intense diplomatic pressure has won us even nominal support from our usual allies? In the Asia we are supposed to be saving, only our client-states back us; no independent state is giving us even token support—not Japan, India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia. We are on a unilateral course in Asia, beset by notions of American omniscience and American omnipotence. It isn't that our best friends won't tell us; it is that we won't listen. If we pursue total victory as we have been doing, we will leave behind us in Vietnam a wilderness of dead civilians and ravaged villages. After such destruction what nations will want our protection?

Where China is concerned, responsible observers have noted that the Chinese may not unreasonably fear that our bases in Vietnam and in Thailand constitute preparations for war with them. As our bombers strike closer and closer to the Chinese border, with an occasional accidental intrusion into Chinese air space, the dangers of a world war escalate. Is this a rational national policy? The Administration is convinced that it can guess exactly how far we can go without bringing the Chinese into the war, but I doubt that most Americans really want to play what Walter Lippmann called this "deadly guessing game."

#### THE GUERRILLA WAR

As for the civil war in Vietnam itself, the Viet Cong could be defeated in the guerrilla fighting there only if the South Vietnamese regime had the support of the population. It did not have that support in Diem's day, and it does not today. Premier Ky served in the French Air Force in Vietnam in the years between 1946 and 1954, fighting, in other words, on the side of the colonialists when France sought to reestablish her prewar empire. Nor is Premier Ky alone in this; out of the ten generals who participated in the coup which brought him to power, nine were born in North Vietnam, not South, and nine fought for the French against the nationalists, only a small minority of whom were Communists. A lack of popular enthusiasm for a government headed by such men is hardly surprising.

American reporters on the scene in Vietnam during the Diem regime knew how badly the war was going. They knew Diem did not have the backing of the populace, even though he announced in 1955 that he intended to "liberate" the North. Despite these facts, American officials in Vietnam continued to send home glowing reports, and the American reporters who disagreed were accused of lacking the proper team spirit. Great progress was being made, U.S. officials insisted; as Senator Mike Mansfield recently remarked, progress reports are strewn like burned-out tanks all along the road into deeper U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Why did the effort in Vietnam fail? President Kennedy said in 1963 that the war was essentially a Vietnamese war; it still is. We really cannot win the war for the Vietnamese, and any military effort in that unhappy country will remain bloody and useless without serious internal reform. 75% of the farms in the South are owned by absentee landlords. In the Mekong Delta, more than one-half of the peasants own no land whatsoever. Of those who do, most own a one-tenth of an acre rice paddy and have to rent another one-half acre in order to live—paying 30 to 50% of their crop to landlords with no security of tenure in return.

What are the chances for reform? A deliberately discriminatory election law kept not only members of the National Liberation Front but so-called neutralists and militant Buddhists from running for the present Constituent Assembly, which in turn determined who could run in the just-concluded election. As a result, the regime in power represents still another mandarin-type collaboration between officers and landlords.

Typically, when a genuine measure of land reform was introduced, only 3 out of 117 members of the Constituent Assembly voted for it, as Senator Stephen M. Young of Ohio recently pointed out.

We badly need to know what the Vietnamese people want—not what the generals say they want. But Premier Ky said he would respond "militarily" if a civilian with whose policies he disagreed won the presidency. "If he is a Communist, or if he is a neutralist," Ky said, "I am going to fight him militarily." In any democratic country you have the right to disagree with the views of others."

How long are Americans going to die to support a regime that is obviously afraid of an honest election? Diem refused to hold the nation-wide elections in 1956 which had been promised by the Geneva agreement because he was afraid he would lose them; we supported him in this policy, as we have supported countless repressions of free speech and free political activity since then, even to the point of standing by while South Vietnamese troops tortured prisoners. Is there no limit at all to what we can stomach?

We now have in Vietnam 460,000 men—more troops than we had in Korea fifteen years ago. Over 12,000 American soldiers have been killed so far and 75,000 have been wounded. The cost of the war is running in the area of \$25 billion annually—as much as we spent on foreign economic development in all the years from 1953 to 1965—and the trend is up, not down. Someone has even calculated that it is costing us in excess of \$300,000 to kill or capture a single member of the Viet Cong, and the cost in damage to American reputation and leadership is incalculable.

#### BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

Next to committing U.S. troops, our largest single step in escalation was the decision to bomb North Vietnam. We widened the war deliberately, and the suspicion is strong that we did so primarily to help the morale of the Ky regime. Roger Hilsman, for one, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the Kennedy Administration, has testified that before our bombing there was no evidence of substantial North Vietnamese infiltration to justify our action. Since that time, infiltration from the North has escalated and the bombing is now defended on the theory that it limits infiltration, punishes Hanoi and will help to end the war—always on the assumption, of course, that China will not intervene. But the war cannot be settled in North Vietnam, as Robert McNamara admits; even if we did as one U.S. general suggested and bombed North Vietnam back into the Stone Age, the war in South Vietnam would still continue. Guerrilla war in the South cannot be won by obliterated the North. As for China's intentions, we may yet find Chinese roulette even more dangerous than the Russian variety.

There should be no mistake about it: in the bombing of North Vietnam we are playing with fire, both literally and figuratively. Even now, North Vietnam regulars amount to only a small fraction of the enemy forces. To pretend that the war simply involves aggression by North Vietnam, as Secretary Rusk insists, is to distort the issues and deceive the American people. It will not deceive China. Mr. Rusk was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Korean War, and he assured us then that China would not intervene. Nonetheless, China did intervene, and it may intervene again.

In any case, the bombing of North Vietnam is doing nothing to speed the end of the war—quite the contrary. Even if beating North Vietnam were the answer, which it is not, bombing would not work. Korea demonstrated that underdeveloped nations have their own kind of immunity from bombing. Only 15% of the Gross National Product of

North Vietnam comes from industry, and no nation in which this is so can be bombed into submission. On the contrary, all reports indicate that our bombing has merely stiffened the North Vietnamese will to resist. It has certainly stepped up the tempo of the in the South, and the North Vietnamese troops that Hilsman said were not there before are now crossing the border in increasing numbers.

The United States already drops more explosives each month in Vietnam than we dropped in Europe and Africa per month during World War II, more in one year than we dropped in the entire Pacific during World War II. One estimate is that we have already dropped a ton of bombs for every Viet Cong soldier. Even in military terms, the cost of this effort is prohibitively high. We have already spent over \$1 billion in planes lost, and we have spent another billion in bombs and rockets. More than six hundred American pilots have been lost, most to the anti-aircraft fire heavily concentrated around the few industrial targets. The Hanoi-Haiphong area, for example, is said to be ringed by 4,000 guns.

All this has been done under the illusion that the war could be shortened by all-out bombing. This has proved to be just that, an illusion. U Thant and other responsible observers insist that an end to our bombing of the North is the inescapable first step to negotiations; we should take that step. I grant that stopping the bombing is a calculated risk and one on which the prospects are not as good today as they were a few months ago, but it is a risk we must take; if we do not, we are risking World War III and a casualty list in the millions.

#### NEGOTIATIONS

Total military victory in Vietnam is unattainable and is in any case politically pointless. The alternative is negotiation, yet there are few subjects in connection with the war on which the American people are worse informed. Ask the average American and he will assure you that the United States is ready and eager to negotiate on the war, anytime and anywhere. In point of fact, however, the Administration has hedged all its offers to negotiate and has never made the Viet Cong a serious offer it could possibly accept, as Michael Novak details in his article.

A tragic gap has opened between reality in Vietnam and what the American people think is happening. That gap between the truth and what the American people believe to be the truth is being carefully widened by Administration half-truths and outright deceptions, deceptions that may in fact be self-deceptions. On the face of it, nothing could seem more reasonable than Mr. Johnson's customary call for negotiations, yet even in the very beginning we barred the National Liberation Front from full participation in the negotiations, thus setting conditions while protesting exactly the opposite. The same pattern has prevailed ever since, with first one condition and then another keeping us from the bargaining table.

I do not doubt that the President and those around him want the war over as much as I do; I fear, however, that they want it over only on their terms. Thus Mr. Johnson has assured the world that we would stop the bombing if we had some assurance of de-escalation—"just almost any step," the President said. But in a letter to Ho Chi Minh on February 2, Mr. Johnson said he would stop bombing "as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has been stopped." This would mean that Ho could not supply his forces; we could, of course, continue to supply ours. Why should the North Vietnamese leader be interested in such an offer? Significantly, the letter was released by the North Vietnamese, not by the United States,

presumably because putting on the record how we had stiffened our conditions was an embarrassment to the Johnson Administration. Even so, the American people apparently did not grasp the significance of the letter, and the press treated the matter as if the North Vietnamese had rebuffed still another generous U.S. offer.

#### SELF-DECEPTION

In these matters it is painfully easy for all of us, from President Johnson down, to deceive ourselves. The enemy supplied their troops during the recent truce, and we did the same with ours. However, U.S. spokesmen charged the Viet Cong with breaking the truce, explaining to those who found it hard to understand that "the difference is a difference of intent. . . ." The enemy, it seems, intends aggression; we do not, so our hands are clean. In the same way we were, by our story, attacked in cold blood in the Gulf of Tonkin; the fact that our forces were standing by to support a South Vietnamese raid on the North Vietnamese coast is irrelevant. What can a rational man say of such reasoning?

Am I charging that President Johnson loves war and that Dean Rusk is Dr. Strangelove? Not at all—although it may be that some in the Administration believe the time to "face up" to China is now. But what I am saying is that a study of the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the Administration decided months ago that it wanted to negotiate—but not yet, and only on its own terms. Washington officials seem to have become convinced that any settlement negotiated now would be unsatisfactory; they want more victories so the U.S. will be in a dominating position when the time comes for bargaining.

A case could be made for such a position, of course, although I would think it a mistaken case; obviously if both sides take such a view, negotiations will never take place. But the point is that such a case is not being made. Barry Goldwater made it in 1964, and he was roundly defeated at the polls. Top officials of the Johnson Administration now seem to have bought the Goldwater thesis, but while they use big bombs in Vietnam, they continue to talk softly to the American people. This is political manipulation at its most cynical.

In short, I charge that Administration policy on Vietnam is misguided, often cynical and by and large unsuccessful. All we have achieved by escalation is a bloodier stalemate on a still higher plateau. If we continue to follow our present course, there is no end to the war in sight, even if we commit the million soldiers that Hanson Baldwin has always said would be necessary. In addition, the world is in deadly peril of World War III, for the Chinese too may think appeasement is risky, and this threat grows with the passing of every day.

The danger is, of course, that it gets harder and harder for each side to compromise; as commitments enlarge, the national sacrifice involved becomes so great that it can only be justified retroactively by total victory. Already one out of every four Americans queried in the Gallup poll favors the use of atomic weapons to gain military victory in Vietnam. How many will there be tomorrow, as our casualties mount? How many Christian voices are being raised on behalf of a proper proportion between what we are seeking and the means we are using to achieve it? It is time, and more than time, to call a halt to encourage negotiation in Vietnam by the Vietnamese themselves; time to end brutality and slaughter on both sides; time for us to cease escalation and drastically change our direction.

There is no chance of winning everything we want at the bargaining table, and there is no doubt that the National Liberation Front will have to be assured of a place in



the life of the country. Negotiation, like a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, represents a real risk. Nonetheless, this risk too we must take. The real choice we face in Vietnam is not between good and evil but between two evils. Surely it is not unreasonable to suggest that we choose the lesser evil of negotiation and less-than-perfect settlement before all of Vietnam is turned into a vast wasteland.

#### THE WAR: THE HUMAN COST

(By James Finn)

What have the last 10 to 12 years done to Vietnam and its people? I presume that the questions cannot be answered both accurately and completely. First, the available statistics are overlapping and contradictory; second, for some quantifiable aspects of Vietnamese life no statistics are available; and third, some important aspects of Vietnamese life are simply not quantifiable.

But the answer that one can give to the question, as partial and incomplete as it must be, is nevertheless impressive—and depressing.

The Vietnamese have been subjected to war for decades, but 1954, the year in which the country was divided into North and South Vietnam according to the Geneva agreements, is a convenient point to start an assessment. In the years 1954–56 the Communist North instituted a harsh Land Reform Campaign during which, it has been estimated, 100,000 people were killed. (As George Carver pointed out in *Foreign Affairs* for April, 1966, this is equivalent to 1,000,000 American citizens.) There are no reliable figures for the number of people in South Vietnam who lost their lives under the dictatorial regime of President Diem.

When the all-Vietnamese election, which the Geneva Agreements scheduled for 1956, failed to take place, a program of violence, aimed at the Diem regime, was initiated in the South. It reached its peak in the years 1962–63, when approximately 20,000 were kidnapped or assassinated. (General Westmoreland has said that during the last nine years the number of kidnappings and assassinations in South Vietnam total 53,000, and most of these were local leaders.) But with the beginning of 1963, the conflict reached a new stage and casualties among armed forces increased rapidly. According to Douglas Pike, the total death rate in Vietnam from 1960 to 1966 "was an estimated 280,000 or 575 per week." To translate these figures again, this would be the rough equivalent of 3,200 people killed weekly in this country.

The tempo of the fighting has, of course, been stepped up gradually and steadily in the last two years, and with the bombing of the North it has become increasingly difficult for anyone to get dependable figures for the total number of Vietnamese casualties. But it is beyond question that the casualty rate has soared. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense says that the U.S. forces killed between Jan. 1, 1961, and July 1, 1967, were 11,534. Of these, almost 5,000 were killed this year. The over-all ratio of South Vietnamese casualties to U.S. casualties is roughly four to one. Another indication of the extensive death toll is that the number of enemy killed during the week of June 24–July 1 is given as 1,331.

The number of civilian casualties remains a tortured question. Senator Edward Kennedy predicted that there would be 100,000 civilian casualties in 1967 and drew no official criticism. The three-man medical team that went to South Vietnam earlier this year for the Committee of Responsibility reported that on the basis of the casualties admitted to the hospitals of the South Vietnamese Ministry of Health during the first three months of 1967 the hospitals would receive 50,000 during the year, 10,000 of which would be children. It has been estimated, however,

that only one of every three casualties reaches a hospital. David McLanahan, a former intern in a Danang hospital, wrote in the March 25 *Saturday Review* that "in 1965, the total amount spent by all sources on medical care of Vietnamese civilians was \$8,500,000, and it is estimated that \$50,000,000 will be spent in 1967."

It is constantly acknowledged that the military conflict in Vietnam is only one aspect of the struggle. There must also be concern for political and social development. This means constant attacks on the problems of inflation and corruption which have accompanied, almost inevitably, the introduction of U.S. men, money and material into Vietnam. The reports of how well these social evils are contained fluctuate from one commentator to another, and one must be content to say that they remain extensive.

More important as a gauge to social development is the extensive effort of "pacification," or "rural construction," or—as it is currently called—"revolutionary development" (R.D.). In the June, 1967 issue of *Progressive*, Thomas Hagley offered some statistics that indicate the scope of the problem. The R.D. program is intended to enhance the security and improve the living conditions of the people in the hamlets of South Vietnam. Of the 11,000 hamlets, it is estimated that 4,500 support the Saigon government, 3,500 are controlled by the Viet Cong, and 3,000 are contested. To pacify five hamlets near Saigon required "more than 1,000 American and Vietnamese troops, more than 700 ambush patrols, more than 500 search-and-clear operations by 30-man teams, and more than 10,000 rounds of supporting artillery fire as well as jet fighter support" and supporting agencies. At such a rate, Hagley concludes, it could take more than 20 years to pacify all of South Vietnam. His view would gain support from Mary McCarthy who, reporting extensively on her recent trip to Vietnam, ladled scorn on the R.D. program.

Again there are counter-judgments, and not always from U.S. officials. For instance Alastair Hetherington, editor of the *Manchester Guardian* (which is not generally regarded as either conservative or pro-American) rejected a number of Miss McCarthy's statements as fanciful and believes that the R.D. teams are making progress. And according to the New York Times of July 10, even the critics of Robert W. Komer, our new Deputy Ambassador, concede that he is improving the organization and planning of the pacification program. But that still leaves open the question of what a successful pacification program does to the social fabric of Vietnamese life.

Against the estimates of the damage now being inflicted upon the Vietnamese—severe even in the most conservative estimates—must be placed estimates of the cost of a U.S. "victory," or withdrawal or another alternative. Mr. Hetherington, for example, writes: "Given the situation as it is today, will the Vietnamese attain peace more quickly if the Americans abandon Vietnam leaving it to chaos and further civil war, or if they stay until their task is done? Answers will differ. Mine is that the Americans ought to stay."

Others, even while they acknowledge that an American withdrawal would expose many South Vietnamese to the mercies of a harsh enemy, think the cost to the Vietnamese would be less than that of continued conflict. But we ascend here from uncertain estimates to rife speculation where objectivity is at a discount, and it is well to return to relative certitudes. The most obvious is that if the war continues to develop according to the pattern now firmly established, the cost to the Vietnamese, both North and South, will mount. Some of the damage could be repaired by massive infusions of postwar aid. What cannot be restored are the lives of the people. When we consider that France and England suffered for generations from the losses in-

curred in World War I, another war of attrition, we can form some idea of what the future holds for the Vietnamese.

#### THE WAR: POLICIES OF DELUSION

(By John K. Moriarty)

"The argument is about what the argument is about," was E. E. Schattschneider's comment on the American political process. Whoever defines what the argument is about has defined the problem and gone a long distance toward defining the answer. The debate over U.S. policy in Vietnam arises from the fact that a significant portion of the American populace will not accept the Administration's word for what the argument is about.

The argument over what the argument is about goes on, in one form or another, not only among the general public and in Congress but in the United States Executive Branch—including the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA. This lack of unanimity in the U.S. government pertains to (1) the threat in Vietnam, (2) the implications of the threat, and (3) what the U.S. should do about the threat. It accounts for most of the ambiguity in present U.S. policy. And there is ambiguity—an ambiguity that has many aspects but which generally resolves itself into two broad, and differing, justifications for our actions in Vietnam: (1) we are in South Vietnam at the request of an independent government, to assist in its defense against external aggression; (2) we are there to defeat, on this crucial battleground, the worldwide campaign of Communist aggression, because if the Communists win here they will probably also conquer Thailand, then the rest of Southeast Asia, and perhaps even the entire underdeveloped world. These two purposes of U.S. policy are not consistent.

The first objective—an independent South Vietnam free from foreign interference—requires that the U.S. itself not interfere unduly in this independent country, and implies that the U.S. would withdraw from South Vietnam if it were asked to do so by a representative South Vietnamese government—even if that government wished to compromise with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. But the second objective—stopping in this crucial spot the worldwide aggressive campaign of subversive Communism—would require that the Communists be defeated in South Vietnam no matter what the cost to them. It is in the confusion between these two objectives, and particularly in the tendency to assume that the first is automatically included in the second, that there arises much of the wider confusion and controversy surrounding the U.S. presence in Vietnam.

#### THE "SPECTER" OF CHINA

A third objective for U.S. actions in Vietnam is sometimes cited by strategic "realists" in the Government. They declare that future Chinese expansionism (basically Chinese national power as opposed to Communist ideology) in the Far East must be contained by U.S. power, and that our stand in South Vietnam is necessary in order to prevent other neighboring countries—chiefly those in Southeast Asia, plus possibly the Philippines and Indonesia—from being brought into the Chinese sphere of influence, as presumably are the North Vietnamese. For the stricter advocates of this "containment" objective, then, Communism is not per se the threat, but is in fact merely a technique of Chinese imperialism. This third argument, however, is rarely heard in its unalloyed form and is not an important factor in the public debate. It will not be considered here in detail.

The fact that there are ambiguities in U.S. policy objectives in Vietnam does not connote U.S. insincerity, as is sometimes charged. A succession of governments in South Vietnam have made it clear that they do wish U.S. help against the Viet Cong, and certainly a considerable portion of the South

Vietnamese population does not wish to live under a Communist government. At the time of the 1954 Geneva Accords, for example, when the population of all Vietnam was given freedom of choice, some 900,000 people moved from the North to the South. They had good reason to fear the Communists. During the period 1953-56, the so-called Land Rent Reduction Program, and its successor the Agrarian Reform Program, became in practice a vast bloodletting in North Vietnam. By the time the terror was finished, some 100,000 people had been executed. Whether or not such a program would ever be instituted in the South if the Viet Cong won is perhaps a moot question, but one can certainly understand the concern of many people there over being brought under a Communist government.

Whether South Vietnam is an independent country, separate from its "neighbor" to the North, is one of those muddy historical questions which are resolved not by documents and logic but by force and accident. Certainly there is no experience of a united, homogeneous Vietnam comprising both North and South—but neither is there a separate South Vietnamese nationality. The people both North and South are basically Vietnamese (who comprise some five-sixths of the total), with the remainder consisting of pockets of Chinese, Cambodians and, of course, the Montagnards spread over the central highlands and the western mountains. But the Vietnamese peoples' loyalties are primarily local, down to village level, and they have historically shown little concern for a national government, either North or South, so long as it would leave them alone and not make the taxes too high. And whether one can speak of the two portions of Vietnam as being more different from each other than, say, North and South Korea, or East and West Germany, or for that matter, the Northern and Southern United States at the time of the Civil War would seem to be open to argument.

Presently—and largely by virtue of U.S. military power—South Vietnam is a separate country. It also faces the very real threat of conquest by force, if the U.S. should withdraw its assistance; and the threat against South Vietnam is closely controlled by North Vietnam. While the National Liberation Front undoubtedly contained significant non-Communist elements in its early years, any picture of it today as a coalition of nationalistic Vietnamese among whom the Communists are merely one group is a total misconception. In its policies and its action—in its very capability for effective continuation of the war—the NLF has shown itself to be basically a creature of Hanoi. On the other hand, the Viet Cong have been primarily South Vietnamese (with most of the leaders consisting of "regroupees" who went north in 1954 and were infiltrated back into the south several years later); even as late as 1963, it was difficult to find North Vietnamese among them, although they were sought for propaganda purposes.

The Viet Cong use of selectively applied terror as a deliberate technique of takeover is also real. Chiefly the victims of the terror are the very good or the very bad. An able, dedicated official or school teacher working in the villages for the government is a danger to the revolution and may thus become the target of an assassination team who will leave his head on a pole as a grim warning. The victim may also be selected from among government spies, however, or officials or policemen who are feared and hated by the villagers, and the Viet Cong may then be viewed as protectors and liberators.

For winning the support of the people—either through positive motivation or through fear—is the essence of revolutionary warfare. And peoples' support is not won through indiscriminate killing and terror. On its positive side, the Viet Cong philosophy

is to teach their members to help the people, to pay for anything taken, not to rape or mistreat the women, and generally both to be and to appear as the friend of the people. The philosophy is certainly sound—and particularly effective, if, as is frequently the case, the government soldiers feel free to beat up or steal from anyone they please, and the South Vietnamese officers show virtually no feeling for the people. The Viet Cong often do not live up to their own standards, and the South Vietnamese government is striving, with American help, to instill a different approach into its civilian officials and military forces—but it is not clear at all that the government is winning this battle.

Taken all together, however, the U.S. case for its presence in South Vietnam is not a weak one. There is definitely a Communist threat; many people in the South have good reason to hate and fear it; the threat is strongly backed and basically controlled from Hanoi; and it has the support of the Communist world, especially China and the Soviet Union. There can be little question that many peoples and governments in Asia are watching with great concern the progress of the war in Vietnam. A U.S. military defeat or a withdrawal by the U.S. that would simply leave the people of the South to their own fate would have a major impact on the attitudes of many Asians regarding the probable future prospects of Communism. The United States bears a major responsibility for the future peace and order of this part of the world, and it can no more absolve itself of this responsibility than a powerful, wealthy individual in an American city can close his eyes in the belief that what goes on around him is no concern of his.

So if one admits that the United States is not in Vietnam because of some unacknowledged imperialistic ambitions, what fault can be found with what it is doing? I find three: (1) we have exaggerated the threat in Vietnam, and therefore the importance of defeating that threat; (2) because we have misunderstood the nature of the threat, we are using the wrong methods in meeting it; (3) we have misjudged the impact of our actions both on the Communist countries and on the so-called Free World.

The dimension of the threat has been exaggerated through the substitution of a metaphor for analysis—the "domino theory"—with its implications that somehow the Chinese Communists are directing the Communist effort in Vietnam, and that they can similarly control "proxy" revolutions in other countries. But Peking is not controlling the Communist effort in South Vietnam. Hanoi is. And there is no reason to believe that the North Vietnamese wish slavishly to follow Chinese orders in the future.

Moreover, it is not at all apparent, even if a Communist government should come to power in South Vietnam, and even if it were dominated by China, why Thailand would fall next, then Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, India and so on through Asia, Africa and Latin America. Does anyone really believe that the Cubans, or the Egyptians, or the Congolese, or the Burmese, or the Indians, or any of the other hundreds of peoples in the Third World would subordinate for very long their own national interests to those of Peking? The Sino-Soviet Bloc did not hold together; even the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe could not be tightly controlled indefinitely from Moscow. China today is clearly having trouble even controlling itself. There is certainly nothing in political logic, in history, or in common sense to justify the belief that there could exist for even a few minutes a monolithic Communist bloc in the underdeveloped world controlled out of Peking.

Even the more limited view of the domino theory—that the only countries really in danger are those in Southeast Asia, includ-

ing Indonesia and the Philippines—is far from obvious. Undoubtedly the Chinese would like to extend their influence over their neighbors. But China today is not a Great Power. Its huge army of over 2-million men is seriously lacking in modern military equipment, its navy and air force are not significant, its nuclear delivery capability cannot approach that of a Great Power for the indefinite future, and its vast and growing population can be regarded as an economic and political liability as much as a power asset. In fact, in terms of Gross National Product, Japan is a more powerful nation than China—and in the foreseeable future Japan might perhaps become a greater military power.

The claim is that the Chinese will conquer their neighbors by subversion and blackmail, rather than by outright military force. The Chinese record in this respect has been outstandingly poor so far, however—and those commentators who glibly find the Chinese failures in Africa and Indonesia a direct result of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam owe their audiences some proof more substantial than a mere wish that it be so. In every case, internal issues appear to have predominated in the turbulent contests for power in the underdeveloped countries—which is precisely what historical experience should lead us to expect.

The Communists (Chinese, Russian or Cuban) do not have a magic formula for taking over underdeveloped countries. The product they have to offer has not proved that attractive. In the years immediately after World War II they attempted takeovers in Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indochina. In all of these except the last the question of national independence was quickly eliminated, and the Communists were eventually defeated. In Indochina, where the French attempted to reimpose their control, very possibly for psychological reasons as much as anything, the war has continued for over 20 years and reached even greater heights with the American involvement.

If the domino theory is interpreted to mean (the theory's adherents are rarely precise on just what it does mean) merely that regimes hostile to the U.S. will irreversibly come to power throughout the underdeveloped world, though not necessarily under Chinese or Russian domination, is there any reason to accept this as a mortal threat to U.S. security? What is their real power, if they are not under central control? And why should non-aligned, or life-leaning, regimes remain permanently hostile to the U.S.? The U.S. too can make powerful political and economic appeals to such countries, if it does not tie itself too closely to reactionary groups within them.

The domino theory posits not only that other countries must inevitably fall to the Communists if South Vietnam falls, but implies conversely that these countries will remain "free" if South Vietnam does not fall. From the standpoint of the peoples involved, however, the choice is not between freedom and slavery but usually between one kind of authoritarian government and another, one kind of poverty and another, one kind of injustice and another. A Communist victory or defeat in South Vietnam may influence, but it will not determine, the course of these separate struggles against authoritarianism, poverty and injustice; they will continue in any event.

In sum, while there is definitely a Communist threat in South Vietnam, the domino theory exaggerates both the scope of the threat and its crucial significance for the "free" world.

What of U.S. methods in Vietnam—the second item with which I have found fault? We began military involvement with Vietnam in 1950, channeling assistance through the French. Then, after the French defeat in 1954, we gave assistance directly to the South



Vietnamese government, building up a conventional army, along American lines and using American weapons, with the initial purpose of defending against an attack across the border such as had taken place in Korea. In the process, we made the army the dominant political institution in South Vietnam, as we did in several other underdeveloped countries. The dictator Diem was able to hold power only by gaining control of the army; when the army decided to depose him he was finished. And the elections held earlier this month in South Vietnam gave the country military officers who will rule as president and vice-president by virtue of the support of the armed forces.

In the last few years the thesis has increasingly found favor in official U.S. policy that the army in underdeveloped countries is the major force for stability, the guardian of social progress, the ultimate repository of political sanity. (It is indeed ironic that this principle should be espoused in the United States, a nation whose oldest and most fundamental political traditions involved a distrust, fear and even hatred of arbitrary military power.) In any event, the officer class in most underdeveloped countries is not the "nation's obedient handyman" of American nineteenth century history, but a powerful social group with its own political and economic interests. Thus, in South Vietnam, though the U.S. has had one policy of consistently urging reforms, its military policy has retained power in the class which supported the French against the Viet Minh and which has little will for the reforms required.

The increasing U.S. commitment of its own forces has compounded the mistake of dependence on the South Vietnamese military. As the U.S. military strength increased, so did the North Vietnamese efforts and resolve to throw out the "American invaders." And as the U.S. strength has increased, so has the disruption of the South Vietnamese social and economic life, and so has the dependence of the South Vietnamese Government on the United States for measures that it should take for itself.

Perhaps most important, it is not apparent that U.S. military forces can accomplish the task now set out for them—that of defeating the Communist threat militarily, so that indigenous South Vietnamese elements can then pacify the country and proceed with "nation building." In the first place, while U.S. forces clearly are not being defeated, it is not obvious that they are winning the war even against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main force units. The tactical initiative in actually joining combat still lies with the enemy, in spite of U.S. superior firepower and mobility, and the North Vietnamese have committed only a portion of their army. Secondly, even if the U.S. could defeat these main forces, there still would remain the guerrilla threat, and there is little evidence that much progress is being made in this sphere. Thirdly, even if the main force and guerrilla threat could be defeated, there is no cause to believe that South Vietnam yet has a government around which the people will rally. If there is not such a government, then the Communist drive for social and economic reform, for Vietnamese unification, for throwing out the "American invaders," and for bringing down the "puppet government" will continue to produce revolutionists for the foreseeable future. In sum, it is not apparent that we "can get there from here" by application of ever-growing U.S. military force in the South.

I further disagree with our methods in regard to the bombing of the North. We are not accomplishing the major objectives we set for ourselves in the bombing and it does not appear likely that we will do so. The U.S. objectives for the bombing have consistently been these three: (1) by interdiction of the infiltration routes to significantly re-

duce North Vietnam's ability to supply and maintain the war in the South, (2) through progressive destruction of selected targets in the North to make it increasingly difficult and costly for North Vietnam to support the war in the South, and thus force them to the conference table—presumably on our terms, and (3) to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese leadership, who about the time the bombing began were in rather desperate straits. The last of these, at least, has been accomplished.

The bombing has also seriously hurt the North Vietnamese transportation and communications network. It has destroyed bridges, fords, roads, trucks, locomotives, railroad cars, choke-points in mountain passes. But there is little evidence that it has significantly reduced the Communist capability to supply the South. The infiltration continues; the war continues; and any diminution in activity in the South can probably be attributed more to the tactical situation than to logistical deprivation. By the use of masses of human labor and improvisation, the North Vietnamese have kept the supply routes open. They have rebuilt smaller bridges, and camouflaged them; repaired railroads; constructed new fords in place of bridges; improvised pontoon bridges which are hidden in the daytime and used at night; built complete new roads; made jungle tracks motorable; by-passed choke points. And the people and supplies continue to move South.

What is probably worse, the routes are more invulnerable now than they were when we began. The big bridges have not been rebuilt. But they have been replaced by the fords and pontoon bridges, and all are more difficult to locate. Where there used to be one main road, now there are several, or even a network. Thus the targets get harder to find and less remunerative all the time.

Lastly, it probably should have been apparent to us beforehand that we were going to have trouble effectively interdicting the routes to the point that we would have a critical effect on the war: (1) much of the men and material originates in the South, and therefore doesn't come over the routes; (2) there are alternative routes, such as water; (3) and most important, we failed at least once before in similar tactics, in the Korean War, where even in a larger operation in which more supplies were being consumed, the tonnage arriving at the front was never reduced below that estimated as necessary for the North Koreans to maintain effective operational capability.

#### INDUSTRIALLY PRIMITIVE

As for the second objective of making the infiltration so difficult and costly for the North Vietnamese that they will come to the conference table, there is still no indication they will come on our terms—if they come at all. Probably the critical factor here is that the supplies moving over the infiltration routes are largely not originating in North Vietnam anyway, so that all the steel mills, power plants and factories there could be destroyed, with little effect. The supplies are coming from China and the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam is in effect simply a logistic funnel through which the supplies are being passed. Also, since North Vietnam is an industrially primitive country, probably all its vulnerable assets can be destroyed without having a critical effect on the leaders' resolve—and the remainder of the Communist world will undoubtedly replace, after the war, whatever has been destroyed.

Such targets as supply depots, fuel depots and military barracks which have been destroyed have not been rebuilt. And when they were bombed, most probably contained little worthwhile anyway, because both personnel and supplies had been dispersed in small packets in the forests and villages, where the targets are more difficult to find, less

vulnerable and less remunerative. The results, then, are minimal—but the costs are not.

By our increasing military pressure we have driven the Liberation Front closer to Hanoi, and Hanoi closer to Peking, when one of our major objectives should be to divide them—and there are reasons to think they could be divided.

We have compromised the loyalty and sympathy of many friends of the U.S. in many parts of the world.

We are making a wider war much more likely. It is not improbable at all that in the near future some spectacular defeat will be inflicted on U.S. forces, and then public pressure in the United States will rise almost irresistibly to do something drastic, such as invade North Vietnam. From there it is but a step to direct war with China. And any idea that the Soviet Union would be happy to have us destroy China for them is, I believe, wild. The Soviets have objected for years to the fact that the strongest military power in Western Europe is the U.S.; they cannot wish that same power to reach round the world, establish itself in China, and enclose them in the pincers.

The U.S. commitment in Vietnam exceeds the importance of its objectives there—and also the clarity with which the nation sees those objectives. Instead of steadily escalating the war, while the objectives recede further into the distance, the U.S. should begin a program of gradual de-escalation to bring its commitments in Vietnam into balance with its stake there. One method of doing this would be as follows:

1. Stop the bombing of the North. It is not accomplishing objectives; it is dividing our friends from us; it is giving the United States an image of imperialism in Asia; and it bears within itself the very real dangers of a wider war, perhaps World War III.

2. Stop the bombing and shelling of the villages in the South. The bombing and shelling have been helpful militarily, it is true, and if we stop them the Viet Cong could use the villages as sanctuaries. On the other hand, by destruction of the villages we are disrupting the fabric of South Vietnamese society, we are doing nothing to defeat the more important guerrilla and non-military threat of the Viet Cong, and we are leaving a residue of hostility for the Americans and the South Vietnamese Government.

3. Stop the crop-spraying. This has also been helpful militarily, because it strikes at the greatest vulnerability of the Viet Cong, which is food. But it is subject to the same disadvantages mentioned above for the bombing and shelling of villages, and these outweigh any gain.

4. Simultaneously with the foregoing actions, reaffirm (a) that the United States is not going to abandon the South Vietnamese, (b) that U.S. objectives in South Vietnam are limited to defense against its takeover by force, and (c) that the U.S. intends to leave the country after the conclusion of hostilities, rather than stay and exploit it as the French did. Couple the above with a reaffirmation of U.S. willingness to draw up a timetable for withdrawal from South Vietnam, though dependent on the actual negotiations and on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese cooperation; also include a willingness to cease future U.S. military support to the South Vietnamese government, whoever comprises it.

5. Continue U.S. encouragement of the South Vietnamese government to get on with the so-called "other war" the land reform measures, administrative and political reforms, the attempts to make the government a friend rather than an enemy of the people, the measures to "civilianize" itself. An important aspect of this would be an extension of the present "Chieu Hoi" or amnesty program in which the members of the Liberation Front would be invited to participate on a no-

reprisals basis in the formation and operation of the government. A further aspect could be a provision for UN-supervised elections, though such matters as this should await developments.

There are obvious dangers in the above proposals. The Communists might not accept them. Or they might accept, and stall negotiations interminably. Or they might say nothing, and redouble their efforts in the South. The U.S. could make clear, however, that it is not going to leave South Vietnam until a settlement is reached. In effect, then, the Communists would have a chance to negotiate the U.S. out of Vietnam. There have been indications that they would pay quite a price for this result.

Another danger, of course, would be that Marshal Ky and others in Saigon would feel betrayed by some of the actions suggested above. They might even attempt an outright coup or revolt. But the U.S. commitment is to South Vietnam, not to Marshal Ky, and there is no reason to allow a military junta to make U.S. foreign policy for it. If the military revolted against their U.S. protector, it is difficult to see how they could sustain themselves for long. The U.S. would have to wait, with "strategic patience," and try to help pick up the pieces.

It is possible, of course, that there would be no pieces to pick up. The program I have suggested above might result in a temporary military or coalition government in South Vietnam, followed by a Communist guerrilla takeover, or it might result in a government which made peace with North Vietnam and merged with it. Either of these results would be very unfavorable for U.S. policy—but they would be preferable to the disadvantages of the present course of action. On the other hand, neither of these results is inevitable, and the U.S. has many cards to play to help prevent them.

#### NATION BUILDING

There are other implications of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam which require a broader look at U.S. political-military policy. One of these is the increasing importance of the U.S. military in the business of "stability operations" and "nation building." Herein lies one of the most portentous, and potentially dangerous, trends in U.S. relations with the underdeveloped world. For in the U.S. military a large number of conscientious, unimperialistic, even idealistic men, particularly in the Army, see for themselves and for the United States a future which involves "winning" the battle of the Free World against Communism, on the battleground of the Third World. The means by which they propose to do this include an entire gamut of actions ranging from outright U.S. military intervention, through military advice and logistical support, to economic assistance and political education at the other end of the spectrum.

In devising this role for the Army in the great battle against Communism they draw partly on their military experience, partly on their history of governing such territories as Alaska and the Canal Zone, partly on their accomplishments in the economic rebuilding and "democratization" of Germany and Japan as an occupation army, and partly on the remarkable record of the Corps of Engineers in the U.S. in integrating itself usefully with the civilian fabric by building bridges, dams, jetties, monuments, etc. But what the U.S. Army can do in the American political context, there must be grave doubts that it can accomplish in the underdeveloped world. If the U.S. is going to engage in this task, then let it find another approach, and another instrument. The primary U.S. contribution to the underdeveloped world is surely its political philosophy of individual freedom and its sincere belief in human material progress, rather than techniques for holding back revolution—whether Communist-inspired or otherwise.

A second implication of the U.S. war in Vietnam is the necessity for arriving at some larger solution to the problem of conflicting power interests in the Far East. A major U.S. task should be the promotion of an Asian security conference, with the objective of underwriting a settlement in Vietnam, and of establishing the outlines of future relationships among the powers in the area. Some of the major U.S. aims in such a conference would be to: (a) encourage the assumption by indigenous countries—especially Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, India and Pakistan—of increasing responsibility for the future development, stability and security of the area; (b) reaffirm U.S.—and if possible, regional—support of countries which might be subjected to external aggression; (c) reaffirm U.S. willingness to participate in regional economic development proposals; (d) leave the door open for as much Chinese and even Soviet participation (however informal) as possible.

An important, though not the sole, purpose of the conference would be to make clear the terms on which Communist China can expect to live in peace with its neighbors in the Far East. For this reason it would be extremely important that the conference not take on simply anti-Communist or anti-Chinese tone. Otherwise, most of the large and truly important Asian nations would not attend or subscribe to its results, the small allies of the U.S. would insure that the divisive issues which will determine the future peace of Asia were sharpened rather than moderated or negotiated, and the U.S. would undoubtedly be committed to decades of conflict and intervention on the Asian continent.

The preparation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy for and during such a conference would pose immense problems. A great nation does not alter even slightly the direction of a policy it has pursued for a decade and a half without major effects upon—even disruptions of—other nations' affairs. Responsibilities have been incurred by the U.S. which cannot simply be dismissed. National expectations have been encouraged and important political figures' personal careers have been committed. There are genuine fears in the Far East both of Communist subversion and Chinese power. And the Soviet Union will look suspiciously at any evidence of detente between the U.S. and China, even though it has certainly not wanted outright war between the two. But these problems are not insoluble. And to the extent that U.S. diplomacy and leadership can rise to them, the most powerful country in the world can throw its weight either in the direction of future world order or increasing world conflict. The task is a truly great one—suitable for a great nation.

#### THE WAR: ALL, ALL HONORABLE MEN (By Michael Novak)

To speak of military victory in South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara has warned us, is to speak nonsense. There are no front lines. There is hardly any opposing army—the major part of the revolutionary forces is composed of civilian soldiers, whose numbers grow steadily with the years, and whose presence in the countryside is extremely difficult even to detect. There is pitifully little to bomb or to shell, except silent jungle. Either the war will slowly peter out over many long years, or it will have to end through negotiations. But what is there to negotiate?

Perhaps even more interesting, who will be the negotiators? The flurry of diplomatic activity in the early part of 1967 revealed that the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam has significantly different ideas about the future than Hanoi. Meanwhile, the military regime in South Vietnam has a vested interest in continuing the war; Pre-

mier Ky, weeks before the September election, announced that if his people voted for a peace candidate or a neutralist he would feel obliged to seize command again by force. And what, exactly, are the aims of the United States concerning negotiations?

Theodore Draper has told the sorry story of the diplomacy of the Johnson administration during the first few months of 1967 in "How Not to Negotiate" in *The New York Review of Books* for May. A Stanford senior, James E. Marti, has prepared an unpublished study of 80 recorded exchanges between the United States and North Vietnam from Jan. 1 to Feb. 28, 1967. Forty of the 49 U.S. transactions, Mr. Marti finds, were nonconciliatory; of the conciliatory moves, eight were initiatives but only three were military. By contrast, the North Vietnamese made 19 conciliatory moves, 15 of which were initiatives, none military. Two patterns in U.S. activity emerged: (1) conciliatory verbal initiatives from North Vietnam met nonconciliatory actions from the U.S.; (2) conciliatory verbal initiatives from the U.S. were followed by nonconciliatory actions by the U.S.

On Jan. 1, for example, Hanoi proposed an extension of the 48-hour truce and Ambassador Goldberg said: "The United States welcomes an extension of the cease fire." The next day, only three hours after the truce had ended, U.S. planes were bombing the Demilitarized Zone. On Feb. 5, Hanoi rescinded earlier demands and announced that the opening of peace talks depended only on the cessation of U.S. bombing. Contacts were made in anticipation of the 96-hour Lunar Truce to begin Feb. 8. But on Feb. 6, the U.S. forces in the field launched a major offensive and made record air strikes in South Vietnam. One minute after the truce had ended, B-52's, in the air for hours, rained bombs on unseen targets. Ho Chi Minh sent a radio message to Pope Paul asking an end to the bombing. One hour later, U.S. bombers struck North Vietnam. North Vietnamese peace bids on Feb. 16, 18 and 22 were met by increased bombings, the "largest offensive yet in the Vietnamese war," the first artillery fire into North Vietnam, the mining of North Vietnamese rivers, and the violation of international waters by warships moving within 200 yards of shore to shell targets in North Vietnam.

On Feb. 9-10, negotiations between Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin had brought, in Wilson's words, "peace within our grasp." On Feb. 8, the bombing had stopped. Kosygin left London on Feb. 12; the next day the bombing was resumed.

What is the point of the bombing? On April 7, President Johnson pictured it as diplomatic "leverage": "I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find necessary to say with guns and planes." The recurrent justification for the bombing has not been military but diplomatic; the bombing "raises the cost" of intransigence. What has the United States asked in return? On Jan. 5, it was a "reciprocal move toward peace"; on Jan. 6, "a reciprocal action"; and on Feb. 2, "just almost any action . . . just almost any reciprocal move." On Feb. 9, Secretary Rusk (one hour after the Wilson-Kosygin talks) asked on television that North Vietnam "reduce its military effort in South Vietnam." The U.S., in short, began to bomb in order to force North Vietnam to the peace table. When Hanoi began to talk about peace on condition that the bombing stop, the U.S. asked for some vague further sign—and meanwhile intensified offensive operations.

It seems quite plain that the U.S. does not want to stop the fighting and begin to talk, but wishes instead to gain military concessions before any cessation of the bombing. Beyond this, Secretary Rusk and President Johnson have laid down the following guidelines for a future settlement: (1) an end to "aggression" from the North; (2) the politi-



cal separation of South Vietnam from North Vietnam; (3) the guaranteed independence of South Vietnam from North Vietnam; (4) the "freedom" and stability of South Vietnam.

It is instructive, however, to notice what these claims must look like from the point of view of Hanoi. In the first place, the Geneva Accords of 1954 specified clearly that the division of South Vietnam from North Vietnam was to be neither political nor permanent. Vietnam, North and South together, has been and is supposed to be as one indivisible nation. Thus, secondly, the troops from Hanoi, let alone the Viet Cong, can hardly see themselves as "aggressors" in their own land; quite clearly, the foreigners are the Americans and their allies. Thirdly, South Vietnam hardly looks to Hanoi like an "independent" nation; it seems quite clearly to be an American dependency, financially, militarily and politically. It seems plain that but for the massive U.S. military intervention in 1965, South Vietnam would by now have had to accept a new government which would have, at a minimum, included members of the National Liberation Front. Finally, the supposed "freedom" given to South Vietnam by the United States appears to have already taken the form of a military dictatorship and the reinforcement of the interests of the hereditary mandarin caste which has long played upon the miseries of the Vietnamese people. Premier Ky is an avowed militarist; he calls effort for peace treasonable, and openly mocks the electoral process.

Yet the United States' interests in South Vietnam are not exhausted by the four claims made public by President Johnson and Dean Rusk. With every American soldier who has been killed or been crippled in Vietnam, American emotional stakes in the war have risen. The buddies of every fallen man, his family and the public as a whole are impelled to ask "that these honored dead will not have died in vain." Thus the U.S. government cannot face the realities of Vietnam truthfully. It cannot admit that the war is largely a civil war. It cannot admit that the government it supports is not a free government. It cannot even admit that its generals are committing blunder after blunder, so that our military efforts are, despite the grander noises, as ineffective as those of the South Vietnamese armies ever were. The guerrillas lure the American behemoth into remote jungle areas (ambushing troops at will), so that after two years of massive American presence the extent of politically secured areas is no larger, perhaps smaller, than it was before the Americans arrived. Meanwhile, civilian workers in the field report, hatred for Americans grows daily in once friendly villages.

"Peace with honor," President Johnson urges. Honor appears to mean the abject surrender of our opponents, an agreement to mutilate their own nation by dividing it, the acceptance of a tyrannical general allied to mandarin interests as ruler of half the land, and the betrayal of a nationalist dream for which scores of thousands have laid down their lives for over 20 years. It is obvious that honor has a different meaning in Hanoi and in the jungle headquarters of the NLF, as it once had in Washington.

[From Commonweal, Sept. 22, 1967]

THE WAR: EXERCISE IN DECEPTION  
(By Tran Van Dinh)

(NOTE.—Tran Van Dinh, a journalist and lecturer, was Chargé d'Affaires of South Vietnam to the United States in 1963.)

For the seventh time since Vietnam was temporarily divided by the 1954 Geneva Agreements, the people of South Vietnam, on Sept. 3, went to the polls (there were presidential elections in 1955 and 1961; Assembly elections in 1956, 1959, 1963 and 1966). Some 4,877,083 voters—83.3 percent of the eligible

electorate—proceeded to 8,824 polling places to elect a President, a Vice President and 60 Senators. The figures seem impressive, but, as the New York Times' Tom Wicker noted, the 83.3 percent represented less than a third of the nation, the rest having been disqualified as neutralists or Communists or residents of insecure areas outside the reach of Saigon.

The Sept. 3 voter, who has had enough of bullets and ballots in the last 22 years, was handed 11 ballots—one for each presidential ticket (two names on each, President and Vice President); then he was given 48 other ballots—one for each senatorial slate (10 names on each). Thus he had to go over 502 names and scrutinize 59 symbols (11 presidential; 48 senatorial). Many Vietnamese are illiterate; those who do read would have had to have taken a speed-reading course to fulfill their duty. Consider Kien Hoa province in the Delta, with 120,000 registered voters and 161 polling stations: voters there would have had to have been processed at the rate of 82 per hour, or 42 seconds per voter.

The voter did not care. His attention was directed at the familiar face of the policeman who controlled the polling booth. General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, head of the national police force and a close associate of Nguyen Cao Ky, had declared in a press conference in Saigon on Aug. 22: "National policemen will be stationed inside and outside booths all over the country. As the national police are the people in closest contact with the lowest echelon, there will be police telling them where to vote, how to vote and when to vote." The policeman also stamped the voter's registration card and anyone subsequently searched (a routine in South Vietnam) and found without the election day stamp on his card would be in danger of prison and even death. Finally, no matter for whom he voted, the voter knew from past experiences that the government candidates would win.

The Thieu-Ky ticket won, as expected, by 34.8 percent of the votes. But General Nguyen Van Thieu was defeated by 5,000 votes in Saigon, where people by and large are more aware of the issues. The front runner in Saigon was Tran Van Huong, former mayor and prime minister and a man respected for his honesty and austerity. Strangely enough, Mr. Huong lost in his home province, Vinh Long, where the local administration had all means to influence or threaten the voters.

The surprise of the elections was peace candidate Truong Dinh Dzu, who made a white dove his symbol. His ticket ran second, followed by Tran Van Huong and Phan Khac Suu, chairman of the Constituent Assembly. Final figures showed opponents of the Thieu-Ky ticket polling an aggregate of 3,086,843 votes, almost two-thirds more than Thieu-Ky attracted. Dr. Dzu's total was 817,120, a figure which, if soberly taken into account, should keep the peace issue in the forefront of Vietnamese politics. Complaints of fraud are being filed with the Assembly (some polls opened late; some ran out of ballots, etc.); the Assembly has until Oct. 2 to consider these and certify the validity of the elections.

No matter what will be the decision of the Assembly, the 1967 Presidential election in South Vietnam was a fraud before it took place. In the first place, the Thieu-Ky ticket was illegal. Article 17 of Electoral Law No 001/67 stipulates: "Government employees and military men, to run for elections, must file and take a leave of absence without pay beginning the closing date of application for the candidacy until the end of election day." Although General Thieu and Vice Air Marshall Ky claimed they had asked for a leave of absence, they remained as government employees and men in power.

There were other travesties. On the eve of the elections, two newspapers, *Than Chung* (Sacred Bell) and *Sang* (Light), were closed down. Colonel Pham Van Lieu, former Na-

tional Police Chief and a supporter of a rival candidate, and other officers were arrested. Thieu and Ky both used government facilities during the campaign. Also the Saigon regime excluded from the race the most serious competitors: General Duong Van Minh, in exile in Bangkok, and Dr. Au Truong Thanh, former Minister of Economy and Finance (1964-1966). All candidates closely connected with the Buddhists were barred. Finally, in one month the number of eligible voters jumped from 5,553,251 to 5,853,251. Said Tran Van Huong: "We are prolific in Vietnam but not that prolific." Admitted General Thieu: "Some soldiers have been given two voting cards."

As in the last elections, Washington was optimistic. Official spokesmen capitalized on the fact that the elections took place amidst Viet Cong sabotage. Did they really try? Wesley Pruden Jr. wrote from Saigon in the Sept. 4 *National Observer*: "Many here did not believe that Hanoi and the Viet Cong seriously tried to disrupt the election. There was, as usual, a long list of terrorist incidents during election week. But brutal death is an everyday Communist contribution to life in Vietnam. If terror had been the election tactic, the terror squad could have done a lot worse. The truth is that the Viet Cong have never put a hell of a lot of importance on this election, says one American here who has watched the long preparations for the campaign. This election and all the trappings have excited the Americans a lot more than the Vietnamese."

The real loser in the elections is Vice Air Marshal Ky. As an elected Vice President, he will have to give up his functions as Prime Minister and his command of the South Vietnam Air Force. These two positions have made him the most powerful man in the military junta. But since June 29, when he was forced by his fellow generals and by U.S. pressure to accept the number two spot on the presidential ticket with his rival General Thieu, Ky has been planning a comeback. He has openly declared that he is not going to be a "tea-drinking" Vice President, which is exactly what he should be according to Article 66 of the 1967 Constitution of South Vietnam. Article 66 reads: "1. The Vice President is chairman of the Culture and Educational Council, the Economic Council, the Social Council and the Ethnic Minority Council. 2. The Vice President cannot hold any other position in the government."

Ky, cunning, ambitious but talkative, has mapped his strategy carefully. He relies for strength on the 90,000-strong police force headed by General Loan, a Northerner and an Air Force officer. On July 16, four C47 planes brought to the mountain resort of Dalat province police chiefs (43 in all) for a conference, followed by a dinner-dance at the Lang Bian Palace with Ky and Loan. Only one "outsider" took part in the meeting: Bui Diem, South Vietnam Ambassador to the U.S. and a close associate of Ky for years. Bui Diem would give Ky the readings of Washington policies, the knowledge of which is vital; he would have told Ky that the mood in the U.S. was for more war. This was reflected in Ky's statements during the campaign. While Thieu, who reads the Vietnam mood, called for cessation of bombings of the North and negotiations with Hanoi (he even declared he is "ready to meet with official representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam"), Ky called for more bombings.

At Ky's instigation, the senior officers of the ARVN (Army Republic of Vietnam) formed a "military committee" to act as a kitchen cabinet for the future government. To upset Ky's maneuver, General Thieu announced in a press conference on Aug. 25, that "some general officers and high ranking colonels will be purged. Some of them will be discharged from the army, others will be

brought before the Disciplinary Council." It remains to be seen if Thieu will carry out this purge, which would affect about 50 officers; it also remains to be seen how many of them are Ky's friends.

Depending on his strength, Ky could force the future parliament to amend the Constitution to enable the Vice President to take on the functions of Prime Minister, or he could simply overthrow Thieu and take his place as President. If, however, with the elections, Ky feels he is not strong enough, he can temporarily come to a compromise with Thieu and select a friend as a civilian Premier. Whatever, the elections will create more conflicts and divisions within the ARVN—and outside of it.

The most serious opposition is likely to come from the Buddhists. Since 1964, the Buddhists have struggled for the holding of elections which would be organized by an "interim government," not the military junta in power. Ruthlessly suppressed in the summer of 1966, Buddhists were excluded from the presidential race. (Buddhists would have supported General Duong Van Minh or Dr. Au Truong Thanh.)

Moreover, in the midst of the elections preparations, General Thieu, a Catholic convert, signed Decree Law 23/67 abolishing the Buddhist Charter (approved by Decree Law 158/SL/CT of May 14, 1964). In a "free" and "democratic" South Vietnam, the majority religion functions under government-approved charter. The approval by General Thieu of the new charter violates article 32 of the 1964 Charter and article 35 of the revised 1966 Charter. These articles stipulate that all amendments and modifications must be discussed and approved by at least two-thirds of the delegates of the General Buddhist Assembly, composed of members of the Council of the Central Committee of the Church and representatives from regions and provinces all over the country. The new charter was proposed by only five Buddhists, one of them the so-called "moderate" Thich Tam Chau.

The reaction of the Buddhists was predictable. On Aug. 8, the Venerable Thich Tinh Khiet, Patriarch of the United Buddhist Church, wrote to General Thieu to protest against the promulgation of the New Charter. On Aug. 24, an extraordinary General Assembly of the United Buddhist Church met at the An Quang Pagoda and unanimously rejected the new charter. The same day Patriarch Thich Tinh Khiet cabled Buddhist countries and Buddhist organizations abroad, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, to inform them of the decision of the Assembly.

A cable was also sent to the Pope, in which the Patriarch asked the Holy Father to intervene with those "who claim to be Catholic and yet engage themselves in destructive actions against religions." The cable mentioned the understanding and brotherhood existing between the Buddhist and the Catholic communities after the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. For the present, the Buddhists are advised to be in a state of alertness and wait directions from the Patriarch.

As for the future of the war and the "pacification," I am in agreement with Lt. Colonel William Carson, head of the Marine Combined Action Program in Danang. Colonel Carson is quoted in the July 29 *Washington Post*: "The peasant sees that we are supporting a local government structure he knows to be corrupt. So he assumes that we are either stupid or implicated. And he decides that we are not stupid. As for the elections, if they provide the leadership and the Revolutionary Development Program does better than it has done in the past, then we have a chance. If not, we've had it. The ball game is over."

The elections have returned the same leadership, corrupt, inefficient, alien to the

peasantry. Directed by the same people, the Revolutionary Development Program is not going to be any better, but the game is not over. The elections were an exercise of deception to the American public. The Vietnamese peasants, after 22 years of war and betrayed revolutions, cannot be deceived.

The 22-man observation group sent by President Johnson has passed a favorable verdict. They did so after a few days in Vietnam, as guests of the Saigon government, escorted by government interpreters and equipped with not even the rudiment of Vietnamese politics and Vietnamese culture. It is a mystery how they could watch over 8,000 polling places. But it doesn't matter. The elections were simply a process of legitimization of the Saigon military junta and the legalization of the U.S. intervention in South Vietnam.

#### THE WAR: THE CASE FOR WITHDRAWAL

(By Peter Steinfels, Associate Editor of *Commonweal*)

The U.S. is pursuing "rollback" in Southeast Asia, a policy it has largely disavowed in the rest of the world. First practically and only later rhetorically, the U.S. decided that in Eastern Europe Communist regimes were a fact of life. We might deplore them, we might argue that they did not represent the majorities in their nations, we might suspend or grant aid in hope of encouraging a different sort of Communist regime, we might even hope for a future for these areas not all recognizable as Communist. But we gave up the idea of attaining our aims by armed invasion.

In Vietnam the U.S. has attempted "rollback" at least twice. In 1954 Washington decided to reverse the outcome of the Indochinese war by ignoring the Geneva agreements and by supporting an anti-Communist satellite state in the South. In 1965 Washington attempted to offset the virtually total military and political collapse of that satellite state by raining bombs on North Vietnam and sending a massive expeditionary force into Asia. On both occasions our own statesmen were of the opinion that for various reasons, many of them historically unique and by no means the doing of the U.S., the Communist-led forces had won the day and effective control of the country was all but in their hands.

Into this gap between almost certain possibility and actual accomplishment, the U.S. inserted its direct intervention; our temporary successes masked from us what we were doing. Gambling on "rollback" in 1954, we later refused to admit that we had lost the wager—and gambled again. There has been no nuclear war, yet. Otherwise, the results have been as disastrous as anything we could have feared in Eastern Europe.

While the United States is occupied in Southern Asia, international relations have reached a critical stage. Like the 1860's when Germany was unified or 1919 when old empires crumbled and the U.S. and Russia temporarily withdrew from Europe, today the emergence of China and of national Communism, the revival of Europe, the détente with Russia, the possibility of an international system vastly and irreversibly altered by nuclear proliferation, together these factors present one of those determining moments for the next decades of international relations. A similar point has been reached in developing lands and American cities, where continuing misery in the face of wealth has raised frustration to a revolutionary pitch. At such a moment, the world's greatest power is exhausting vast resources, economic, military and political, on a local war which is taking a toll worse than did Hanoi's cruel purges and which will, moreover, increase the very wartime terror and postwar bloodletting the war is meant to prevent. Simply put, the war in Vietnam is

doing more harm—to the Vietnamese, to world peace, to America itself—than would even a Communist regime in Saigon.

This is the conclusion which underlies any call for American withdrawal. The United States must recognize the failure of its "rollback" and radically reverse its priorities. Those priorities now line up: (1) prevention of a Communist regime in the South; (2) ameliorative measures to minimize Vietnamese suffering; (3) ending the war. The order should be reversed: (1) ending the war; (2) ameliorative measures to minimize suffering; (3) prevention of a Communist regime.

The implications of such a reversal are that the U.S. would immediately try to obtain Hanoi and Vietcong agreement to a non-Communist coalition government in the South including Communist elements. If agreement could not be reached, the U.S. should lower its demands, to a coalition government in which the Communist elements would be stronger or even dominating. As part of the agreement, the various sides must guarantee measures to minimize the reprisals and postwar suffering: population movements; medical and economic assistance; U.N. or Red Cross observation units; phased withdrawal of American troops (presenting the unstated threat of a reversal of policy if reprisals went beyond the horrible minimum which can be realistically expected); or whatever ingenuity and a percentage of the billions now spent on the war can devise.

Hanoi and the N.L.F. may accept the first offer which presents at least a possibility of their future control of Vietnam; they may fear that such an offer, if refused, will only be followed by a hardening of U.S. policy. Or they may hold out for assurances of almost complete power from the start. America should consider the former eventuality a fortunate bonus, the latter outcome the just consequence of our failure. In either case, ending the war and employing every non-military means we can devise to limit Vietnamese suffering are higher priorities.

These, I realize, are radical proposals. They arise, however, from radically deranged situation: to "lose" this war today would be better for the world, the U.S. and Vietnam than to "win" it fifteen years from now. I put the words "win" and "lose" in quotation marks because in Vietnam their simple meaning has been strained to the breaking point.

#### THE ALTERNATIVES

A willingness to enlarge the bait until Hanoi and the N.L.F. bite adds up to the policy sometimes termed "withdrawal." Mention this word out loud, and you will usually receive three objections: "But the situation is complicated!" "But are you against negotiations?" "But we can't just abandon the Vietnamese."

Each of these objections has some basis. For some people, no doubt, the proposal to make an end to the war our overriding priority is an escape from the burden of complexity. Like the advocate of bombing North Vietnam back into the Stone Age, they merely want to "get finished with it." They forget that an American withdrawal won't make Vietnam or Southeast Asia or China disappear. (Or the State Department and the Pentagon, for that matter.) The problem is foreign relations, not foreign events, and these are long-term matters.

Still, to cry "complexity" is no unanswerable objection to withdrawal. Given, in fact, the full complexity of the situation and the drawbacks of every alternative, withdrawal may be the best of a bad lot, the lesser of evils. "Complexity" is certainly no argument for the present policy in Vietnam, except in the sense that attempting surgery with a cleaver is guaranteed to produce awesome complications. Is complexity on the side of any of the other alternatives?

Many answer that it is on the side of "negotiations," and the critics of the war can



be roughly divided between advocates of a negotiated settlement and advocates of withdrawal. The antagonism between these groups is surprising, because any casual observer will note that their objectives are neither self-explanatory nor mutually exclusive. If the U.S., having reversed its priorities, were determined to withdraw, nothing would be easier than to arrange negotiations to formalize the process. On the other hand, almost every scheme for negotiations now in the public arena, including the State Department's, looks forward to some process of eventual withdrawal. There are, of course, those who would like to force Hanoi to sign what amounts to a surrender; and there are those who would savor some sort of American Dunkirk. Both groups sometimes cloak their desires with the terms "negotiations" or "withdrawal." But generally, serious critics of the war desire some combination of negotiations and withdrawal. And most of them realize that phrases like "unconditional negotiations" and "immediate withdrawal" are hyperbolic impossibilities. Neither Hanoi nor Washington will begin negotiations without some idea of what may emerge, and this constitutes a condition. No withdrawal could be accomplished in such a blink of the eye as to avoid decisions concerning the future rulers of Vietnam, and this constitutes an implicit or explicit form of negotiation.

The two formulas, then, are not dichotomous, but expressions of relative differences. The negotiator may feel there is still a good chance for a peaceful and non-Communist South Vietnam, led by the Buddhists or another "third way" group. Much as the withdrawer might prefer such a settlement, a Vietnam free of both war and Communism, he doubts whether it is any longer possible. The non-Communist forces in Vietnam are too weak, too local, too divided, or too unpopular to survive long without the American military prop. To insist absolutely on a non-Communist solution is to insist on a Vietnam at war.

The negotiator wants Hanoi and the Vietcong to "be reasonable" and come halfway, and he has faith that they would, if given a chance by Washington. The withdrawer doubts that "being reasonable" can mean the same thing for a revolutionary group fighting in its homeland as for a great power. Once again, he might prefer to see Hanoi and the Vietcong come halfway, but he doesn't want to depend on it.

The negotiator hopes that the very process of negotiations, once initiated, will lead to a lowering of American aims. The withdrawer fears that only a lowering of aims, a reversal of American priorities, will lead to the initiation of successful negotiations. He knows that, unless linked to a will to end the war, many of the negotiator's proposals—to start talks or de-escalate the war—can be manipulated for government purposes, either to cast responsibility for the war on Hanoi or to reduce the war effort to a level more acceptable to the American electorate. The withdrawer is aware that the hawks are watching like . . . hawks. And that the U.S. will not be pressed by any bargaining process into concessions its leaders are not completely prepared to defend. It will take a firm act of political will power to extricate us from Vietnam; it probably cannot be done on the sly, or on the cheap. Beyond the problem of raising public support for beginning talks, the withdrawer senses the need for public recognition of the price to be paid if talks are actually to occur and be successful. No new illusions for the old, please. The withdrawer is a dove, but a hardnosed one.

But another objection remains. If our first priority becomes ending the war rather than containing the Communists, are we abandoning the Vietnamese?

Not that America's concern for the Vietnamese has ever been overriding: we paid

for the war of their colonial masters, tolerated the corruption of their ruling elites, and supported the oppression of their mandarin leaders. There are many ways to abandon a people. For two decades the Vietnamese have been abandoned to civil strife, military destruction, national division, individual suffering. We have pledged our willingness to abandon them, if necessary, to a vast war between American armies and hordes of their ancient Chinese oppressors. One of our ex-Presidents has approved of abandoning them, if necessary, to the pleasures of atomic weapons. The Vietnamese are being abandoned to American needs and notions today, have been so abandoned for a decade past, and may be so abandoned for years to come.

Let us not be hypocritical. There are few debts heavier than the one America now owes the Vietnamese. Are we going to pay by bombing, searching, destroying, pacifying, and rooting out, for fifteen years? Or will we, at last, stop abandoning Vietnam?

#### AMERICA'S INCREASING COMMITMENTS TO EDUCATION

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, two recent public pronouncements by the President and the Vice President of the United States clearly underline the fact that great progress has been made through legislation in bringing opportunities for educational attainment to American boys and girls.

I have reference to the remarks of the President of the United States upon the occasion of the signing of the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments Act of 1967 on Tuesday, October 3, 1967, and the address of the Vice President before the Catholic Education Association in Cincinnati, Ohio, on September 28, 1967. Although the remarks were made in different forums, there is a unity of theme and a message in both which we would do well to take to heart. It is that the commitment of Americans to the provision of educational opportunity has never been stronger. Many of us, and I certainly include myself among the company, are impatient for the realization of the aspirations which we hold in this area; and we necessarily tend to concentrate upon that which is yet to be accomplished rather than upon the tremendous progress that has been made through enactment of statutes.

Thus, it is appropriate to have recalled to our attention by the President that:

If men in the future want to suggest the range of our achievements, I think they could do it in only two sentences:

"The American people in three years, multiplied their commitment to health and education four times over. They passed more laws and they committed more funds to the education of our children—and to the health of our people—in three years than in all the previous history of America put together."

Junior colleges are now being founded in America at the rate of one per week.

By 1965, new Federal programs were helping 500,000 young people go to college and without that help, they might not have had a chance. Next year—I want all of you to get this—we will be helping 1,200,000; so we have doubled the number that we helped go to college—more than doubled it in the last two years—500,000 to 1,200,000.

Those to me are not just numbers. They are miracles. They represent human lives

which are being changed and human lives which are being enriched.

They mean that a new idea is already at work here in America.

As the Vice President recalled:

Today, one American in four is enrolled in some sort of educational program.

And in the last few years education has taken a more central place in national policy than at any other time in our history.

As a parent, as a former teacher and professor, as a friend of education in the Senate, as your Vice President, I am proud to say it: The Johnson-Humphrey Administration has put into operation 31 major education and training laws. And these are laws not just in quantity, but of quality.

I need not tell you that the most revolutionary breakthrough came, with your help in 1965, with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

Signing the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments Act of 1967 was a symbol to be sure, but behind the symbol lies the reality. I applaud the statement made by President Johnson that the signing was more than just a ritual. By that act, he as the representative of all the people of the United States, expressed our national purpose which he defined on our behalf as fulfillment for the individual.

I am sure that all of us, irrespective of party, who serve on the Education Subcommittee on the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, are firmly behind the objective he outlined to knock down every barrier that keeps a child or a man from realizing his full potential in our country.

At the signing President Johnson paid just and due tribute to the great Senators in this body who helped to bring about this achievement for the people. As the historians of the future look back at our time they will echo, I know, the tribute given by the President to our beloved chairman, Senator HILL, and to the dean of the Senate, the uniquely distinguished senior Senator from Arizona, CARL HAYDEN.

Deserved tribute was also given by the President to our colleagues in the other body, Chairman PERKINS of the House Committee on Education and Labor and his colleague, Congressman DANIELS, and to all the other Members who worked with them on the bill. They, too, deserve the thanks of the people of this country.

A further unifying theme runs through both statements, and that is the task for the future, and here I refer first to the specific reference by the President to the National Center for Deaf-Blind Youth and Adults contained in the bill because this reference strengthens the testimony we have received during our hearings on the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments in support of the complementary facilities for boys and girls under the age of 16.

I shall take great pride as this proposal is debated in our subcommittee, in referring to the President's statement:

And finally, it strikes at one of the most baffling and heartbreaking handicaps that we can imagine: the double handicap of deaf-blindness. For years, that problem seemed too difficult for us. Now, by establishing a National Center for Deaf-Blind Youth and Adults, we hope to change all of that.

It will be of enormous help to us.

So, too, in a similar fashion will be the reminders in the Vice President's address that American education, despite the progress that has been made does show inadequacies in areas, particularly the areas of our slum schools in our big cities. His recommendations for our future action will, I know, be given careful consideration and I hope favorable action as we review the specific language in our mark-up sessions on the 1967 amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

I am grateful, too, to the Vice President for the plea that he made on behalf of our committee when he told his audience:

All of us believe it, but we must awake the national consciousness to this fact: an extra dollar well spent on education will be repaid by a lifetime of dividends . . . a dollar denied is a dollar that will soon be wasted in unproductive welfare.

And so I specifically ask now your full support for the education measures still pending before the Congress. Let your Congressmen know about your support. Let your local newspapers and radio-tv stations know. Make yourselves heard, now.

And I join him in dedicating myself to the charter of educational opportunity with which he concluded his speech, in these words:

I propose that we dedicate ourselves to a fresh Charter of Educational Opportunity for every American child—a promise that he can and will get the skills and the knowledge he needs to make the most of himself in our fast-changing and competitive society. We do not need to settle for less.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there appear at this point in my remarks these challenging and inspirational remarks of two great Americans.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT UPON SIGNING H.R. 12257, THE VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1967, EAST ROOM Secretary Gardner, Under Secretary Cohen, Mrs. Switzer, Members of Congress, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Eight years ago in Portage, Pennsylvania, a 20-year machinist dived into a swimming hole and struck his head. Thus, he was paralyzed for life.

Even before that accident, he was handicapped; he had been partially deaf since his birth. Now he was not only deaf, but he was sentenced to another kind of life imprisonment. In many ways, that seemed to be a very, very hopeless case.

Today, that "hopeless case" is a very successful draftsman. He makes a good living with a design firm near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He pays his taxes. He is a member of a community—instead of its helpless ward.

All of that was true because he was helped, helped right from the start by a counselor from the Pennsylvania Bureau of Rehabilitation.

The law that I am going to sign today makes such stories as this possible. It brings them into reality. Thousands of them. Half a million exactly in the last four years. Since Woodrow Wilson's day it has helped more than two million Americans who—in one way or another—would be equally "hopeless cases."

As much as any law on the books, this law reveals what great possibilities every person has—and what, I believe, a great heart we have in America.

Last year, we helped restore 173,000 people to useful lives. Three-fourths of them had been unemployed—20 percent of them were already on welfare.

Today, every one of them are taxpayers. This program reaps five tax dollars for every dollar that we sow. And measured in human happiness, its value is beyond all of our counting.

So this moment is more than just a ritual. Today we express again our purpose in America: fulfillment for the individual. We aim to knock down every barrier that keeps a child or a man from realizing his full potential in our country.

The history of these years, I believe, when it is written, will be the story of how we in America accomplished that goal.

A rather bitter writer once gave this definition of history: "The account, mostly false, of events, mostly unimportant, which were brought about by rulers, mostly knaves. . . ."

I disagree with him on all counts.

History, I am convinced, will remember these years as a great awakening in America.

In these years, we discovered poverty in the midst of plenty—and we did something about it—not as much as we would like—but we did all that we could get a majority to do.

If historians seek a name for this age in the United States, I hope that they will call it the Age of Education.

Our government guarantees to all of its citizens all the education that he or she can take.

In the past six years, the number of young people going to college from poor homes has risen by more than 12 percent.

In six years, the number of high school dropouts has dropped—from 25 percent to only 18 percent of our young people between 16 and 24.

I regret we have 18 percent. But I would much rather have 18 than 25 that we started with.

If men in the future want to suggest the range of our achievements, I think they could do it in only two sentences:

"The American people in three years, multiplied their commitment to health and education four times over. They passed more laws and they committed more funds to the education of our children—and to the health of our people—in three years than in all the previous history of America put together."

Junior colleges are now being founded in America at the rate of one per week.

By 1965, new Federal programs were helping 500,000 young people go to college and without that help, they might not have had a chance. Next year—I want all of you to get this—we will be helping 1,200,000; so we have doubled the number that we helped go to college—more than doubled it in the last two years—500,000 to 1,200,000.

Those to me are not just numbers. They are miracles. They represent human lives which are being changed and human lives which are being enriched.

They mean that a new idea is already at work here in America.

Once, we thought of rehabilitation as something for the physically handicapped. This law is evidence of that. But now we have learned that other handicaps yield to the same treatment. The handicap of ignorance for example. Mental handicaps are another. The handicap of poverty is another.

Rehabilitation, in fact, has become a basic idea in our country. We act on the belief that every man—no matter what his color, no matter what his bank account, no matter what his handicap or no matter what his I.Q.—has abilities which America needs.

That is a new idea. But it is a great idea. It is like discovering a new country right in our midst—the territory of human promise. That idea promises not more welfare, but

more well-being for all—well-being for our people—the people we have selected to serve.

So we come here to the East Room of the White House this afternoon to continue this program. To continue it—and to add much to it that is new:

This law extends rehabilitation service to migrant laborers—the poorest among us, the most needy among us.

It increases Federal support for rehabilitation here in our Nation's Capital.

"And finally, it strikes at one of the most baffling and heartbreaking handicaps that we can imagine: the double handicap of deaf-blindness. For years, that problem seemed too difficult for us. Now, by establishing a National Center for Deaf-Blind Youth and Adults, we hope to change all of that."

To all the supporters of this law in Congress, to all the Members of the House and Senate who are here this afternoon on behalf of all the Nation, I want to say the Nation owes you a debt of thanks.

I would like to call each of your names. I am sure I would overlook some and make some of you offended. But I must refer to Senator Hill, who is always in the limelight to anything that is good for health and education in this country—to Congressman Daniels, and to their committee members.

They gave this law dedicated—and bipartisan—support.

In the next few years, this law will turn hope into achievement for thousands of our people.

And it will prove something to us in history: that in America there is no such thing as a "Hopeless Case."

Before I conclude—because I couldn't go to the Capitol yesterday—I want to pay my respects, my very great esteem and affection to that grand young man who was 90 yesterday, Carl Hayden.

I have never known a better public servant. I have never known a better human being. And I have never had a better friend. I am so glad he could be here today.

REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT HUMPHREY BEFORE THE CATHOLIC EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, CINCINNATI, OHIO, SEPTEMBER 28, 1967

When the Office of Education was established by Congress just a century ago, the Secretary of the Interior—who was put in charge—very clearly set forth his regard for the new agency. "There is no necessity of anyone knowing anything whatever about education," he said.

Education has come a long way since then within our government—and within our country. I sometimes think we've forgotten just how far.

At the turn of this century, only 7 percent of our teenagers were receiving secondary education of any kind. Today the figure is 93 percent.

In the last 20 years alone, the percentage of American young people going to college has doubled.

Today, one American in four is enrolled in some sort of educational program.

And in the last few years education has taken a more central place in national policy than at any other time in our history.

As a parent, as a former teacher and professor, as a friend of education in the Senate, as your Vice President, I am proud to say it: The Johnson-Humphrey Administration has put into operation 31 major education and training laws. And these are laws not just in quantity, but of quality.

I need not tell you that the most revolutionary breakthrough came, with your help, in 1965 with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

The immediate impact on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, has been enormous. In its first year it provided additional services for 8.3 million educationally disadvantaged children—no matter whether



they attended public, private, or parochial schools. Our average annual educational expenditure on those disadvantaged children has increased 119 dollars per capita—a major contribution in our educationally poor states, and an important amount in every community.

But the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is important not only because of this. It is important because of the spirit in which it was passed, and the precedent which it has set for the future.

As a Senator, I watched good bills for federal aid to education blocked year after year by intransigent attitudes on state-church relations, and by state and local interests who feared federal interference in their traditional education responsibilities.

The debate went on—and our children suffered.

Then the people and Congress came to the realization that it was our children, not long-standing doctrinal disputes, that counted. They realized that this country—if it wished to grow and flourish—had better start making the best possible use of all its educational resources—private as well as public, parochial as well as secular.

And they realized what some of us had been saying for a long time—that federal support need not and must not mean federal control. For quality education depends most of all on the creative initiative and competence of the local educators, public and private, who personally deal with the children we are trying to reach. Federal support for local initiative is the basis of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and I believe the basis of an historic first step toward the future path of education in our country.

Yes, there has been progress.

Yes, we have overcome some of the old jealousies and fears that stood in the way of a nation-wide effort in education.

But we have still done only enough to bring us to the starting line in the momentous race for truly adequate education in the last third of the 20th century.

We have passed through a summer of unprecedented lawlessness and conflict in our cities.

There is no room in America for lawlessness and violence—and it will be met by strict and uncompromising enforcement of the law. This country is not going to be taken over or held for ransom by inciters and haters who would wreck their own communities, and harm their innocent neighbors, to satisfy their own lust for personal power.

But every thinking American knows that the violence we have seen, however unjustified, is at the same time a symptom of deep social problems—of poverty and despair, of a feeling on the part of far too many citizens that society has nothing to offer them that is worth saving.

It is a symptom of ghetto unemployment rates three times the national average, of poor housing and shamefully inadequate public services.

And to a very large degree it is a symptom of grossly inadequate education in those very communities where education offers the only avenue of escape from a life, at best, on the American fringe.

The education offered in our slum schools is inadequate for a great many reasons:

Because it does not equip students with skills they need to hold a decent job;

Because it is not tailored to the needs of students from disadvantaged backgrounds; does not allay their fears and offer them a sense of personal worth and success;

Because it does not succeed in making the classroom more attractive than the street corner;

Because it is too often second or third rate in a country which can and should afford the best for its children.

I don't think we can point to a single big

city in America today and say "education is working in the inner-city there."

The Coleman Report for the Office of Education . . . the U.S. Civil Rights Commission . . . the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and many other groups concerned with urban problems have documented the story of educational failure—of drop-outs, delinquency and hopelessness in our ghetto schools.

What does this national failure mean to the individual child?

Listen to this description of dreadful human destruction by a Negro mother trying to bring up a family in the ghetto in one of our big cities. She is talking about her children.

"They is alive," she said, "and you bet they is, and then they goes off and quits. I can tell it by their walk, and how they look. They slow down and get so tired in their face, real tired.

"And they get all full of hate; and they look cross at you, as if I cheated them when I brought them into the world. I have seven, and two of them have gone that way, and to be honest, I expect every child to have it happen—like it did to me.

"I just gave up when I was about 14 or so. And what brings us back to life is having the kids, and keeping them with us for a while away from the outside and everything bad.

"But there comes a day when they ask you why it's like it is for us, and all you can do is shrug your shoulders, or sometimes you scream.

"But they know already, and they're just asking for the record. And it don't take but a few months to see that they're no longer kids, and they've lost all the hope and the life you tried to give them."

Those words are a terrible indictment of every one of us, and they vividly point to the next great challenge before our schools, both public and private.

For it is through our schools, and through our teachers, that America must help to make up for the heritage of deprivation which destroys the hopes of such ghetto children.

For education is the basic starting point for the ghetto child—whose family may have been in poverty for generations—in building a life of productive and satisfying labor rather than a life of pent-up frustration and despair.

What are we going to do to make education work for the millions of American youngsters who need it most?

First, and most important, we have to stop locking students out of our schools in the summers, on weekends and in the evenings.

In the context of our present needs, the nine-month school year and the six-hour school day make no sense.

A century ago the school year lasted 78 days. Now it averages 162 days. I have suggested before—and I urge it again today—that every American school now become a full-time, year-round community center of opportunity.

Some communities have already adopted the 12-month school year with assistance from Title One of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

The results have been dramatic—particularly when students from disadvantaged backgrounds have been led out of the structured classroom environment, placed in smaller groups, and exposed to cultural and recreational opportunities which are not part of the normal school program.

Informality, and the absence of grades and the threat of failure, have given thousands of disadvantaged students what promises to be a decisive boost toward a successful education.

I am not the only person who thinks we should be making more use of our schools.

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in a recent report on "Juvenile Delinquency and Crime" recommended that Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act be expanded to pay the cost of keeping schools open year-round, 15 hours a day, six days a week.

I regret to report, however, that in the summer of 1967, almost 100 million dollars less was spent on summer programs under Title I than in the summer of 1966.

Second, we have to be sure school leads to something—a good job or college.

For the ghetto youngster, it cannot be just one more dead end street.

We cannot promise and not produce. Census figures for the state of Ohio tell a story which applies to every state in the union.

Some 42 per cent of the jobs in Ohio are for craftsmen or technicians, but back in 1960, when most of today's young workers were in school, only 3 per cent were trained for such jobs.

Almost 15 per cent of Ohio's job openings today are for retail sales people. But only 1.3 per cent of Ohio's youngsters were trained for this kind of work in 1960.

Our curricula must be matched with the world as it is today, not as it was 10 or 20 years ago.

My third point grows out of the second. We have to prevent drop-outs. A million students are going to drop out of school this year unless we do something about it; 8 million will drop out in this decade.

And many of them will not be drop-outs at all—they will be kick-outs or force-outs—youngsters who had to leave because it was financially or psychologically impossible for them to stay. Our society can not stand to let them fail.

Fourth, we have to insist on quality in our schools—adequate basic training and up-to-date refresher courses for our teachers . . . modern laboratories and teaching aids . . . specialized facilities for children who need them. We must have, in short, people and facilities that will elicit and demand the best performance from our students. And this is as much a matter of exacting, dedicated commitment by those with responsibility in and for our schools as it is a matter of the newest techniques or hardware.

Finally, our country must be willing to pay for education in proportion to its value for our society. Last year our society spent 32 billion dollars—5 per cent of our national income—for elementary and secondary education, both public and private.

America spends half as much on just alcohol and tobacco.

Our investment in education is a scant investment when we are talking about the human resources upon which the future strength and prosperity of our nation depend.

All of us believe it, but we must awake the national consciousness to this fact: an extra dollar well spent on education will be repaid by a lifetime of dividends . . . a dollar denied is a dollar that will soon be wasted in unproductive welfare.

And so I specifically ask now your full support for the education measures still pending before the Congress. Let your Congressmen know about your support. Let your local newspapers and radio-tv stations know. Make yourselves heard, now.

I propose that we dedicate ourselves to a fresh Charter of Educational Opportunity for every American child—a promise that he can and will get the skills and the knowledge he needs to make the most of himself in our fast-changing and competitive society. We do not need to settle for less.

I think the Catholic schools of this country have an especially great opportunity to help make that Charter a reality.

You already have six million students, and

your schools have grown twice as fast as the public schools over the last 20 years.

You have a cadre of dedicated lay and clerical teachers.

You are in a unique position to experiment and innovate because you are not bound by political restraints and red tape. You can offer healthy competition for our public schools, the kind of competition and, I might add, a freedom of choice—that is the lifeblood of a pluralistic society.

Moreover, many of your schools are in the inner city where deficiencies in education are most acute. You, the leaders of your communities and governments at all levels can cooperate to keep those schools open and extend the opportunities they represent to all children—without respect to religious affiliations.

Monsignor Donohue, my good friend and your great educational leader, has made that suggestion, and I wholeheartedly endorse it.

The task before every educator and every public official in the United States today is to make that new Charter of Educational Opportunity available to each and every one of the children God placed in this land.

That is God's work. And that is a responsibility that none of us who accepts Judeo-Christian religious teaching can neglect.

#### "WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN?"— SUMMER 1967 ISSUE OF IMPRINT, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON MEDICAL SCHOOL

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the summer 1967 issue of *Imprint*, a publication of the University of Oregon Medical School contains an article entitled, "What Makes Humans Human?" written by Susan Avery Platt.

The article is concerned with the fine work being done by Dr. Archie Tunturi, associate professor of anatomy at the University of Oregon Medical School, in Portland, and it contains a very interesting exposition of the research he and his staff are conducting. I was particularly impressed to learn that research such as that undertaken by Dr. Tunturi has already made a difference in medical diagnosis and treatment in the field of hearing testing and I certainly echo the hope expressed by Susan Platt that when such research is completed and we know better how the brain works, we will be better able to use the capabilities of human beings, thus allowing those with brain and nervous disorders to live fuller lives.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have alluded be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

#### WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN?

(By Susan Avery Platt)

Screaming and kicking, a red, slightly wizened baby emerges into the world. He has all the physical properties of a human being in miniature, yet the quality of being human does not imply just physical properties—there is something more.

What that something is has been answered many different ways. We assume that it originates in the brain, the heart having been ruled out, except figuratively years ago. Yet how the brain functions in humans or animals, and how differently in the two, has been an unanswered question. The neurosurgeon operating today knows precious little more about the actual functioning of

the brain than the amateur surgeon or curious investigator of 2,000 years ago.

Some questions about how the brain functions are now being answered; part of this work is going on at the University of Oregon Medical School where Dr. Archie Tunturi, associate professor of anatomy, has worked for the last 25 years on tracing the nerve paths for sound in the brain.

So far Dr. Tunturi has worked with dogs. Because the nervous systems in dog and man are quite similar, we assume their brains are also. Shortly, consenting neurosurgery patients will give scientists a chance to confirm this theory.

The soon-to-be-begun studies of the human brain, built on the studies of the dog's brain, hold out a promise of help for children who cannot understand the meaning of speech because of aphasia (a condition akin to hearing but not comprehending a foreign language). They hold promise for epileptics, those with cerebral palsy, those blind because of damage to the cortex not the eye, and many with psychological disorders.

"If you know how a computer is put together," says Dr. Tunturi, "then you can repair it. If you don't, you are reduced to empirical methods like kicking it. That's about all we have now when dealing with disorders of the brain or nervous system."

People like 19-year-old Gloria, who is only now learning to speak (she heard sounds but could not put them together into meaningful language) may not have to wait that long once we know how the brain functions.

We will not have that knowledge tomorrow. The brain is an intricate system. It has taken 10 million years to put together; it is going to take some time to unravel.

A part of this unraveling process is going on behind an unimposing door, bearing only an inconspicuous name tag. Inside that door, and past three very ordinary looking desks, an \$800,000 computer system works daily at the preliminaries of deciphering the minds that invented it. It is an impressive roomful of whirling tapes, flashing lights, printed forms, much more impressive to the average person than the much more efficient human brains he deals with daily.

The sound of the computer fills the room like the background hum of air conditioning. It is Monday afternoon, one of two experiment afternoons each week.

In a soundproof room in a corner of the laboratory a dog is resting, 50 electrodes placed painlessly on his brain, which has no sense of feeling.

The dog does not hear the noise of the computers, only a sound like the cork from a muffled pop gun. It is the *p* pulse, a very short duration of sound, an elementary signal which contains one bit of information.

The pulse drums its way across your consciousness at maddeningly regular intervals.

The animal's ears pick up the pulse, send the impulse to the brain, which responds by changing electrical activity in some of the nerve cells (neurons).

These changes (along with the regular brain activity) are picked up by the electrodes which transmit and trace the animal's response onto oscilloscope screens.

Only three of the 50 oscilloscopes show a marked upward jag at the beginning of the trace, indicating response to the sound. The other 47 oscilloscopes register normal brain activity.

The tone of the *p* pulse is changed. Again the blue light jags from left to right on the oscilloscope screens and fades to a green trace, but this time a different trio of oscilloscopes shows a response to the sound.

The *p* pulse is changed again and again. First it sounds like water dropped on an empty tin bucket, then like a bass-voiced cricket, then like the clicking of a fingernail. Each time the sound is changed there is a corresponding change in the area of the

animal's brain which is responding. Usually there is about a two millimeter (.08 inch) difference for each octave, quite clear in some animals, crude in others, depending on the individual. Tone and area are being matched and charted.

Each time the animal's brain activity has been picked up by the electrodes, visually represented as a blue line racing across an oscilloscope face, the IBM 1410 Data Processing System has converted the responses to three-digit numbers, placing 15,000 numbers on the tape in a 1/3 second sample.

The measure is changed from 1/3 second to two seconds; the traces dance across the screens on tiptoe, an electronic ballet.

The machine goes on storing the information in numerical form, ready to be analyzed the next day.

Never before has this wealth of statistical data been available. In the last three years with the computer, Dr. Tunturi and his staff have done 2,000 years of work. A four-minute experiment with the computer would have taken 20 years without it.

But these scientists are not just collecting numbers, they are looking for the reasons behind those numbers. After they have run the control checks, they begin the real experiment. Today they are trying to induce paradoxical sleep—trying to find new circuits in the brain which do not appear under normal conditions.

Six states of consciousness have been discovered, each projecting its own pattern on the oscilloscopes. What circuits in the brain work during each of these states? Does each use a completely different thinking or responding system?

Still unanswered questions.

But some questions about the anatomy and functioning of animals' brain have been answered. Dr. Tunturi has found four separate hearing areas in the dog's brain (one in the region primarily for touch). He also found an association area which has connections from the other auditory areas but receives no direct impulses from the ears.

Most dogs, his research shows, have an arrangement for responding to different frequencies of sound. But some exhibit no apparent pattern in which certain frequencies are handled at certain points in the brain.

What of a human with the same condition?

"He might never learn to speak," says Dr. Tunturi, "assuredly his speech would be poor."

Dr. Tunturi has also found that the kinds of condition responses that dogs are trained to do (pick up balls, fetch sticks) are performed just as well or better when the primary auditory center of the brain is removed. Yet dogs can be trained to respond to a series of tones (a kind of tone language). Then they will not respond when the auditory center is removed. The auditory center, he concludes, is capable of higher functioning, but is normally not used for such.

At other research centers investigators have found eight auditory regions in cats' brains. Dr. Tunturi believes there are probably eight similar regions in all animals up the evolutionary scale from the cat—they just have not been found yet.

Also in other research, scientists have found a cell in the retina of the frog's eye which picks out moving dark spots in the environment and follows them throughout the field of vision. Designed for catching flies, the cell does not send a picture of the fly to the brain, merely the information that one is present. It is, in short, a cell that "thinks," which distinguishes one class of objects from all others.

In a similar vein, the cat's eye has receptors which respond only to certain angles, different receptors for different angles.

Are there such cells in human beings—cells which sort out and classify stimuli? We do not know. Nor is it known how many



auditory areas there are in the human brain nor exactly what it is that the ear recognizes from speech.

When Dr. Tunturi and his staff begin to study the human brain, they will look first at the primary auditory center. Does it respond like the dog's to different frequencies at different locations? He assumes that the same basic structure exists as was found in laboratory animals.

Once he has run the "control checks" on the human brain, Dr. Tunturi will begin to look for meaning detectors—whatever it is that allows people to think.

The search will be involved. There are 10 billion neurones in the human central nervous system (CNS). Each neurone is either with or without a nerve impulse at a given point in time, like a lightbulb which is either on or off. These neurones are connected with another or several neurones by junctions known as synapses. At some junctions the impulse only has one choice of direction, one bulb to light up, at others it may follow one of many diverging paths.

The state of the CNS is the pattern of those neurones with an impulse and those without—like a switchboard pattern of lights off and on.

Imagine a very simple system, one with two neurones. With this number, there are four possible patterns the system can have: both neurones off, both on, first on and second off or vice versa.

The human nervous system with its 10 billion neurones has 10-followed-by-3,200,000,000-zeroes possible states. Working 24 hours a day and writing one zero per second, it would take over 100 years just to write this number.

Since the pattern changes each time the ear picks up a sound, and the number of possible states is so great, multivariate statistics (which allow consideration of many variables at one time) will be used to allow understanding of what occurs at complicated junctions, where cells classify words into categories.

In studying the human brain, the system for employing statistical analysis will be similar to that used for laboratory animals. Patients with epilepsy or temporal lobe tumors who enter the hospital for neurosurgery will be asked to participate in the experiment.

If the patient agrees, an hour or so before his operation 50 painless electrodes will be attached to his brain. Sounds will then be fed to him and his brain response transmitted over 11 telephone wires to the computer system in the Research Building. There the data will be monitored and stored on magnetic tape.

With human patients Dr. Tunturi will have an advantage—the patient can be asked to concentrate on the sound, can be asked what he hears, so that the physical response can be correlated with the subjective response of the patient. The patient can be asked to associate the sound or word with other things, perhaps bringing into play the complicated junctions or circuits at which Dr. Tunturi hopes to find out how humans abstract—in short, what makes humans human.

It's a rather Herculean task, yet the ability to understand language (which presupposes the ability to abstract, by definition) has greatly influenced the destiny of the human race, as metallurgists are only now beginning to explore.

Only man has the ability, so far as we know, to take sounds and make of them meaning. The word itself is not the meaning—that is basic to ideas about language. The American tourist who indignantly asks why the French insist on calling bread *pain* when any fool can see it's bread just as it was at home, confuses the word with the meaning. There is no necessary connection.

But human beings have formed such con-

nections. Using the same basic sounds (phonemes) in all languages, but using them differently, all peoples have come up with systems of abstraction we call language.

A \$3 million computer will do the work of physical speech recognition that the three by three by 1/4 inch speech and hearing center of the human brain can do. It cannot, however, recognize meaning.

Any computer manufacturer, obviously, would see his stock skyrocket if he knew how to duplicate the working of the human brain. The Navy would like to know how the brain works. Then its scientists could learn how to improve its sonar and underwater communications systems to mesh with the workings of the humans who use them.

But most importantly, doctors would welcome the knowledge of how to improve their treatment of patients with disorders of the nervous system or brain.

Research such as that conducted by Dr. Tunturi has already made a difference in medical diagnosis and treatment, for example, in hearing testing. A steady tone, it has been observed, is not a test of cortical (brain) functioning. Complicated systems have been worked out which apparently do test the cortex.

But we need to know more both about the brain and language itself. At Georgia Institute of Technology they have found that the loss of a tiny section of speech can often obliterate a consonant from a test syllable or cause it to sound like a different speech element altogether. What if a person's cortex did not respond to one or several of these recognition clues in consonants? Since 90 percent of the knowledge in a language is carried by the consonants, how much meaning might that person miss while still able to hear?

When research like Dr. Tunturi's is completed and we hopefully will know how the brain works, then we can better use the capabilities of human beings, allowing those with brain and nervous disorders to live fuller lives.

The possibilities sound like science fiction. What question would you ask a robot whose brain was modeled after yours to test whether or not he were human?

We know of no such question.

But if such a robot is built, he will affect each of our lives. For the questions being asked in this research may well affect thinking in all fields—sciences and humanities. Such research may well raise moral questions as it provides scientific answers; it may change our total outlook, for its probes to the core—what makes humans human?

## ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10:30 A.M. MONDAY

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the order previously entered, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 10:30 a.m. on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 14 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, October 9, 1967, at 10:30 a.m.

## NOMINATION

Executive nomination received by the Senate October 6, 1967:

### DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

L. Dean Brown, of Maryland, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Senegal, and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of

the United States of America to the Gambia, vice William R. Rivkin, deceased.

## CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate October 6, 1967:

### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Alfred B. Pitt, of Michigan, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

### OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING

Price Daniel, of Texas, to be Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.

### NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Maj. Gen. Winston P. Wilson, FG398325, Air National Guard, to be reappointed as Chief, National Guard Bureau, for a period of four years beginning September 1, 1967, under the provisions of section 3015, title 10, of the United States Code.

### U.S. NAVY

Rear Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler, U.S. Navy, having been designated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5231, for commands and other duties determined by the President to be within the contemplation of said section, for appointment to the grade of vice admiral while so serving.

### IN THE AIR FORCE

The nominations beginning William B. Duty, to be lieutenant colonel, and ending John R. Younger, to be second lieutenant, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 28, 1967.

### IN THE NAVY

The nominations beginning Frank M. Adams, to be captain, and ending Martin "M" Zenni, to be captain, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 27, 1967.

### IN THE MARINE CORPS

The nominations beginning Roy J. Casteel, to be second lieutenant, and ending George W. Dilley, to be first lieutenant, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 18, 1967; and

The nominations beginning William C. Airheart, to be colonel, and ending Sidney S. Wade, Jr., to be first lieutenant, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 18, 1967.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1967

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

*The Lord is my strength and my song, and He has become my salvation; this is my God, and I will praise Him, my Father's God and I will exalt Him.—Exodus 15: 2.*

Almighty and eternal God, before whom a thousand years pass as a watch in the night, rekindle within us Thy spirit and replenish us with Thy grace as we face the tasks of another week. Be Thou a pillar of fire to us by night and a pillar of cloud by day. Lead us into green pastures, beside still waters, along right paths, that our spirits may be restored, that we may find comfort in hours of need, and that goodness and mercy may follow us all the days of our lives.

In these trying times help us to rise